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The Web of Legal Protections
for Participants in Genomic
Research
Leslie E. Wolf, Erin Fuse Brown, Ryan Kerr,
Genevieve Razick, Gregory Tanner, Brett Duvall,
Sakinah Jones, Jack Brackney & Tatiana Posada †
Abstract
The identification and arrest of the Golden State Killer using DNA
uploaded to an ancestry database occurred shortly before recruitment
for the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) All of Us Study
commenced, with a goal of enrolling and collecting DNA, health, and
lifestyle information from one million Americans. It also highlighted the
need to ensure prospective research participants that their
confidentiality will be protected and their materials used appropriately.
But there are questions about how well current law protects against
these privacy risks. This article is the first to consider comprehensively
and simultaneously all the federal and state laws offering protections to
participants in genomic research. The literature typically focuses on the
federal laws in isolation, questioning the strengths of federal legal
protections for genomic research participants provided in the Common
Rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, or the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act. Nevertheless, we found significant numbers and
surprising variety among state laws that provide greater protections
than federal laws, often filling in federal gaps by broadening the
applicability of privacy or nondiscrimination standards or by providing
important remedies for individuals harmed by breaches. Identifying and
explaining the protections these laws provide is significant both to allow
prospective participants to accurately weigh the risks of enrolling in
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these studies and as models for how federal legal protections could be
expanded to fill known gaps.
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Introduction
GEDmatch, a DNA database and genealogical resource for
“amateur and professional researchers and genealogists,”1 played a
critical role in law enforcement’s arrest of the notorious “Golden State
Killer,” who had eluded police for decades.2 Using DNA collected from
crime scenes, police were able to identify relatives of the suspect that
ultimately led to the suspect’s identification and arrest.3 In the months
following the Golden State Killer arrest, law enforcement has begun to
use this technique to identify suspects for other unsolved crimes.4
Despite the clear benefits to law enforcement and to families who
have long sought answers to crimes committed years ago, law
enforcement’s use of these genealogy databases has raised concerns.5
After all, the people who uploaded their DNA did not do so for this
purpose. The publicity over this use of consumers’ DNA led direct-toconsumer genetic testing companies, including well-known companies
like Ancestry and 23andMe, to clarify their privacy policies.6
1.

Tools
for
DNA
and
Genealogy
Research,
GEDMATCH,
www.gedmatch.com/login1.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).

2.

Thomas Fuller, How a Genealogy Site Led to the Front Door of the Golden
State
Killer
Suspect,
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
26,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/golden-state-killer.html.

3.

Id.

4.

See Heather Murphy, Genealogists Turn to Cousins’ DNA and Family
Trees to Crack Five More Cold Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/science/dna-family-trees-coldcases.html; Kyle Swenson, Undercover Cops Grabbed a DJ’s Chewing
Gum. It Helped Crack a Teacher’s 1992 Murder, Police Say, WASH.
POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2018/06/26/undercover-cops-grabbed-a-djschewing-gum-it-helped-crack-a-teachers-1992-murder-policesay/?utm_term=.6796d2ff6caa; Kyle Swenson, After 30 Years, Police
Say They’ve Captured A Child-Killer Who Left A Sickening Trail of
WASH.
POST
(July
16,
2018),
Taunts,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018
/07/16/i-been-watching-you-a-child-killer-taunted-little-girls-withterrifying-notes-police-say-after-30-years-dna-led-to-an- arrest/.

5.

Natalie Ram et al., Genealogy Databases and the Future of Criminal
Investigation, 360 SCIENCE 1078 (2018); see also Fuller, supra note 2;
Adhiti Bandlamudi, Tactics Used to Find Golden State Killer Raise
Privacy and Legal Questions, NPR (Apr. 27, 2018, 4:22 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/27/606580162/tactics-used-to-find-goldenstate-killer-raise-privacy-and-legal-questions; Ashley May, Took an
Ancestry DNA Test? You Might be a ‘Genetic Informant’ Unleashing
Secrets About Your Relatives, USA TODAY, (Apr. 27, 2018, 11:31 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2018/04/27/
ancestry-genealogy-dna-test-privacy-golden-state-killer/557263002/.

6.

Tony Romm & Drew Harwell, Ancestry, 23andMe and Others Say
They Will Follow These Rules When Giving DNA Data to Businesses
or
Police,
WASH.
POST
(July
31,
2018),
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Although the Golden State Killer case did not involve a research
database, its implications for research are significant. Indeed, as
recruitment for the NIH’s All of Us study commenced, with its goal of
enrolling and collecting DNA and other health information from one
million Americans, NIH director Francis Collins and project director,
Eric Dishman, sought to reassure potential participants that their data
would be safe.7 Collins emphasized the NIH’s efforts to protect
participants’ confidentiality, including obtaining a Certificate of
Confidentiality that protects against subpoenas or other legal demands
for research data, as an important mechanism for “getting people
comfortable” with sharing their information.8 While the All of Us Study
and the Million Veterans Program9 are among the most ambitious
research studies in terms of scale and scope, researchers already hold
DNA and health data from a large number of Americans. 10
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/31/ancestryandme-others-say-they-will-follow-these-rules-when-giving-dna-databusinesses-or-police/?utm_term=.5c123617f2e5. The new guidelines
would include getting “separate express consent” before sharing individual
genetic information with other entities and disclosing the number of law
enforcement requests received each year. The guidelines are available at
Carson Martinez, Privacy Best Practices for Consumers Genetic Testing
OF
PRIVACY
FORUM
(Jul.
31,
2018),
Services,
FUTURE
https://fpf.org/2018/07/31/privacy-best-practices-for-consumer-genetictesting-services. GEDmatch is not one of the listed companies associated
with these practices. At the time of the Golden State Killer case, they
noted that their privacy policy informed consumers that their data could
be used for other purposes. Fuller, supra note 2; News of 23andMe’s
agreement to share its DNA information with GlaxoSmithKline to develop
drugs raised additional concerns. Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug
Company Now Has Access to 23andMe Genetic Data. Should You Be
Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018), http://time.com/5349896/23andmeglaxo-smith-kline/.
7.

Lenny Bernstein, NIH Seeks Health Data of 1 Million People, With
Genetic Privacy Suddenly an Issue, WASH. POST (May 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/nih-seekshealth-data-of-1-million-people-with-genetic-privacy-suddenly-anissue/2018/05/01/cb38a588-4d4b-11e8-b725
92c89fe3ca4c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e533459c6db9.

8.

Id.

9.

The goal of the Million Veterans Program is “to study how genes affect
health” and “build[ing] one of the world’s largest medical databases”
by enrolling one million Veterans and collecting blood samples. Million
Veteran Program (MVP), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
https://www.research.va.gov/mvp/ (last visited. Feb. 4, 2019).

10.

National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) estimated that, in
1998, there were over 280 million biospecimens collected from over 176
million individuals held in a variety of clinical and research repositories
in the United States and biospecimens from 20 million individuals were
added each year. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY
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Privacy concerns are not limited to DNA databases. In January
2018, Strava, a GPS tracking company, published an interactive map
based on data accumulated through fitness trackers and mobile phones,
which then revealed classified military and intelligence facilities of the
United States and other western countries.11 In March 2018, the New
York Times reported that Cambridge Analytica12 had used data
involving millions of Facebook users for election analysis.13 These
examples illustrate the massive amount of information that may be
collected, analyzed, and used, not always in ways individuals intend.14
For research projects like the All of Us study that seek to harness
a broad range of data, including DNA, health information, and data
from wearable devices or mobile apps, adequately addressing these
privacy concerns is critical to earn public trust in the research
enterprise. But there are questions about how well current law protects
against these privacy risks. The literature is replete with discussion of
GUIDANCE, 13-14 (Vol. 1 1999); NBAC noted that many of these
specimens may not be used for research purposes, but these estimates
provide a picture of how many specimens are collected that could be used
in research and how many Americans are implicated. Id. at 24. In
contrast, 23andMe and Ancestry have collected more than 9 million DNA
samples. About Us, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/aboutus/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2018) and AncestryDNA Reaches 4 Million
Customers in DNA Database, ANCESTRY BLOG (Apr. 27, 2017)
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2017/04/27/ancestrydna-reaches-4million-customers-in-dna-database/.
11.

Liz Sly, U.S. Soldiers are Revealing Sensitive and Dangerous
Information
by
Jogging, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-map-showing-the-usersof-fitness-devices-lets-the-world-see-where-us-soldiers-are-and-whatthey-are-doing/2018/01/28/86915662-0441-11e8-aa61f3391373867e_story.html?utm_term=.1d3e66ff9c38.

12.

Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the
Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analyticatrump-campaign.html (explaining that Cambridge Analytica analyses
data and uses behavioral science to offer businesses and political
candidates marketing materials targeted as specific consumers).

13.

Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the
Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridgeanalytica- trump-campaign.html (explaining that the data was
originally provided to a researcher).

14.

Id.; According to reports, the wearable manufacturer FitBit adopted
privacy practices akin to those adopted in clinical research, although
not required to, to ease some of these concerns. Alex Ruoff, Fitbit
Lauds Research Protections Amid Expansion, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS,
May 19, 2016; See also Julie Appleby, Privacy Advocates Urge Stronger
Protection of Employee Health Data, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 30,
2015), https://khn.org/news/privacy-advocates-urge-stronger-protectionof-employee-health-data/.
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the limits of the federal laws, including the Common Rule, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its Privacy
Rule, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), that
may protect participants of such large-scale, national genomic research
studies.15 While state laws that provide greater protections may fill in
these gaps, until now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of what
those laws provide and how they might work together to protect
research participants. We undertook an empirical study how the federal
and state laws work together to create a “web of legal protections” and
to understand the limits of the web in protecting participant interests
in genome research. 16 This paper reports key findings from that study.
Like most empirical studies, this article proceeds in four parts. Part
I sets forth a framework to describe the potential risks and
corresponding legal protections for participants in genomic research,
organized conceptually into three stages: research entry, the release of
information from research, and unwanted use of research information
after release. Part I also summarizes what is known and also what is
poorly understood about the nature and substance, as well as existing
gaps, within the web of legal protections for participants in genomic
research. Part II describes our research methods used in identifying
federal and state statutes and regulations that form the web of
protections for participants in genomic research. Part III organizes the
results of the research, describing the web of protections in four
conceptual categories: (a) human subjects research laws, (b) laws
specific to genetic information, (c) medical privacy laws, and (d)
disability discrimination laws. Of these, the second category of laws
15.

See, e.g., Robert Green et al., GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and
Genomic Medicine, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 397, 397 (2015); Heather Harrell
& Mark Rothstein, Biobanking Research and Privacy Laws in the United
States, 11 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 106, 111-12 (2016); Sharona Hoffman,
Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big
Data, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1741, 1746 (2015); Valerie Gutmann
Koch & Kelly Todd, Research Revolution or Status Quo?: The New
Common Rule and Research Arising from Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 81 (2018); Amy L. McGuire & Mary Anderlik
Majumder, Two Cheers for GINA?, 1 GENOME MED. 6 (2009);
Elizabeth R. Pike, Securing Sequences: Ensuring Adequate Protections
for Genetic Samples in the Era of Big Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977,
2026 (2016); Mark A. Rothstein, The End of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule?, 44 J.L. MED & ETHICS 352, 352 (2016); Shuang Wang et al.,
Genome Privacy: Challenges, Technical Approaches to Mitigate Risk,
and Ethical Considerations in the United States, 1387 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 73, 82 (2017); Ellen Wright Clayton, Why the Americans
with Disabilities Act Matters for Genetics, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2225,
2226 (2015).

16.

This project was part of a larger project, Beyond Data Security:
Promoting Confidentiality and Advancing Science (Laura M. Beskow,
Principal Investigator, R01-HG-007733), funded by the National Human
Research Institute.
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specific to genetic information are of particular relevance to participants
of genomic research. Part IV synthesizes our research findings and sets
forth our discussion of the significance of these findings for participants,
researchers, institutional review boards, and policymakers.

I. Background: A Framework for Mapping the Web of
Protections
Large-scale genomic research offers unprecedented opportunities to
learn more about human health and disease. The technological advances
enabling genomic research, however, have also created conditions where
genomic data can never be truly anonymized. Despite adherence to data
security measures designed to protect participant anonymity,
investigators have demonstrated that it is possible to discover the
identities of participants based on genomic data that had been
considered “de-identified.”17 This unsettling development poses privacy
risks to research participants that, if unaddressed, could undermine
individuals’ willingness to participate in research.
Good research practice has required that participants’ personal
information be kept confidential through technological security
measures, such as firewalls or encryption and by limiting use of
identifiers, either through coding or, when scientifically feasible,
rendering the data anonymous by removing identifiers entirely.18
Indeed, much genetic research has proceeded without consent under
regulatory guidance and exceptions that assume that research would
present very little risk to participants if the researchers do not have
access to or record overt identifiers, such as names, medical record, and
social security numbers.19
The assumptions underlying these regulatory exceptions have been
challenged by a number of provocative studies that have demonstrated
that deidentified genomic data may be re-identified without breaching

17.

Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339
SCIENCE 321, 324 (2013).

18.

Jane Kaye, The Tension Between Data Sharing and the Protection of
Privacy in Genomics Research, 13 ANNUAL REV. GENOMICS HUM.
GENETICS 1, 10 (2012); These practices are consistent with the federal
regulations governing human subjects protections, which requires IRBs to
ensure “[w]hen appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the
privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.111(a)(7) (2018).

19.

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Services, Guidance on Coded Private
Information or Biological Specimens Use in Research (2008), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html [hereinafter Guidance on
Coded]; NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE,
28 (Vol. 1 1999).
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data security measures.20 In response to the earlier of these studies, the
NIH made a number of preemptive modifications to its policy for
posting and accessing data contained in its genome-wide association
study (GWAS) databases, including removing aggregate genotype data
from public access, making them available only through a data access
committee process.21 A 2013 study, however, described the ability to
deduce individual identities even in the absence of a reference DNA
sample, using only free, publicly accessible Internet resources, such as
genetic genealogy databases.22 Although the inherent identifiability of
genomic data has long been discussed,23 this development adds urgency
to the challenge of protecting genomic research participants’ privacy
while also ensuring that the data they contribute can be used for the
greatest societal good.24
20.

See Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts
of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping
Microarrays, 4 PLOS GENETICS 8, 1 (2008); Eric E. Schadt et al.,
Bayesian Method to Predict Individual SNP Genotypes from Gene
Expression Data, 44 NATURE GENETICS 603, 606-607 (2012); Hae
Kyung Im et al., On Sharing Quantitative Trait GWAS Results in an Era
of Multiple-omics Data and the Limits of Genomic Privacy, 90 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 591, 591 (2012); Jean E. McEwen et al., Evolving
Approaches to the Ethical Management of Genomic Data, 29 TRENDS
GENETICS 375, 376 (2013); Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic
Privacy to Open Consent, 9 GENETICS 406, 406 (2008); Bradley Malin et
al., Technical and Policy Approaches to Balancing Patient Privacy and
Data Sharing in Clinical Translation Research, 58 J. INVESTIGATING MED.
1, 1 (2010); Carol J. Weil et al., NCI Think Tank Concerning the
Identifiability of Biospecimens and “Omic” Data, 15 GENETICS MED.
997, 1002 (2013); Gina Kolata, Poking Holes in Genetic Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/science/
poking-holes-in-the-privacy-of-dna.html; Amy Gutmann & James W.
Wagner, Found Your DNA on the Web: Reconciling Privacy and
Progress, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. (2013); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises
of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010).

21.

NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, MODIFICATIONS TO GWAS DATA ACCESS
(2008),
available
at
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/
Data_Sharing_Policy_Modifications.pdf.

22.

Gymrek, supra note 17.

23.

Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312
SCIENCE 370, 370 (2006); William W. Lowrance & Francis S. Collins,
Identifiability in Genomic Research, 317 SCIENCE MAG. 600, 600 (2007);
Harald Schmidt & Shawneequa Callier, How Anonymous is
‘Anonymous’? Some Suggestions Towards a Coherent Universal
Coding System for Genetic Samples, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 304 (2012);
Heather Patterson, Contextual Expectations of Privacy in Self-Generated
Health Information Flows, 41 TRPC: THE 41ST RES. CONF. ON COMM.,
INFO., & INTERNET POL’Y (2013).

24.

Laura L. Rodriguez et al., The Complexities of Genomic Identifiability,
339 SCIENCE 275 (2013); Gutmann, supra note 20.
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Although several federal laws provide protections to participants in
genomic research, these laws also have known gaps. The federal laws
include the Common Rule that regulates human subject research
conducted or funded by the federal government,25 the HIPAA Privacy
and Security Rules that established minimum standards for protecting
identifiable health information,26 and GINA that prevents large
employers and health insurers from discriminating based on genetic
information. 27 Each of these laws establishes a minimum national
standard but they are limited in their scope of protections. Although
state laws that fall below these standards are preempted, state laws
that exceed these standards must be followed.28 Figure 1 graphically
represents some of the primary federal protections and the known gaps
in those protections. These will be presented in more detail throughout
the paper.

Figure 1

Together, these federal and state laws that fill in these known gaps
work together to provide what we refer to as the “web of legal
protections” for research participants.
25.

45 C.F.R. § 46 (2018); Dep’t Health & Hum. Services, Revised Common
Rule
Regulatory
Text
(Mar.
17,
2017),
available
at
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/revisedcommon-rule-regulatory-text/index.html.

26.

45 C.F.R. § 160 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2018).

27.

29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (2018) (prohibiting discrimination in employer-based
insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(b)(1)(B) (2011) (regarding group health
insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2018) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of genetic information).

28.

Elizabeth McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the
Presumption of Preemption, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 95, 99, 103 (2016)
(discussing the traditions of preemption analysis in various federal health
law statutes).
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Nevertheless, the strengths and weaknesses of the cumulative web
of protections created by federal and state law are poorly understood
by participants and even researchers engaged in genomic research.29 At
the same time, large-scale genomic research endeavors like the All of
Us study (previously called The Precision Medicine Initiative) and the
Million Veteran Program are each seeking to enroll a million individuals
and gather genomic, health, and lifestyle data on an unprecedented
scale.30 Thus, we undertook this research to develop a fuller
understanding of the web of legal protections applicable to this type of
large-scale genomic research with the goals of better informing
prospective participants about the extent and limitations of these
protections and to provide insight into updates to the legal protections
that may be needed to adapt to a rapidly evolving research
environment.
The range of risks to participants in genomic research and their
corresponding legal protections can be organized in a framework that
follows the participant’s information through time, starting from the
initial research consent to the possible uses of the data were they to be
disclosed outside the research enterprise. The first stage in the
framework involves protections at study entry found in laws governing
human subjects research. The second stage relies on protections against
information release out of the research context found in genetic and
health information privacy laws. If the information nonetheless escapes
the research context, the third stage addresses protections against use
of the information by third parties, including laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of genetic or other health information.
At the first stage, the primary research risks are that the
participant’s data will be used for research purposes that the
participant finds objectionable, such as to develop a commercialized
product or in research that could be used in ways that could harm their
identity or social group.31 The primary legal protections against this
29.

Alicia A. Parkman et al., Public Awareness of Genetic Nondiscrimination
Laws in Four States and Perceived Importance of Life Insurance
Protections, 24 J. GENETIC COUNSEL 512, 512-13 (2015) (lack of awareness
of GINA among public); Leslie E. Wolf et al., Certificates of
Confidentiality: Legal Counsels’ Experiences with and Perspectives on
Legal Demands for Research Data, 7 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES.
ETHICS 1, 9 (2012) (legal counsel) [hereinafter Certificates of
Confidentiality]; Laura M. Beskow et al., Institutional Review Boards’
Use of Understanding Certificates of Confidentiality, PLOS ONE
(Sept. 4, 2012), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0044050.

30.

Nat’l
Inst.
of
Health,
All
of
Us
Research
Program,
https://allofus.nih.gov/about (last visited Dec. 30, 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERAN’S AFFAIRS., supra note 9.

31.

Unlike clinical trials where the research risk involves physical injury or
harm, in genomic research the primary harm to participants is
informational: that their data will be used in research for which that they
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risk of harm are found in laws governing human subjects research. In
particular are the Common Rule’s requirement for IRB review to
minimize risks to participants (including assessment of confidentiality
protections), as well as the requirement of informed consent, which
protects participants by allowing them to decline to participate in the
research if the risks of participation or the research purposes are
objectionable.32 When research data is collected prospectively through
interaction with the individual, as in the All of Us study, participants
must consent to research participation.33 However, their research data
may be used for secondary research studies to which the participant
does not specifically consent, through broad consent for future
research34 or through exceptions to the regulatory requirements, as
described further below.35 Similarly, data collected for clinical or other
non-research purposes may be used without consent for research
purposes under the same regulatory exceptions.36
At the second stage, the primary risk is that the participant’s data
will be released from the research context, either through a permitted
would not consent. This is because the actual physical intervention in
genomic research, such as the drawing of blood, poses a relatively low risk
in terms of physical injury. When specimens are collected prospectively,
individuals have the opportunity to decide whether they are willing to
have their genomic information collected and used. But, as described infra
in detail in Part II below, research can be conducted on specimens
collected for other purposes without the individuals’ knowledge or
consent.
32.

Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’),
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Federal Policy].

33.

Leslie E. Wolf, Advancing Research of Stored Biological Material:
Reconciling Law, Ethics, and Practice, 11 MINN. J.L., SCI., & TECH. 99,
130 (2010) [hereinafter Advancing Research].

34.

Secondary research use refers to research involving data or specimens
that are beyond the original purposes. Such research may be done with
consent – either specific or broad – or without consent under
regulatory provisions that permit such uses. In specific consent, the
participant consents only to the specific purposes, risks, and benefits
of a particular research use of specimens or information. By contrast,
broad consent involves a more open-ended consent to unspecified or
generally described future research uses of the participant’s specimens
or information. Broad consent is generally viewed as necessary for
large- scale genomic research, where it would be impracticable to seek
specific consent from each participant for every subsequent research
use of the information. Pike, supra note 15, at 2026-2027.

35.

See infra, Part III.A.1.

36.

How Can Covered Entities Use and Disclose Protected Health Information
for Research and Comply with the Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERV., https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_08.asp (last
visited Feb. 7, 2019) [hereinafter How Can Covered Entities].
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or unauthorized disclosure. Such disclosure could result in a tangible
harm, such as discrimination based on the information released, but
unauthorized disclosure itself can be a dignitary harm stemming from
the breach of the promise of confidentiality and the unwanted disclosure
of information to others.37 The primary legal protection against the
privacy harms of disclosure are privacy laws, in particular the federal
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules and, with respect to compelled
disclosures from research, Certificates of Confidentiality. The HIPAA
Privacy Rule offers scant protection to participants in genomic
research. First, the HIPAA Privacy Rule may not apply to researchers
or biobanks if they are not HIPAA “covered entities” or “business
associates.”38 Furthermore, the Privacy Rule does not apply if the
information has been de-identified under the terms of HIPAA, even if
they are re-identifiable as demonstrated above.39 Even if the Privacy
and Security Rules were to apply to the researcher or biobank and the
participant’s information, there are several exceptions where the data
could be disclosed outside the research context without the individual’s
authorization.40 Of particular concern are compelled disclosures, where
researchers may be subject to a legal demand by a court, administrative
tribunal, or law enforcement to disclose an individual’s information
pursuant to a court order, subpoena, warrant, or summons.41
Individuals’ information may be disclosed, without their knowledge, to
law enforcement if they or a family member are identified as a potential
criminal suspect.42 Certificates of Confidentiality, which apply to all
NIH-funded research, are legal tools authorized by Congress that
provide protection against compelled disclosure of sensitive, identifiable
research data “in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal,
administrative, legislative, or other proceeding.”43 Certificates of
37.

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS AND
FACILITATING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES RESEARCH 25-30
(Constance F. Citro et al., eds., 2003) (describing different types of
research risks and harms and describing confidentiality protection as
a “means of showing respect for a person”).

38.

45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102-103 (2018).

39.

U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, GUIDANCE REGARDING
METHODS FOR DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE (2015).

40.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2018) (setting forth disclosures where an individual’s
authorization is not required, including those required by law, for public
health activities, about victims of abuse or domestic violence, health
oversight activities, for law enforcement purposes, for research purposes,
and others); see also Harrell et al., supra note 15, at 353-354.

41.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2018).

42.

See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.

43.

42 U.S.C. § 241d (2016).
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Confidentiality were developed precisely to protect against compelled
disclosure.44 Even with the uncertainty about the strength of its
protection, legal counsel have been successful in using its authority to
minimize production of research data and crafting protective orders
when data are disclosed.45
The protections afforded by HIPAA and Certificates are directed
at specific holders of information, covered entities and their business
associates and research institutions, respectively.46 However,
Certificates permit disclosures mandated by law.47 And the federal
Privacy Rule permits disclosure without individual authorization for
purposes of government investigation, national security, mandatory
reporting obligations, or public health.48 Genetic or genomic data may
also be returned to the individual,49 placed in the individual’s health
record,50 breached or hacked, which also have implications as to whether
and which privacy protections apply. Thus, our research identifies ways
in which state laws may fill gaps in privacy protection available to
genomic research participants under the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule
and Certificates of Confidentiality.
At the third stage, the participant’s genomic and other data has
been released outside the research context and there are risks that the
information will be used against that individual to limit economic

44.

Leslie E. Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting Human
Subject Research Data in Law and Practice, 43 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 594,
595 (2016).

45.

Id. at 7.

46.

Certificates of Confidentiality, supra note 29.

47.

Leslie E. Wolf & Laura M. Beskow, New and Improved? 21st Century
Cures Act Revisions to Certificates of Confidentiality, 44 AM. J.L. &
MED. 343, 350-52 (2018) (discussing the exceptions to the Certificates
disclosure prohibition following the amendments to Certificates under
the 21st Century Cures Act) [New and Improved]; see also Leslie E.
Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting Human Subject
Research Data in Law and Practice, 43 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 594, 597600 (2015) (discussing cases involving Certificates and their
implications).

48.

45 C.F.R. §164.512 (2018).

49.

Amy L. McGuire et al., Returning Genetic Research Results: Study
Type Matters, 10 PERSONALIZED MED. 27, 27-28 (2013); Bartha Maria
Knoppers et al., Return of Genetic Testing Results in the Era of Whole
Genome Sequencing, 16 NATURE REV. GENETICS 553, 555 (2015).

50.

Jalayne J. Arias & Jason Karlawish, Confidentiality in Preclinical
Alzheimer Disease Studies, 82 NEUROLOGY 725, 726 (2014); Anya E.R.
Prince et al., Automatic Placement of Genomic Research Results in
Medical Records: Do Researchers Have a Duty? Should Participants
Have a Choice?, 43 J.L, MED., & ETHICS 827, 833 (2015).
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opportunities, such as employment or access to insurance.51 Other risks
are that the information can be used for identity theft (including
medical identity theft), that the individual will be targeted for
unwanted marketing, or suffer embarrassment from having the
information made public.52 The primary legal protections against these
third-stage risks are laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
genetic, genomic, or other health information, including the federal
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and state laws that
fill GINA’s gaps.53 These laws prohibit third parties, such as employers
or health insurers, from using genetic or other health information in
discriminatory ways.54 Nevertheless, GINA’s protections are limited—
GINA only applies to employers with 15 or more employees, and it only
applies to health insurers and not to life, disability, or long-term care
insurers.55 When they understand GINA’s limits and the possibility of
genetic discrimination, prospective participants may actually avoid
participating in research based on fears of discrimination in insurance
or other opportunities.56 Studies demonstrate that individuals avoid
even clinically beneficial genetic tests over fear of misuse.57 Though
largely anecdotal, stories of misuse and unauthorized disclosure have
understandably raised concerns that such fears will thwart the potential
benefits of genomic research.58
Given the known limits of federal legal protections, state laws can
play a significant role in filling gaps in legal protections for research
participants. But the extent, applicability, and variety of state laws
that provide additional protections for genomic information are poorly
understood. As stated by the Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues:
51.

Laura M. Beskow et al., Thought-Leader Perspectives on Risks in
Precision Medicine Research, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS
161 (I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., 2018) [hereinafter Thought-Leader].

52.

Id.

53.

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), HUNTINGTON’S
DISEASE SOC’Y OF AM., https://hdsa.org/living-with-hd/gina/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2019).

54.

See also ERIC A. FELDMAN & CHELSEA DARNELL, HEALTH INSURANCE,
EMPLOYMENT, AND THE HUMAN GENOME: GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND
BIOBANKS IN THE UNITED STATES, IN COMPARATIVE ISSUES IN THE
GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH BIOBANKS: PROPERTY, PRIVACY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 66 (2013), also
available
at https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/
1550/.

55.

Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 2, 201(2)(B), 122 Stat. 881 (2008); see also Green
et al., supra note 15, at 397.

56.

Green et al., supra note 15, at 398.

57.

Clayton, supra note 15.

58.

Id.
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Current U.S. governance and oversight of genetic and genomic
data . . . do not fully protect individuals from the risks associated
with sharing their whole genome sequence data and information.
In particular, a great degree of variation exists in what
protections states afford to their citizens regarding the collection
and use of genetic data.59

To address the uncertainty surrounding the patchwork of federal
and state laws for acquiring, disclosing, and using genomic information,
this project systematically catalogues and analyzes the ways in which
state laws may fill known gaps in the federal protections for participants
in genomic research. Though often overlooked, these state laws are
significant for two reasons. First, they may provide substantive rights
and stronger legal protections for participants who are subject to them,
which may in turn affect descriptions of these protections and risks in
the informed consent process. Second, they may offer models for how
federal legal protections could be strengthened. The web of protections
for participants in genomic research is what results when we analyze
how state laws fill (or do not fill) the known gaps in federal legal
baseline. The web of protections, taken together, offers genomic
research participants uneven protections and highlights both the
shortcomings of the federal laws, as well as a surprisingly robust degree
of state action.

II. Methods
To identify laws that make up the “web of legal protections,” we
conceptualized several different types of protections afforded by federal
and state laws to participants in genomic research. These categories of
laws correspond to the sequential framework described above. First, we
considered the decision to choose to participate in genomic research and
consent to genetic testing by researchers as a protection against the
risks of research participation, namely objectionable research uses of
the participant’s data. Second, we viewed genetic and health
information privacy laws that limit disclosure of information –
particularly when coupled with penalties for violation of those
obligations – as the next layer of protection after information is
obtained in research. The third and final layer of protections were laws
that restrict access and use of participants’ information once it is
released from the research context, and, thus, guard against third-party
uses of the information against the participant’s interests.
Based on this 3-stage conceptualization, we identified several sets
of laws that may provide protections to participants in genomic
research. For stage one, we identified laws governing human subjects
research and informed consent for genetic testing as the primary
59.

PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,
AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING at 3 (2012).
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protections against objectionable research use of the participant’s
information. For stage two, we focused on genetic and health
information privacy laws as the main protections against the disclosure
of data out of the research context. For stage three, we examined
genetic discrimination laws and laws against unauthorized use of
genetic information as the main protections against use of the data
against the individual’s interests by third parties. In each of these sets,
there were well-recognized, relevant federal laws.60 These include the
federal regulations governing human subjects protections (the Common
Rule),61 the HIPAA Privacy Rule,62 Certificates of Confidentiality,63
GINA,64 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),65 the Affordable
Care Act (ACA).66 As noted in Part I, these federal laws establish a
minimum standard, and all of them have known gaps. These laws also
provide limited recourse for individuals who are harmed as a result of
a breach. For example, an individual who suffers as a result of a breach
in violation of HIPAA may bring a complaint to the United States
Department of Justice’s Office of Civil Rights, but may not bring an
individual claim against the entity who violated their HIPAA
obligations.67 Finally, while these federal laws preempt state laws that
offer less protection than the federal law does, state provisions that
exceed the federal standards must be followed.68 Accordingly, we
60.

The Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-240, 128 Stat. 2851 (2014).

61.

Federal Policy, supra note 32; 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2019) (providing provisions
substantially the same as those in the Common Rule); 21 C.F.R. § 56
(2019) (providing provisions substantially the same as those in the
Common Rule).

62.

45 C.F.R. § 160 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 162 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2018).

63.

42 U.S.C. § 241d (2016).

64.

Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).

65.

Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990).

66.

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

67.

45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2018); KENNETH L. SHIGLEY & JOHN D. HADDEN,
FEDERAL HIPAA MEDICAL PRIVACY REGULATIONS, GA. LAW OF TORTS
PREPARATION FOR TRIAL § 8:2 (2017 ed.).

68.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f) (2019) (setting forth the Common Rule’s
application, which does not affect any state or local laws that provide
additional protections); Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 209(a)(1), 122 Stat. 881
(2008) (setting forth the construction of GINA, which should not be
construed to limit rights or protections provided under another federal or
state statute providing equal or greater protections); 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.203(b) (2018) (setting forth HIPAA’s preemption only of conflicting
or less-stringent state laws); 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2018) (setting forth
the Affordable Care Act’s preemption of conflicting state laws); see
generally McCuskey, supra note 28 (discussing the traditions of
preemption analysis in various federal health law statutes).

16

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research

conducted searches to identify state laws that had provisions that added
to the federal protections in some way.
We crafted formal search strategies to identify state laws for
inclusion in our datasets.69 These strategies were developed in
consultation with our legal librarians to yield comprehensive, relevant
search results, using the Boolean and full-text search capabilities
available in legal databases, Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis. We searched
only for enacted statutes and promulgated regulations in effect between
January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2017. We did not include bills or
proposed regulations that were pending at the time of our searches and
had not taken effect. Because Westlaw proved to have richer resources
for statutory and regulatory research than Lexis-Nexis, our searches
were conducted either exclusively in Westlaw or in both Westlaw and
Lexis-Nexis; no searches were conducted solely in Lexis-Nexis. In
addition to these searches, we used the book browse feature to ensure
we had all relevant parts of statute or regulation, as not all sections
would contain our search terms. We also compared our results to lists
of relevant laws that had been gathered by others to ensure
completeness of our datasets.70
We focused our analysis on laws that apply to how and when
genetic testing may be conducted, protect the confidentiality of genetic
information, and protect against uses of that information.71 Because our
research focused on legal protections for participants in genomic
research, we searched for laws that would apply to genetic information,
tests, and biospecimens, and other health information used and held by
researchers and biobanks. We also looked for laws protecting against
unwanted use of genetic and other health information by employers,
insurers, or “any person” if such information were to be disclosed,
breached, hacked, or returned to the participant or their health care
provider. There are numerous other laws—such as laws relating to use
of genetic information in health care and operations (including licensure
requirements of genetic counselors), in paternity or adoption scenarios,
intestate succession, or regarding criminal law enforcement DNA

69.

See infra Appendix (listing specific searches for each data set).

70.

For example, we looked at Table of State Statutes Related to
Genomics,
NAT’L
HUM.
GENOME
RES.
INST.,
www.genome.gov/27552194 (last updated July 11, 2018), and
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY
AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING at 121-124 (2012).

71.

We searched for laws in each of these categories independently and
analyzed them separately. However, as there is substantial, but not
perfect, overlap, we present this analysis together.
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databases—that we did not analyze as they are beyond the scope of our
research question.72
Research team members worked in pairs to conduct searches and
select relevant laws across all 50 states and the District of Columbia for
inclusion in the datasets. Initially, each pair conducted searches for
their assigned dataset independently and determined whether to include
or exclude the law according to defined set of inclusion/exclusion
criteria.73 The pair then compared their selections and any
disagreements were resolved by discussion. If there were any lingering
disagreements, a faculty member would make a final determination.
Given the volume of laws we were encountering, we elected to limit the
double searching to five states for comparison, with a check for
consistency. Each member of the pair continued to review
independently the list of search results to identify those laws for
inclusion in the dataset and to compare them for agreement. We merged
selections and sorted the data in Excel to allow for comparisons of all
selections, rather than on a subset of the search results.
Once the searches for and section of relevant laws were complete,
we proceeded to coding. We created a coding scheme that would
capture both common provisions across the datasets (e.g., right and
penalties), and provisions specific to particular datasets. The coding
scheme was developed through a collaborative process within the team,
during which we defined the different codes. Two independent coders
coded each law in the qualitative software program NVivo.74 The
research team met regularly to reconcile coding of individual laws and
further develop the codebook as coding proceeded. After coding, we
compiled summary tables of the relevant coded sections to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the various types of laws analyzed and to
identify exemplars of specific kinds of provisions for further exploration.
We then used coding reports that contain textual provisions by code,
to this deeper exploration of specific types of protections. When
necessary, we referred back to the relevant law for context. Any
interpretive questions were identified and discussed among the faculty
members.
Although we sought to compile a comprehensive picture of the laws
relevant to our research questions, there are limitations to our research.
We can only provide a snapshot of the laws in place at the times of our
searching. Laws may have changed, been repealed, or adopted since our
searches. In addition, although we tested and refined our searches based
on existing information about relevant laws, it is possible that there are

72.

We used exclusion criteria to limit the scope of state laws to those most
relevant to the privacy of genomic or health data held by researchers, set
forth in the Appendix.

73.

See infra Appendix (listing inclusion and exclusion criteria).

74.

We moved from NVivo 10™ to NVivo 11™ over the course of the project.
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laws that our search terms did not identify. Given our focus on the
privacy of genomic or health data held by researchers, laws that might
otherwise fall within the broader topics we considered were excluded as
not applying to the genomic research context we were studying. Finally,
other types of laws that we did not consider may have provisions that
expand on the protections we discuss here.

III. Results: The Web of Legal Protections for
Participants in Genomic Research
We found substantially more state activity in each of the areas than
we expected, and the types of issues these laws address extend beyond
those addressed by federal law in unanticipated ways. For example,
although the literature tends to refer to only a handful of state laws
regulating human subjects research,75 we found that half the states have
such laws. In addition, state laws are much more likely than federal
laws to provide individuals with legal remedies for violations. Our
findings from the different datasets follow.76 The results of the 50-state
searches for laws protecting participants in genomic research are
organized below under each of the four datasets: (A) human subjects
research laws; (B) laws specific to genetic testing and information; (C)
medical privacy laws; and (D) disability discrimination laws. In
addition, each section includes a brief description of the “baseline” of
requirements set forth under applicable federal laws.
A. Human Subjects Research Laws
1. Federal Regulation of Human Subjects Research

The primary federal law addressing human subjects research is the
Common Rule.77 It applies to “all research involving human subjects
75.

See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 15, at 114; See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES, SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUM. RES.
PROTECTIONS MEETING MINUTES (May 25, 2017) (minutes reference less
than 5 states).

76.

It is important to note that there is some overlap between the datasets.
For example, genetic privacy laws often have genetic discrimination
provisions. However, that is not always true. We treated each dataset
separately in terms of identification and coding.

77.

Federal Policy, supra note 32; Revisions to the Common Rule were
promulgated on January 19, 2017. Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7211-14 (Jan. 19, 2017) (Final Rule);
These revisions were originally to take effect in January 2018, but the
effective date has since been deferred until July 2018. Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects: Delay of the Revisions to the Federal
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 2885, 2886
(Jan. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R pt. 745); The Food and Drug
Administration has its own regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 50 & 56. Its
provisions are substantial similar to the Common Rule, although the FDA
regulations do not have the exemptions or waiver of consent provisions
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conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by any Federal
department or agency that takes appropriate administrative action to
make the policy applicable to such research.”78 The Common Rule
generally requires that research studies are reviewed and approved by
an Institutional Review Board (IRB), which must, among other things,
ensure appropriate consent to research participation, risks are
minimized and reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, and
selection of subjects is equitable.79
Although the Common Rule requires consideration of
confidentiality protections, when applicable, it does not have any
specific provisions that protect research data.80 Federal law authorizes
protection of sensitive, identifiable research data from compelled
disclosure through a mechanism called a “Certificate of
Confidentiality.”81 Historically, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services’ authority to issue Certificates was discretionary, whether the
research was federally funded or not, and researchers had to apply for
the protection.82 However, following the enactment of the 21st Century
Cures Act, the Secretary must issue Certificate protections to federally
funded research.83 In keeping with this change, the NIH will
the Common Rule does. For these reasons, we focus our discussion on the
Common Rule.
78.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a); Fifteen federal agencies took appropriate
administrative action to make the policy applicable to their research,
which is the reason these regulations are referred to as the Common Rule.
Federal Policy, supra note 32.

79.

45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)-(5) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2019) (providing
the requirements for consent).

80.

45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (2018) (stating that “[t]he Secretary of HHS will,
after consultation with the Office of Management and Budget’s privacy
office and other Federal departments and agencies that have adopted this
policy, issue guidance to assist IRBs in assessing what provisions are
adequate to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the
confidentiality of data”).

81.

Congress originally authorized this protection as part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, § 3(a), § 303(a), 84 Stat. 1236, 1241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 242a(a) (1970)) (repealed 2000); This provision has been revised
multiple times over the years, most recently through the 21st Century
Cures Act, Pub. L. 114-255, sec. 2012(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1049-50 (2016)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 241d (2016)). In all versions, researchers holding
a Certificate may avoid identifying research participants in “any Federal,
State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other
proceedings.”

82.

See New and Improved, supra note 47, at 345 n.8 (citing the original
language of 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)) and at 347-348 (discussing the changes
under the 21st Century Cures Act).

83.

21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 34, 114th Cong. § 2012(a) (2016); see New
and Improved, supra note 47, at 347-348 for a discussion of this change.
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automatically issue a Certificate to any research it funds in which
identifiable information is collected.84 At this point, however,
researchers who are not NIH-funded must still apply a Certificate of
Confidentiality to protect research data from compelled disclosure.85
This requires the researchers or their IRBs to be aware of Certificates
and decide to apply. There is also the possibility that researchers who
are not federally funded may not receive one, even if they do apply.86
The revised Certificate statute includes a new provision permitting
disclosures in compliance with federal, state, and local law (except for
compelled disclosures), which may undermine the Certificate’s
protections, although a new provision making research data
inadmissible as evidence in legal proceedings may mitigate the effects
of this exception.87 Importantly, the revised Certificate statute
explicitly provides that the protections against compelled disclosure
apply to all copies of the data in perpetuity.88 Accordingly, if
biospecimens are shared with identifiers, the Certificate’s protections
would apply to subsequent studies using the data. A research biobank
protected by a Certificate would be obligated to refuse to disclose its
data, including biospecimens, even in a case like the Golden State Killer
scenario, where law enforcement seeks to solve a serious crime.89
Research that involves prospective collection of biospecimens is
subject to the Common Rule’s requirements for IRB review and
participant consent.90 Consent provides a mechanism for individuals to
decide whether to participate in research after being told of the relevant
84.

CERTIFICATES OF CONFIDENTIALITY, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,
https://humansubjects.nih.gov/coc/index (last visited March 20, 2019).

85.

Id. at 347-348.

86.

Id. at 347-348.

87.

Id. at 349-350.

88.

Id. at 346.

89.

People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379, 386-389 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1163 (1974) (upholding the director of a methadone clinic
protected by a Certificate refusal to disclose patient photographs to
assist in a line-up, despite the statement of a witness to a murder that
she had seen the murderer at the clinic).

90.

Regardless of method, prospective collection of biospecimens constitutes
human subjects research under the Common Rule. A “human subject” is
defined as a “living individual about whom an investigator obtains (1)
data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2)
identifiable information.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2019). Research means a
systematic investigation, including research development, testing and
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2019). These definitions are largely unchanged in
the Final Rule. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82
Fed. Reg. 7149, 7150 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46);
82 Fed. Reg. 7150 (2017); See also Advancing Research, supra note 33,
at 130.
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benefits, risks, and potential harms of participating in the research.
Included in the discussion of potential risks and harms is a description
of the relevant legal protections that may prevent or mitigate these
harms.91 The consent requirement protects participants because it
allows an individual who is risk averse, is concerned about a specified
risk, or feels particularly susceptible to a harm to choose not to consent
and, thus, not to participate.
Under the revised Common Rule, consent requirements for research
involving identifiable data, biospecimens, and whole genome sequencing
must describe whether identifiers will be removed, whether
biospecimens will be used for commercial purposes, whether the
individual can expect to share in any profits, and whether clinically
actionable results of genetic testing or genomic sequencing will be
returned to the individual.92 A corollary to the right to consent to
research participation is the right to withdraw.93 In the context of
biospecimens research, the right to withdraw might best be conceived
of as a right to revoke consent to further use of the biospecimens.94
There may also be some practical constraints on this right, permitting
researchers to retain data already collected from the biospecimen and
recognizing that it may not be possible to stop use of biospecimens that
have been deidentified, whether they have been shared or not.95
Assuming a participant’s data and specimens are collected
appropriately pursuant to Common Rule requirements, there is no
federal restriction preventing researchers or biobanks from storing and
using such research data or specimens indefinitely. Although researchers
may promise to destroy data and samples to the extent they can be
identified as that participant’s if she withdraws consent, if the
participant does not act, consent does not expire.96 The researchers are
91.

See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2019).

92.

82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 7256 (2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 7266
(2017).

93.

Included in the required consent disclosures is “a statement that . . . the
subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.” See 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(a)(8) (2019). See generally G. Owen Schaefer & Alan
Wertheimer, The Right to Withdraw from Research, 20 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 329 (2010).

94.

This right has not been conceived of an absolute right to stop further
research. Some have permitted researchers to strip biospecimens of
identifiers and to continue to use the now deidentified biospecimens in
research. Advancing Research, supra note 33, at 116-118, 140-142, 154155.

95.

Id. at 154-155.

96.

See Attachment D - Recommendations for a Broad Consent Template,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
sachrp-committee/recommendations/attachment-d-august-22017/index.html (last visited March 20, 2019) (recommendation approved
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not obligated to destroy the data and no expiration of consent by
operation of law for continued future use of data and samples for
research.97
There are several gaps to the application of the Common Rule.
First, the Common Rule applies only to “research” involving “human
subjects,” as these terms are defined in the regulations.98 Pursuant to
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) guidance,99 research
involving only coded specimens does not constitute human subjects
research if it meets certain conditions. These conditions include that
the specimens were not collected specifically for the proposed research
through interaction or intervention with a living individual and the
investigator cannot readily ascertain the identity of the individuals
whose specimens are used.100 Accordingly, such research is not
considered human subjects research and is not subject to the consent
and IRB review requirements of the Common Rule. If specimen research
is considered human subjects research, it still may be exempt from the
Common Rule if it involves existing specimens that are either publicly
available or the “information . . . is recorded by the investigator in such
a manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot readily be
ascertained, directly or through identifiers linked to the
subjects . . . .”101 While the IRB may, but is not required to, review the
protocol to ensure it meets with the exemption, consent would not be
required.102 Finally, human subjects research that does not fit the
by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections
on July 26, 2017).
97.

See id.

98.

45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (defining a human subject as a “living individual
about whom an investigator obtains (1) data through intervention or
interaction with the individual, or (2) identifiable information”); 45
C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2019) (defining research as “a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge”); These
definitions are largely unchanged in the Final Rule. Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (2017) (to be codified
at 48 C.F.R. pt. 46); 82 Fed. Reg. 7150 (2017) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R.
pt. 46).

99.

OHRP leads HHS efforts with respect to human research protections,
including providing guidance on the regulatory requirements. History,
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/aboutohrp/history/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).

100. Guidance on Coded, supra note 19; An example for when research with
specimens is not human subjects research is when there is an agreement
not to release the key that would identify the individuals with the
researchers to whom the specimens are provided. Id.
101. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d) (2019). Research that falls within any of these are
collectively referred to as “exempt research.”
102. Exempt Research Determination FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/
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exemption for existing specimens may be conducted without consent if
the researcher can demonstrate it is eligible for a waiver of the consent
requirement.103 Thus, with respect to secondary research with
biospecimens, there are three ways that genomic research may be
conducted without consent, and two ways that such research may be
conducted without IRB review.104
That the Common Rule does not extend to non-federally funded
research is another well-recognized gap.105 Although many institutions
have voluntarily agreed to apply these regulations to all research
conducted at their institutions in their “federalwide assurance,” some
institutions have “unchecked the box” so that they are not required to
faq/exempt-research-determination/index.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2018) [Exempt Research].
103. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2019) (permitting a waiver of consent if an IRB
determines that: (1) the research involves no more than minimal risk to
the subjects; (2) the waiver will not adversely affect the rights and welfare
of the subject; (3) the research could not practicably be carried out
without the waiver; and (4) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be
provided with additional pertinent information after participation); Id.;
The last provision is more commonly applicable to deception research,
in which some information must be withheld during the consent
process in order to conduct the study. See Roseanna Sommers &
Franklin G. Miller, Forgoing Debriefing in Deceptive Research: Is It
Ever Ethical?, 23 ETHICS & BEHAV. 98, 99 (2013).
104. The Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014
alters the Common Rule’s treatment of research on specimens with
respect to newborn blood spots, which are collected for screening for
specific genetic conditions postnatally. The Act categorized all
research involving newborn blood spots as “human subjects” research
and, thus, subject to the Common Rule provisions. Section 12 of the
Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, P.L. 113240, § 12, 128 Stat. 2851 (2014) (December 18, 2014 provides:
“Research on newborn dried blood spots shall be considered research
carried out on human subjects meeting the definition of section
46.102(f)(2) of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, for purposes of
Federally funded research conducted pursuant to the Public Health
Service Act until such time as updates to the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects (the Common Rule) are
promulgated . . . For purposes of this subsection, sections 46.116(c)
and 46.116(d) [permitting waiver of consent] of title 45, Code of
Federal Regulations, shall not apply”). At the time that this Act was
adopted, the proposed revisions to the Common Rule would have
required consent for all biospecimen research. 80 Fed. Reg. 53933, 53943
(proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 46); However,
the Final Rule did not do so. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7150 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pt. 46). Accordingly, this requirement for consent will be
eliminated when the Final Rule becomes effective. Id.
105. Eric M. Meslin & Kimberly A. Quaid, Ethical Issues in the Collection,
Storage, and Research Use of Human Biological Materials, 144 J.
LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 229, 230 (2004).
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apply the regulations to non-federally funded research.106 Research
conducted outside of institutions with a federalwide assurance and
without federal funding would fall entirely outside the scope of the
Common Rule’s protections.107
Finally, the Common Rule does not provide a right of action nor
corresponding remedies for individuals who are harmed as a result of
violations of its provisions. While OHRP oversees compliance with the
Common Rule and may respond to participant complaints, its
enforcement actions are directed at researchers and their institutions.108
Aggrieved individuals may bring state law tort claims, based, in part
on the obligations enshrined in the regulations, however, there are many
obstacles to a successful claim.109
106. See Assurance Process Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/register-irbsand-obtain-fwas/fwas/assurance-process-faq/index.html (last visited Dec.
30, 2018) (regarding assurance and the ability to voluntarily extend
scope); See generally Fanny K. Ennever, Reducing Regulatory Burdens on
Research with Human Subjects: A Case Study of the Transition to the
Final Common Rule at Boston Medical Center and Boston University
Medical Campus, 46 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 164 (2018) (discussing the
“check the box” option and the Final Common Rule change removing this
option).
107. See Adil E. Shamoo & Jack Schwartz, Universal and Uniform
Protections of Human Subjects in Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 7
(2007) (describing “a patchwork of regulation[s] [that] leaves a
significant number of human subjects in research without any
regulatory protection”); Inder M. Verma, Editorial Expression of
Concern and Correction, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 10779
(2014) (explaining the publication decision of the Facebook emotional
contagion experiment, despite the lack of IRB approval, on that
grounds that “as a private company Facebook was under no obligation
to conform to the provisions of the Common Rule when it collected
the data used by the authors, and the Common Rule does not preclude
their use of the data.”).
108. Office for Hum. Res. Protections, Compliance Oversight Procedures for
Evaluating Institutions (2009), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES
(Oct. 14, 2009), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance-and-reporting/
evaluating-institutions/index.html; See also OHRP Generally Conducted
Its Compliance Activities Independently, But Changes Would Strength
Its Independence, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (July 2017),
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-15-00350.asp.
109. Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects
Research, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40, 41-43 (2003) (commenting
on an increase in human subjects litigation). Despite a brief peak in
the number of such cases, they appear to remain relatively rare.
Interestingly, lawsuits in Minnesota and Texas led those states to
require consent to use newborn screening spots in research. See, e.g.,
Sonia M. Suter, Did You Give the Government Your Baby’s DNA?
Rethinking Consent in Newborn Screening, 15 MINN. J.L., SCI., &
TECH. 729, 748-50 (2014); Allison M. Wheelan, Federal Newborn
Screening Law Emphasizes Informed Consent, BILL OF HEALTH BLOG
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2. State Regulation of Human Subjects Research

Discussions about human subjects research in the literature almost
exclusively focus on the federal regulations,110 with little mention of
state human subjects protections laws, and then only a few well-known
examples, in particular, California, Maryland, and New York.111
However, we found that five states substantially expand upon the
Common Rule’s protections in scope or substance for participants in
genomic research, although they do so to a different extent. Other states
close gaps in the Common Rule in a more incremental fashion.

(Jan. 16, 2015), http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/16/
federal-newborn-screening-law-emphasizes-informed-consent/.
110. This conversation also generally focuses on the Common Rule, unless the
particular research falls under FDA authority.
111. See e.g., Harrell et al., supra note 15, at 111. This article goes further
than some in mentioning some state laws that apply to specific
populations.
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There are four states – California,112 Maryland,113 New York,114 and
Virginia115 – that have laws that apply to human subjects research when
the Common Rule does not, namely to non-federally funded research.
However, even under these laws, some of the Common Rule’s gaps
pertaining to secondary research persist. For example, California,
Virginia, and New York permit secondary research without consent
using specimens collected for other, non-research purposes.116
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24170 (West 1999); These statutory
provisions apply to a “medical experiment” that is defined as “(a) [t]he
severance or penetration or damaging of tissues of a human subject or the
use of a drug or device . . . electromagnetic radiation, heat or cold, or a
biological substance or organism, in or upon a human subject in the
practice or research of medicine in a manner not reasonably related to
maintaining or improving the health of the subject or otherwise directly
benefiting the subject; (b) The investigational use of a drug or device . . .
; (c) Withholding medical treatment from a human subject for any
purpose other than maintenance or improvement of the health of the
subject.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24174 (West 2019); However,
the statute “shall not apply to any person who is conducting a medical
experiment as an investigator within an institution that holds an
assurance with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services pursuant to Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations
and who obtains informed consent in the method and manner required by
those regulations.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178 (WEST 2019).
113. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-2001 (West 2018). With respect to
compliance with the federal regulations, this statute provides “a person
may not conduct research using a human subject unless the person
conducts the research in accordance with the federal regulations on the
protection of human subjects” and “[n]otwithstanding any provision in
the federal regulations on the protection of human subjects that limits the
applicability of the federal regulations to certain research, subsection (a)
of this section applies to all research using a human subject.” MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-2002(a)-(b) (West 2018).
114. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2440 (McKinney 2019); “The provisions of this
article shall not apply to the conduct of human research which is subject
to, and which is in compliance with, policies and regulations promulgated
by any agency of the federal government for the protection of human
subjects.” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2445 (McKinney 2019).
115. Virginia also has some regulations that apply to specific state agencies.
VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-162.20 (2018); see. e.g., 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 3040-10 (2018) (Department for Aging and Rehabilitative Services); 22 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 40-890 et seq. (2018) (Department of Social Services).
116. Virginia exempts research that is exempt from the federal regulations from
its provisions. VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-162.16 (2018) (referencing specifically
the exemptions contained in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)); See also VA. CODE
ANN. §32.1-162.17 (2018) (exempting several types of research in language
similar to the Common Rule exemptions, in addition to exempting
research conducted by the Virginia Department of Health); New York’s
definition of human research explicitly excludes research using
biospecimens removed for clinical purposes. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2441 (McKinney 2019) (“Human research shall not, however, be
construed to mean the conduct of biological studies exclusively utilizing
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Maryland’s picture is more complex. It adopts the federal definition of
“human subject,”117 but also explicitly applies federal Common Rule
requirements to “all research using a human subject.”118 On its face, the
latter provision seems to prevent research that meets one of the federal
Common Rule’s exemptions from avoiding avoid the regulatory
requirements. However, the Maryland Attorney General indicated that
this was not the intention of the statute.119 Accordingly, if Maryland
chooses to follow OHRP guidance that some secondary research with
biospecimens is not human subjects research, this statute would not
change how biospecimen research is treated.120 Interestingly, New York
limits who can conduct human subjects research to “researchers,” which
are defined as medical professionals or those who an IRB deems
qualified.121 By restricting who may conduct research, New York may
further limit the number of human subjects who might otherwise fall
outside the federal regulations.
Another approach taken by states expands on the Common Rule
by applying broader legal protections to research in particular contexts
or populations.122 These laws would apply to genomic research
tissue or fluids after their removal or withdrawal from a human subject
in the course of standard medical practice, or to include epidemiological
investigations.”); California’s definition of “medical experiment” appears
to cover research in which biospecimens are prospectively collected, but
not research involving biospecimens collected for other purposes. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24174 (West 2019), Advancing Research, supra
note 33, 116-118, 140-142, 154-155.
117. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-2001(c) (West 2018).
118. Notwithstanding any provision in the federal regulations on the protection
of human subjects that limits the applicability of the federal regulations
to certain research, subsection (a) of this section [which requires
compliance with the federal regulations] applies to all research using a
human subject.” MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-2002(b) (West
2018).
119. Letter from J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Regarding House Bill 917 – “Human
Subject Research – Institutional Review Boards”, Maryland Att’y Gen.,
to Parris N. Glendening, Governor of Maryland (May 2, 2002), available
at
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Health%20Policy%20
Documents/hb917letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
120. See supra note 100.
121. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2443 (McKinney 2019); “Researcher” is defined
as “any person licensed under title VIII of the education law to perform
diagnosis, treatment, medical services, prescription or therapeutic
exercises with regard to or upon human beings, or any other person
deemed appropriately competent and qualified by a human research
review committee as provided by section twenty-four hundred forty-four
of this chapter.” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2441 (McKinney 2019).
122. Most commonly, states have laws that apply to research conducted in
mental health or substance abuse facilities. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 87.063 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. § 51.61 (2018).
There are also laws that apply to prisons. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
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conducted in these settings or populations but would not apply more
generally. In contrast, Oregon has specific provisions that apply to
genetic research.123 Although Oregon permits holders of genetic
information to disclose it without consent for anonymous and coded
research, Oregon law requires all genetic research to go to an IRB for
“explicit prior approval or an explicit determination that the research
is anonymous or otherwise exempt.”124 This is more prescriptive than
the federal approach, which recommends, but does not require, that
institutions review potentially exempt research to confirm that
determination.125 In submitting the research to the IRB, Oregon
requires researchers to “disclose to the IRB the intended use of human
DNA samples, genetic tests or other genetic information for every
proposed research project, even anonymous or otherwise exempt
research.”126 There is no exception for federally funded research. This
requirement has significant implications, particularly for secondary use
studies, as it requires IRB review for secondary research that the
Common Rule permits to proceed without IRB review. These choices
are deliberate, as Oregon’s law also notes that “these rules set state
standards that are in addition to, and not intended to alter, any
requirement under the Federal Common Rule or the Federal Privacy
Rule.”127 Oregon also imposes obligations on the recipient of a limited
data set of genetic information, which may limit secondary research
using that data set.128
Although the Common Rule requires IRBs to consider
confidentiality protections undertaken by the researcher, it does not
have any specific provisions to protect research data, and the
20, § 106 (2019). In addition, states have laws regulating human subjects
research that are conducted or funded by particular state government
entities, such as the department of health, public health, or mental health.
A list of these laws is on file with the authors.
123. OR. ADMIN. R. 333-025-0120 (2019).
124. OR. ADMIN. R. 333-025-0120 (2019).
125. Exempt Research, supra note 102.
126. OR. ADMIN. R. 333-025-0110(3) (2019) (emphasis added).
127. OR. ADMIN. R. 333-025-0105(2) (2019).
128. It provides that the recipient of limited data set will “not use or further
disclose the information other than as permitted by the data use
agreement or as otherwise required by law; (ii) use appropriate safeguards
to prevent use or disclosure of the information other than as provided for
in the data use agreement; (iii) report to the investigator any use or
disclosure of the information not provided for by its data use agreement
of which it becomes aware; (iv) ensure that any agents, including a
subcontractor, to whom it provides the limited data set agrees to the same
restrictions and conditions that apply to the limited data set recipient . .
and (v) not identify the information or contact the individuals.” OR.
ADMIN. R. 333-025-0120 (2019).
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Certificate’s protections to not automatically extend to non-NIH funded
research.129 A few states fill these gaps by providing additional
confidentiality protections to research data.130 Most protective are
Arkansas and Oklahoma; their laws protect the research records of
subjects in “genetic research studies” from “subpoena or discovery” in
civil (not criminal) lawsuits, except when “the information in the
records is the basis of the suit.”131 Both of these laws apply broadly to
all genetic research approved by an IRB or conducted in accordance
with the Common Rule or the FDA regulations.132 Unlike the federal
Certificate of Confidentiality, it does not depend on federal funding or
require an application. However, because the Arkansas and Oklahoma
protections rely on IRB approval or compliance with the federal
regulations, they may not apply to secondary research when specimens
are not identifiable because such research would not require IRB review
under federal requirements. Louisiana provides that identifiable
information held by researchers in public universities, medical schools,
and colleges is not available for subpoena and is not discoverable.133
This law provides similar protections to the Arkansas and Oklahoma
laws, but it is not restricted to genetic research. On the other hand,
Louisiana’s law only applies to research conducted at public
institutions, a substantial limitation. Kentucky provides that
identifiable research information is “confidential” and cannot be
129. Other federal agencies may follow NIH’s lead to automatically provide
Certificates to the research they fund, but they have not done so as of the
date of this writing. Moreover, Certificate protection for non-federally
funded research is discretionary. See discussion supra in text
accompanying notes 81-89. In this section, we address laws that apply to
research data. For a discussion of laws that provide protection to genetic
information, see Part III.B, infra.
130. In this section, we address laws that apply to research data. For a
discussion of laws that provide protection to genetic information, see
infra Part III.B.
131. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-35-102, 35-103 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36,
§ 3614.4C (2019).
132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-35-102 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.4B
(2019) (referring to the federal regulations without specifying a date).
133. LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:7 (2018) (“All records of interviews, health surveys,
questionnaires, laboratory and clinical data, reports, statements, notes,
and memoranda, which contain identifying characteristics of research
subjects hereinafter referred to as ‘confidential data’, and which are
procured and prepared by employees of public universities, medical
schools, and colleges for the purpose of research, and acting in accordance
with institutional Internal Review Board [sic] policy and procedures for
research involving human subjects, . . . shall be subject to the following
provisions: (1) No part of the confidential data shall be available for
subpoena nor shall it be disclosed, discoverable, or be compelled to be
produced in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding, or other
tribunal or court for any reason.”)
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disclosed to someone outside the research team without consent, but it
does not explicitly address subpoena or discovery.134
Only California and Maryland discuss remedies for violation of
human subjects protections obligations. California provides for civil
damages, criminal fines, imprisonment, attorney’s fees, and court costs
for conducting research without consent.135 A researcher who negligently
permits research without consent shall be liable to the subject for a
minimum of $500 in damages and a maximum of $10,000, and willful
failure to obtain consent is subject to minimum damages of $1,000 and
a maximum of $25,000.136 Maryland authorizes the Attorney General to
seek injunctive of other relief “to prevent violations” of its human
subjects research law.137 It does not discuss remedies for the participants
affected by any violations.
3. State genetics laws with implications for human subjects research

Several states require the individual’s written consent to retain
genetic materials or information.138 These provisions may be coupled
134. 920 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1.060 (2019) (“Research information that identifies
an individual subject shall be regarded as confidential in accordance with
[state and federal law] and shall not be disclosed to a person outside the
research project staff or published without the subject’s prior written
authorization”).
135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24176 (West 2019).
136. Id. at subsections (a) & (b). When the willful failure is coupled with a
“known substantial risk of serious injury, either bodily harm or
psychological harm,” it is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of
up to one year in the county jail, a $50,000 fine or both; The same
penalties apply to pharmaceutical company representatives or employees
who contract the research and willfully withholds information about the
risks of the research. Id. at subsections (c) and (d); Further ‘[e]ach and
every experiment performed in violation of any provision of this chapter
is a separate and actionable offense.” Id. at subsection (e); The statute
explicitly preserves the rights of injured subjects to seek recovery under
other laws, such as state tort law. Id. at subsection (g).
137. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-2004 (West 2018).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2018) (“a person may not collect a DNA
sample from a person, perform a DNA analysis on a sample, retain a DNA
sample or the results of a DNA analysis, or disclose the results of a DNA
analysis unless the person has first obtained the informed and written
consent of the person, or the person’s legal guardian or authorized
representative, for the collection, analysis, retention, or disclosure”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(a) (2019) (“No person shall retain an
individual’s genetic information without first obtaining informed consent
from the individual”); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019); 29 U.S.C. § 1191b
(2017) (“A person shall not perform genetic testing on an individual or
collect, retain, transmit, or use genetic information without the informed
and written consent of the individual or the individual’s authorized
representative” where genetic information is defined as an individual’s
genetic tests or that of their family members and genetic test “means an
analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites,
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with obligations to destroy samples that could limit future research
using the biospecimens. For example, Delaware requires prompt
destruction of genetic materials, except if needed for criminal or death
investigations or proceedings, a court orders retention, the individual
authorizes retention, or for “anonymous” research in which the identity
of the individual is not disclosed.139 New Jersey provides that “a DNA
sample from an individual who is the subject of a research project shall
be destroyed promptly upon the completion of the project or
withdrawal of the individual from the project, whichever occurs first,
unless the individual or the individual’s representative directs otherwise
by informed consent.”140 It also provides:
The DNA sample of an individual from which genetic information
has been obtained shall be destroyed promptly upon the specific
request of that individual or the individual’s representative,
unless: (1) Retention is necessary for purposes of a criminal or
death investigation or a criminal or juvenile proceeding; or (2)
Retention is authorized by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.141

These laws suggest that that they would prohibit a researcher from
deidentifying a specimen and continue to use it for research after
withdrawal of consent, as permitted under the federal regulations.142
that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes”); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 22:1023 (2018) (“No person shall retain an insured’s or enrollee’s
genetic information without first obtaining authorization from the
insured, enrollee, or their representative . . . .”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37
§ 4515 (2018) (“No person shall retain an insured’s or enrollee’s genetic
information without first obtaining authorization from the insured,
enrollee, or their representative”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (West 2018)
(“No person shall retain an individual’s genetic information without first
obtaining authorization under the informed consent requirement . . . ”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(B) (2019). (“[G]enetic analysis of an individual
or collection, retention, transmission or use of genetic information without
the informed consent of the individual or the individual’s authorized
representative is prohibited”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.161 (2019) (“It is
unlawful to retain genetic information that identifies a person, without
obtaining the informed consent of the person or the person’s legal guardian
. . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(3) (2019) (“A person may not retain
another individual’s genetic information or DNA sample without first
obtaining authorization from the individual or the individual’s
representative”).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203 (2019).
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (West 2018).
141. Id.
142. Attachment C - Recommendations for Broad Consent Guidance, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrpcommittee/recommendations/attachment-c-august-2-2017/index.html
(last visited Dec. 30, 2018); In contrast, Nevada requires destruction of
genetic information upon request, but includes an exception when
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Texas requires destruction of genetic material after “the purpose for
which [it] was obtained is accomplished unless” it was obtained for IRB
approved research and retention is either required or authorized by the
participant.143
There are some common exceptions to the requirement for consent
to retain genetic material. These primarily include: retention for public
purposes, such as law enforcement (including criminal DNA databases),
paternity determinations, newborn screening, by court order, or
otherwise authorized by law.144
Similar to the right to withdraw consent to participate in research,
several states explicitly grant individuals the right to revoke an
authorization to use or disclose genetic information. Louisiana law not
only grants the right to an individual to revoke the authorization before
disclosure, but it invalidates the authorization if used for any improper
purpose.145 Accordingly, any research use not covered by the original
consent would invalidate the authorization and could subject
researchers to penalties. Minnesota and Washington also grant the right
of revocation.146
Finally, a few states have specific provisions limiting the research
use of genetic information, but these are limited to newborn spot
specimens.147 While they require researchers to return or destroy unused
newborn spot specimens obtained from the state, 148 cutting off further
“authorized or required by state or federal law or regulation.” NEV. REV.
STAT. § 629.161 (2017); Oregon similarly allows retention after an
individual requests destruction for “anonymous research or coded
research” provided the individual has been notified that the information
may be retained for such research or has consented to such retention. OR.
REV. STAT. § 192.537(2) (2019).
143. TEX. INS. CODE § 546.054 (2017); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.405 (2017);
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 58.052 (2017); see also ME. STAT. tit. 24-A,
§ 2215(H) (2018) (allowing insurers to share genetic information for
actuarial or research studies, but requiring that identifiable samples to be
“returned or destroyed as soon as they are no longer needed”).
144. See table in Appendix for list of laws with such exceptions.
145. LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (2018); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 4511 (2018).
146. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22 § 126055 (West 2019); MINN. STAT. § 144.125
(2019); R.I. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVICES, HIPPA-1, NOTICE OF PRIVACY
PRACTICES (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.02.040 (2019).
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124975 (West 2019); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 17 § 6551 (West 2019); MD. CODE REGS. 10.10.13.15 (2018); 181 NEB.
ADMIN. CODE § 2-007 (2019).
148. Id.; Dried Blood Spot Usage and Storage, BABY’S FIRST TEST,
https://www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-screening/dried-blood-spotstorage-and-usage (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (“When newborn screening
is performed, a nurse collects a few drops of blood from the baby’s heel
on filter paper. After the sample dries and is sent to the state-approved
laboratory, multiple “punches” of varying sizes are taken from the blood
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secondary uses that might otherwise be permissible, these do not apply
to materials originally obtained for research.149
As this section demonstrates, a handful of states have laws that fill
in some of the gaps in the federal laws governing human research
protections. These include a handful of states that have laws that apply
to human subjects research when the federal regulations do not, and
one, Oregon, that has specifically requires IRB review for all genetic
research, including some genetic research that would be exempt from
IRB review under federal law. There are also a few states that have
adopted specific confidentiality protections that extend beyond federal
requirements. Finally, California provides for remedies, including
minimum damages for subjects involved in research without their
consent.
B. Laws Regarding Access, Use, and Disclosure of Genetic Information
1. Federal Genetic-Specific Laws

One of the main risks of participating in genomic research is that
the genomic information will be released beyond the confines of the
research study and be used against the individual.150 The primary
federal law addressing access, use, and disclosure of genetic information
is GINA. Substantively, GINA prohibits employers and health insurers
from requesting or requiring prospective or current employees or
insureds to submit genetic information, undergo genetic testing, or
reveal whether the individual or family member has undergone genetic
testing.151 In this way, GINA prohibits employers and health insurers
spots so they can be tested for the conditions included in the state’s
newborn screening panel. After newborn screening is complete, a small
amount of dried blood remains on the filter paper”); Newborn spot
specimens are blood samples obtained within forty-eight hours of birth
and sent to a public health laboratory to be tested for congenital disorders.
Newborn Screening Laboratory Bulletin, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/nbslabbulletin/bulletin.html (last updated Feb. 21,
2014); What Happens to the Blood Sample, BABY’S FIRST TEST,
https://www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-screening/what-happens-to-theblood-sample (last reviewed Oct. 12, 2018).
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124975 (West 2019).
150. Thought-Leader, supra note 51.
151. Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101, 202(b), 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1182(b)) (regarding employer-based insurance); 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-3(b)(1)(B) (2011) (regarding group health insurance); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ff-1 (2008) (regarding employers); GINA defines genetic
information to include genetic test of the individual and their family
members, plus the manifestation of a disease or disorder in a family
member. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L.
No. 233, § 201(4)(A), 122 Stat. 881; Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101, 202(b),
122 Stat. 881 (2008); Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008); GINA’s
definition of “genetic test” as “an analysis of human DNA, RNA,
chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations,
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from accessing a person’s genetic information.152 GINA also limits how
employers and health insurers may use and disclose genetic information
that they may receive. Employers may not make hiring, termination,
promotion, or other adverse employment decisions on the basis of
genetic information or the fact that an employee or family member has
undergone genetic testing.153 Health insurers may not make
underwriting decisions, such as whether to offer coverage or setting
premiums, based on genetic information and may not require applicants
or enrollees to undergo genetic testing or submit genetic information in
connection with enrollment or underwriting.154 This feature of GINA
was incorporated into the Affordable Care Act’s federal requirements
for health insurance plans, which prohibit making coverage
determinations or setting premiums upon genetic information or upon
health conditions.155 Finally, GINA extends confidentiality protections

or chromosomal changes” does not limit it to clinical tests. Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. 233, § 201(7),
122 Stat. 881; GINA’s definition of “genetic test” as “an analysis of human
DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” does not limit it to
clinical tests. See, e.g., Summary of Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act of 2003 (S. 1053), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.
(Mar. 17, 2012), https://www.genome.gov/11508845/summary-of-s1053/.
152. There are six exceptions to GINA’s prohibition on employers from
accessing genetic information: (1) inadvertent acquisitions; (2) as part of
health services and wellness programs offered by the employer on a
voluntary basis; (3) family medical history as part of certification of family
medical leave to care for a family member with a serious health condition;
(4) acquisitions through commercially and publicly available documents,
as long as the employer is not searching those sources with the intent of
finding genetic information; (5) through a genetic monitoring program
that monitors the biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace;
and (6) acquisition of genetic information of employees by employers who
engage in DNA testing for law enforcement purposes as a forensic lab or
for purposes of human remains identification is permitted for limited
purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2008).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-6 (2008); Note, however, that GINA’s
prohibition on employment discrimination on the basis of genetic
information does not apply to manifestations of diseases or conditions in
the employee him- or herself, including manifestations of diseases with
genetic bases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-9 (2008).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1182b (2008) (applying to employer-based health plans); 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-3(b)(1)(B) (2011) (applying to group health plans).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53(a), 53(d) (2008) (prohibiting group or individual
health insurers from determining eligibility for coverage based on health
status factors, including genetic information); see 42 U.S.C. §300gg (2010)
(prohibiting small group or individual health insurance issuers from
charging charged higher health insurance premiums on the basis of
anything other than factors: individual or family plan, age, tobacco use,
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to genetic information, defining genetic information as “protected
health information” (PHI) under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, discussed
below.156 GINA also requires employers to keep any genetic information
they may have about employees or applicants in separate, confidential
medical file and prohibits disclosure of genetic information except for
limited purposes.157
GINA’s protections contain notable gaps. First, the employer
provisions of GINA only apply to employers with 15 or more employees
and therefore do not apply to the approximately 17 million people
(almost 15% of all employees), who work in companies with less than
15 employees.158 Second, GINA’s insurance provisions only apply to
health insurers and do not apply to other forms of insurance, such as
disability, life, or long-term care insurance. Given the aging population
and the importance of these forms of insurance to provide financial
security to a large and growing segment of the population (and their
familial caregivers), GINA’s inapplicability to these other forms of
insurance is a significant gap.159
2. State Genetic-Specific Laws

Every state except Mississippi has a law that addresses genetic
testing, privacy, or discrimination in some form.160 Collectively, we refer

geography. The implication is that premiums may not vary on the basis
of health status factors or genetic information).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9 (2017); The requirements of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule are discussed in text accompanying infra notes 178-183.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2008); Employers may disclose employees’ genetic
information (1) to the employee himself or herself; (2) to an occupational
or other health researcher if the research is conducted in compliance with
the Common Rule; (3) in response to a court order with a requirement to
inform the employee of the disclosure; (4) to government officials who are
investigating compliance with GINA; (5) in connection with an employee’s
application for certification under the Family Medical Leave Act or state
medical leave laws; (6) to a Federal, State, or local public health agency
only with regard to a contagious disease that presents an imminent hazard
of death or life-threatening illness; and (7) in compliance with the HIPAA
Privacy Rule. Id.
158. U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 SUSB Annual Data Tables by Establishment
Industry, U.S. and States, NAICS Sectors, Small Employment Sizes Less
than 500 (Jan. 2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/econ/
susb/2015-susb-annual.html.
159. McGuire & Majumbder, supra note 15; Sarah Zhang, The Loopholes
in the Law Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/03/
genetic-discrimination-law-gina/519216/.
160. NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., TABLE OF STATE STATUTES RELATED TO
HEALTH INSURANCE NONDISCRIMINATION, https://www.genome.gov/
policyethics/legdatabase/pubsearchresult.cfm?content_type=1&content
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to these laws as “genetic-specific laws.” In some cases, these laws are
coextensive with federal protections under GINA, but we found a
number of instances in which states go beyond the federal minimums,
closing gaps in protection offered by federal law.
As a threshold question, we had to consider whether state laws that
apply to genetic testing or information would apply to analyses
conducted for research purposes. We found that these laws rarely
explicitly apply to research.161 But they also rarely explicitly exclude
research from their reach.162 When we did find genetic testing and
_type_id=1&topic=2&topic_id=1&source_id=1 (choose content type
“state statute”, search topic “health insurance nondiscrimination”).
161. One exception is N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-2(D) (2019) (defining “genetic
information” to “mean . . . information about the genetic makeup of an
individual or members of an individual’s family, including information
resulting from genetic testing, genetic analysis, DNA composition,
participation in genetic research or use of genetic services.”) (emphasis
added); Oregon’s law has specific provisions regarding research. OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.531 (2019).
162. We identified two states, Nebraska and Michigan, that explicitly
exempted research from its laws while also limiting the relevant definition
to clinical purposes. Specifically, although Nebraska has a broad definition
of “genetic information,” its requirements for consent apply to “genetic
tests”, which is defined as “analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes,
epigenetic status, and those tissues, proteins, and metabolites used to
detect heritable or somatic disease-related genotypes or karyotypes for
clinical purposes.” (emphasis added). It further explicitly states that
genetic test “does not include a procedure performed as a component of
biomedical research that is conducted pursuant to federal common rule
under 21 C.F.R. parts 50 and 56 and 45 C.F.R. part 46.” NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-551 (2019); 181 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 001 (2019). Michigan similarly
defines genetic information in relation to genetic test, which is defined as
“the analysis of DNA, RNA, chromosomes, and those proteins and
metabolites used to detect heritable or somatic disease-related genotypes
or karyotypes for clinical purposes. A genetic test must be generally
accepted in the scientific and medical communities as being specifically
determinative for the presence, absence, or mutation of a gene or
chromosome in order to qualify under this definition.” (emphasis added).
Like the Nebraska statute, it goes on to state that “the term ‘genetic test’
does not include a procedure performed as a component of biomedical
research that is conducted pursuant to federal common rule under 21
C.F.R. parts 50 and 56 and 45 C.F.R. part 46”. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 333.17020(8)(b), 333.17520(8)(b) (2018); In addition, Massachusetts
requires laboratories and health care providers to obtain written consent
for genetic testing, but exempts testing involving “confidential research
information,” which is defined as “any results of a genetic test maintained
pursuant to pharmacological or clinical research protocols which are
subject to and conducted in accordance with the review and approval of
an Institutional Review Board established pursuant to the provisions of
45 CFR 46 and 21 CFR 50 and 56 which protects the confidentiality of
the individual who is the subject of the genetic test either by encryption,
encoding or other means consistent with the requirements of said federal
regulations, or where the identity of the individual is unknown or
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information laws that excluded research, the exclusion applied only to
research conducted under the Common Rule or FDA regulations.163 A
few laws do not explicitly limit their application to clinical purposes,
but their use of the term “diagnose” suggests such a limitation.164 These
examples provide support for our interpretation that states with broad
definitions that neither exclude research from their laws or nor define
genetic information in terms of clinical uses may apply to research.165
That some states exclude non-clinical types of genetic testing suggests
that other states could exclude research should they desire.166 Thus,
protected from
consistent with
LAWS. ch. 111,
Massachusetts
definitions.

disclosure by encrypting or encoding, or by other means
the requirements of said federal regulations.” MASS. GEN.
§ 70G (2018). Unlike the Michigan and Nebraska laws,
does not explicitly mention “clinical purposes” in its

163. The elimination of the option to “check the box” and legally commit to
applying the federal regulations to all research conducted at an institution
may expand the scope of the research to which this applies.
164. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-L (McKinney 2019) (“‘genetic test’ shall mean
any laboratory test of human DNA, chromosomes, genes, or gene products
to diagnose the presence of a genetic variation linked to a predisposition
to a genetic disease or disability in the individual or the individual’s
offspring; such term shall also include DNA profile analysis”) (emphasis
added).
165. These laws may variably use terms such as “DNA analysis”, “DNA test”,
“genetic characteristic”, or “genetic tests,” in addition to “genetic
information”. These broad definitions may apply generally to the makeup
of the genome, the absence, presence, or alternation of a gene, and the
like. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-10 (2018) (defining genetic test as
“an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites
that detects genotypes, mutations or chromosomal changes”); FLA. STAT.
§ 760.40 (2018) (uses the term “DNA analysis,” which it defines to mean
“the medical and biological examination and analysis of a person to
identify the presence and composition of genes in that person’s body. The
term includes DNA typing and genetic testing”). IDAHO CODE § 39-8302
(2019) (genetic testing is “the testing or analysis of an identifiable
individual’s DNA that results in information that is derived from the
presence, absence, alteration or mutation of an inherited gene or genes, or
the presence or absence of a specific DNA marker or markers” and
“Private genetic information” is defined as “any information about an
identifiable individual that is derived from the presence, absence,
alteration or mutation of an inherited gene or genes, or the presence or
absence of a specific DNA marker or markers, and which has been
obtained from a genetic test or analysis of the individual’s DNA or from
a genetic test of analysis of a person’s DNA of whom the individual is a
blood relative”).
166. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 111, § 70G (2018), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 151B § 1 (2018) (“The term ‘genetic test,’ shall mean any tests of
human DNA, RNA, mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or proteins for the
purpose of identifying genes or genetic abnormalities, or the presence or
absence of inherited or acquired characteristics in genetic material.”
(excepts information pertaining to abuse of drugs or alcohol)).
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unless a state law referencing genetic testing or genetic information
specifically excluded research or explicitly limited applicability to
clinical or diagnostic contexts, we concluded the law could apply to the
genetic tests and information of participants in genomic research. There
are two independent reasons for taking a broad view of these laws. First,
identifying which genetic mutations are associated with specific diseases
or conditions is one of the main purposes of genomic research,167 even if
the links are not yet confirmed. Second, in the context of whole genome
sequencing, the information generated is likely to include genetic
mutations whose associations with disease are known, as well as
mutations of unknown significance.168
Using these analytical frameworks, we found states’ legal activity
in this category is substantial, both in volume and variety. A number
of states have passed laws regulating genetic testing or information in
ways that go beyond the federal requirements. Notably, state laws
create substantive individual rights to control genetic information or
assert claims for damages in the event genetic information is
inappropriately used or disclosed. The results of our research into state
laws specific to genetic information and testing are organized under the
following subcategories: (a) laws requiring consent for genetic testing;
(b) laws restricting access to or use of genetic information; (c) laws
restricting disclosure of genetic information; and (d) laws creating
individual rights regarding one’s own genetic information. The results
are discussed in detail below.
a. Laws requiring consent to genetic testing

Ten states require written informed consent for genetic testing.169
This is significant because there is no federal requirement for informed
consent for genetic testing. While the Common Rule may require
167. What is Genetic Testing?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/genetictesting.
168. What do the Results of Genetic Tests Mean?, GENETICS HOME
REFERENCE, (Jan. 8, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/
interpretingresults; Sue Richards et al., Standards and Guidelines for the
Interpretation of Sequence Variants: A Joint Consensus Recommendation
of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics and the
Association for Molecular Pathology, 17 GENETICS MED. 1, 2, 18 (2015)
(about the scientific application); for discussion as part for return of
results see Susan M. Wolf et al. Mapping the Ethics of Translational
Genomics: Situating Return of Results and Navigating the ResearchClinical Divide, 15 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 1, 12-13 (2015); Wylie Burke et
al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental Findings? We
Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 1, 2 (2013); Ellen Wright Clayton and
Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomic
Research, 14 GENETICS MED. 1 (2012).
169. See infra note 173; Examples of State-Required Components of Informed
Consent for Genetic Testing, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (June 12,
2009), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5806a3.htm.
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written informed consent for individuals to participate in research,
including prospective collection of biospecimens for genomic research,
it may not require a separate written consent for secondary research or
genetic testing of biospecimens.170 To the extent it applies to the
research context at all, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s authorization
requirement does not apply to information that has been deidentified.171 Therefore, there may be instances where researchers
genetically test specimens without seeking written informed consent or
authorization from the individual. Moreover, because GINA prohibits
employers and health insurers from requesting or requiring individuals
to undergo genetic testing,172 GINA does not speak to whether written
informed consent is required for genetic testing.
Most of the states’ statutes are written broadly to apply to “any
person” (or “no person” when written in the negative) and thus include
researchers in their scope.173 In these states, researchers would have to
170. Informed Consent Guidelines & Templates, RES. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE:
U. MICH. (Dec. 19, 2018, 11:36 PM), https://research-compliance.
umich.edu/informed-consent-guidelines; U-M Implementation: Informed
Consent Changes, RES. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE: U. MICH. (Nov. 13, 2018,
1:42
PM),
https://research-compliance.umich.edu/human-subjects/
common-rule-other-changes/u-m-implementation-informed-consentchanges; See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 100-104.
171. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d) (2018).
172. Background Information of EEOC Final Rule of Title II of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, U.S EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ginabackground.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)
(2008); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53(d) (2008) (limiting request for genetic testing
in employment and health insurance, respectively).
173. These include ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-448.02(a) (2019) (“a person shall not require the performance of or
perform a genetic test without first receiving the specific written informed
consent of the subject [or legally authorized representative]” where
“genetic test” is defined as “an analysis of an individual’s DNA, gene
products or chromosomes that indicates a propensity for or susceptibility
to illness, disease, impairment or other disorders, whether physical or
mental, or that demonstrates genetic or chromosomal damage due to
environmental factors, or carrier status for disease or disorder”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1201–1202 (2019) (“No person shall obtain genetic
information about an individual without first obtaining informed consent
from the individual” where “genetic information” is defined as
“information about inherited genes or chromosomes, and of alterations
thereof, whether obtained from an individual or family member, that is
scientifically or medically believed to predispose an individual to disease,
disorder or syndrome or believed to be associated with a statistically
significant increased research of development of a disease, disorder or
syndrome”); FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018) (“Except for purposes of criminal
prosecution, [determining paternity, and for criminal DNA banking], DNA
analysis may be performed only with the informed consent of the person
to be tested” where “DNA analysis” is defined to mean “the medical and
biological examination and analysis of a person to identify the presence
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and composition of genes in that person’s body. The term includes DNA
typing and genetic testing.”); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019) (“a. A person
shall not obtain genetic information or samples for genetic testing from
an individual without first obtaining informed and written consent from
the individual or the individual’s authorized representative. b. A person
shall not perform genetic testing of an individual or collect, retain,
transmit, or use genetic information without the informed and written
consent of the individual or the individual’s authorized representative.”
Genetic information and testing are defined as in 29 U.S.C. § 1191b
(2017), which include the broad definition of genetic test as “an analysis
of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” and excepting analysis of
proteins or metabolites, including those related to a manifested disease,
disorder, or condition); MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2019) (“ . . . genetic
information about an individual: (1) may be collected by a government
entity . . . or any other person only with the written informed consent of
the individual” where “genetic information” is defined as “information
about an identifiable individual derived from the presence, absence,
alteration or mutation of a gene, or the presence or absence of a specific
DNA or RNA marker, which has been obtained from an analysis of: (1)
the individual’s biological information or specimen; or (2) the biological
information or specimen of a person to whom the individual is related”.
Interestingly, it “also means medical or biological information collected
from an individual about a particular genetic condition that is or might
be used to provide medical care to that individual or the individual’s
family members.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:1 (2018); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-21-3 (2019) (“[N]o person shall obtain genetic information or
samples for genetic analysis from an individual without first obtaining
informed and written consent from the individual or the individual’s
authorized representative” where “genetic information means information
about the genetic makeup of an individual or members of an individual’s
family, including information resulting from genetic testing, genetic
analysis, DNA composition, participation in genetic research or use of
genetic services” and “genetic analysis means a test of an individual’s
DNA, gene products or chromosomes that indicates a propensity for or
susceptibility to illness, disease, impairment or other disorders, whether
physical or mental; that demonstrates genetic or chromosomal damage
due to environmental factors; or that indicates carrier status for disease
or disorder; excluded, however, are routine physical measurements,
chemical, blood and urine analyses, tests for drugs, tests for the presence
of HIV virus and any other tests or analyses commonly accepted in clinical
practice at the time ordered”). It is important to note that the New
Mexico statute has multiple, common exceptions to the consent
requirement, including to identify an individual for a criminal
investigation, for DNA banking purposes (if convicted of a felony), to
identify deceased individual, for parental determinations, to screen
newborns, if not identified with the individual or family members, by
court order for damage awards for the Genetic Information Privacy Act,
by medical repositories or registries, for purposes of medical or scientific
research or education if identity of individual or family members not
disclosure, for emergency treatment, by a laboratory pursuant to
healthcare practitioner order); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 629.100 (2019) and
NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.121 (2019) (“A person, governmental agency or
political subdivision of a government that wishes to obtain genetic
information of a person . . . must first . . . obtain from the person who is
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obtain individual consent to conduct genetic testing on research
specimens even if such research would not have required consent under
federal law. Oregon’s law is unique in explicitly addressing consent for
genetic research. It permits “anonymous” and “coded” research using
specimens or genetic information if the individual consents to the
specific research project, consents to genetic research generally, or was
notified that her information may be used in such research and did not
request that her information not be used.174 Researchers likely prefer
the last approach because it sets the default as permitting research use
unless the individual objects. Research in choice architecture suggests
that people are more likely to choose the default option.175
Some of the state laws requiring written informed consent for
genetic testing only apply to physicians or other health care providers
and, therefore, may only apply to genomic research if it is conducted
by physician-investigators.176 Florida requires consent for genetic
testing, without specifying that it must be written,177 although in
practice consent is likely done in writing.
the subject of the genetic test or his legal guardian the [signed] consent
document described in NAC 629.110” and “genetic information” refers to
the results of a genetic test, which is defined as “a test . . . to determine
the presences of abnormalities or deficiencies, including carrier status,
that: 1. Are linked to physical or mental disorders or impairments; or 2.
Indicate a susceptibility to illness, disease, impairment or any other
disease, whether physical or mental.”); individual’s DNA sample, without
first obtaining informed consent of the individual or the individual’s
representative” with limited exceptions, including “anonymous . . . or
coded research” where notice provisions are complied with, for law
enforcement, identification of persons, newborn screening, and paternity
determinations. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.535(11), (14), (2019) “Genetic
information” means “information about an individual or the individual’s
blood relatives obtained from a genetic test,” which is defined as “a test
for determining the presence or absence of genetic characteristics in an
individual or the individual’s blood relatives, including tests of nucleic
acids such as DNA, RNA, and mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or
proteins in order to diagnose or determine a genetic characteristic”).
174. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(2) (2019); If proceeding under notice, the notice
must describe how the specimen or information may be used and include
a place for the person to mark if they want to opt out of the research. OR.
REV. STAT. § 192.538(3) (2019).
175. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler et al., Choice Architecture, SSRN, 4-6 (2010),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1583509.
176. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (2019) (a “health care provider
shall not conduct a genetic test . . . unless the health care provider first
obtains written informed consent . . . ”).
177. FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018). (“Except for purposes of criminal prosecution,
[determining paternity, and for criminal DNA banking], DNA analysis
may be performed only with the informed consent fo the person to be
tested” where “DNA analysis” is defined to mean “the medical and
biological examination and analysis of a person to identify the presence
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Contrary to what is required under federal law, in many states,
researchers would need to obtain consent, sometimes specific or written
consent, to conduct genetic testing on samples from participants in
genomic research. Given how broadly many of these statutes are
written, it seems that consent would be required even for secondary
research.
b. Laws limiting disclosure of genetic information

The primary federal law regulating the disclosure of health
information, including genetic information, is the HIPAA Privacy
Rule.178 The HIPAA Privacy Rule includes genetic information in the
definition of “health information,”179 but the Privacy Rule is limited by
its applicability only to HIPAA covered entities or their business
associates.180 The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally requires individual
authorization to disclose identifiable health information, but there are
several exceptions allowing for disclosure without authorization, such
as for law enforcement purposes, pursuant to a court order or subpoena,
or to public health or other governmental authorities.181 Significantly
for participants in genomic research, the HIPAA Privacy Rule may
have limited applicability to researchers or biobanks that gather, store,
and use genomic data, particularly if those researchers receive the data
directly from the participant rather than from health care provider that
is covered by the Privacy Rule.182 To the extent that researchers and
and composition of genes in that person’s body. The term includes DNA
typing and genetic testing”).
178. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2018).
179. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining health information as “any
information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in
any form or medium, that: (1) Is created or received by a health care
provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer,
school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the
past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual”) (emphasis added).
180. The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which include
health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses. It also
applies to covered entities’ “business associates” who are persons who
receive protected health information from covered entities to provide
certain business or administrative functions, such as claims processing,
billing, management, or quality assurance. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
181. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2018)
authorizations are not required).

(specifying

disclosures

for

which

182. Researchers and biobanks would not be covered entities or business
associates unless the researcher is part of a covered entity and the entity
elects to include the researcher’s activities as part of its HIPAA-covered
functions. See How Can Covered Entities, supra note 36.
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biobanks de-identify the information or data such as through the use of
codes instead of individual identifiers, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s
protections would not apply.183 Moreover, once genetic data escapes the
realm of regulated institutional holders (to the extent they are covered
entities or their business associates under HIPAA), either through
return of results to the participant, breach, hacking, or permitted
disclosure (e.g., subpoena or court order), the information is entirely
beyond the reach of HIPAA. As noted above, GINA prohibits
employers and health insurers from disclosing genetic information of
employees, enrollees, or applicants.184 This is an area where state laws
are particularly significant—both in their number and in the
substantive ways that states fill the gaps in protection left by GINA
and HIPAA.
i. Consent to disclosure of genetic information
As noted above, the HIPAA Privacy Rule may not apply to the
researcher, biobank, or any other subsequent holder of a participant’s
genetic information. States broaden the privacy protection offered by
requiring consent to disclosure beyond HIPAA covered entities. Sixteen
states prohibit any person, including corporations and entities, who
holds information obtained through genetic testing from disclosing the
information without the individual’s consent, although some of these
laws also have exceptions.185 For example, Nevada provides “[i]t is
183. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2018), providing, in relevant part: “Health
information that meets the standard and implementation specifications
for de-identification under §164.514(a) and (b) is considered not to be
individually identifiable health information, i.e., de-identified. The
requirements of this subpart do not apply to information that has been
de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of §164.514,
provided that: (i) Disclosure of a code or other means of record
identification designed to enable coded or otherwise de-identified
information to be re-identified constitutes disclosure of protected health
information; and (ii) If de-identified information is re-identified, a covered
entity may use or disclose such re-identified information only as permitted
or required by this subpart.”
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9 (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2008); see supra text
accompanying notes 156-157. Although GINA prohibits employers from
requesting or requiring collection of genetic information, employers may
receive such information inadvertently or if it pertains to occupational
exposures. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2018); see also UNIF. PROTECTION OF
GENETIC INFO. EMP’T ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011).
185. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2018) (“a person may not . . . disclose the
results of a DNA analysis unless the person has first obtained the informed
and written consent of the person, or the person’s legal guardian or
authorized representative . . . ” with exceptions for law enforcement
(including criminal DNA databanks, paternity, newborn screening, or
emergency medical treatment); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-448.02 (2019)
(“The results of a genetic test performed are privileged and confidential
and may not be released to any party without the expressed consent of
the subject of the test”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-35-103 (2001); CAL. CIV.
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CODE § 56.17 (West 2019) (providing penalties for negligent or willful
disclosure without consent, but limited to genetic information contained
in the medical record); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3-1104.6 (West 2019)
(exceptions for diagnosis, treatment, or therapy, and others); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1205 (2019) (“Regardless of the manner of receipt of the
source of genetic information . . . a person shall not disclose or be
compelled, by subpoena or any other means, to disclose the identity of an
individual upon whom a genetic test has been performed or to disclose
genetic information about the individual in a manner that permits
identification of the individual” with exceptions for paternity
determinations, court orders, criminal DNA banking, with consent, for
medical diagnosis of blood relatives of person tested who is deceased; for
identifying dead bodies, for newborn screening, for identifying persons, by
insurer to regulatory agency, or authorized by law; includes penalties for
unauthorized disclosure); FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018) (DNA analysis
results “are confidential, and may not be disclosed without the consent of
the person tested” with exceptions for criminal prosecutions, paternity
testing, and criminal DNA databases); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/15(a-b)
(2019) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Act, genetic testing and
information derived from genetic testing is confidential and privileged and
may be released only to the individual tested and to persons specifically
authorized, in writing . . . by that individual to receive the information”
with exceptions for criminal investigations and prosecutions for
underwriting); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70G (2018) (applying to
hospital, dispensary, laboratory, hospital-affiliated registry, physician,
insurance institution, insurance support organization, or insurance
representative, and commercial genetic testing company, agency or
association reports and records, but limiting exceptions for court orders,
persons whose official duties entitle receipt (per insurance commissioner
determination), life, disabilities, and long term care insurance, or
“confidential” research); MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2018) (genetic information
“may be disseminated only: (i) with the individual’s written informed
consent; or (ii) if necessary in order to accomplish purposes described [in
individual’s written consent, which is limited to one year unless otherwise
specified”]); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1309(1) (2018) (“Any person who, in
the ordinary course of business, practice of a profession or rendering of a
service, creates, stores, receives or furnishes genetic information . . . shall
hold such information as confidential medical records and shall not
disclose such information except pursuant to written authorization of the
person to whom such information pertains or to that person’s authorized
representative” with exceptions for statistical data (without identifiers),
health research conducted according to the Common Rule or using data
that protects the identity from disclosure, as required by law, or for body
identification); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 629.100 (2019) (“A person . . . that
wishes to . . . disclose or compel a person to disclose the identity of a
person who was the subject of a genetic test or to disclose genetic
information of a person in a manner that allows identification of the
person must first . . . [o]btain from the person who is the subject of the
genetic test or his or her legal guardian the [written] consent document
described in NAC 629.110”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:1 (2018); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-48 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(C) (2019)
(“[T]ransmission . . . of genetic information without the informed and
written consent of the individual or the individual’s authorized
representative is prohibited” except to identify individuals in criminal
investigations, for criminal DNA databases, for paternity determinations,

45

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research

unlawful to disclose or to compel a person to disclose the identity of a
person who was the subject of a genetic test or to disclose genetic
information of that person in a manner that allows identification of the
person, without first obtaining the informed consent.”186 These
restrictions on disclosure would apply both to researchers and biobanks
as well as third parties who may subsequently obtain individuals’
genetic information if it were to escape the confines of research.
In addition to these general prohibitions on disclosure of genetic
information without consent applicable to any person, states also
restrict specific entities from disclosing genetic information. Fifteen
states restrict employers’ disclosure of genetic information.187 Vermont
for newborn screening, for information that does not identify the
individual or their family members, for determination of damages under
the act, by medical registries or repositories, or for research without
disclosure of the identities or the individual or their family members, for
emergency medical treatment, or for laboratory testing under written
order); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537-539 (2019) (“an individual’s genetic
information and DNA sample are private and must be protected, and an
individual has a right to the protection of that privacy. Any person
authorized by law or by an individual or an individual’s representative to
obtain, retain or use an individual’s genetic information or any DNA
sample must maintain the confidentiality of the information or sample
and protect the information or sample from unauthorized disclosure or
misuse.” And “[r]egardless of the manner of receipt or the source of genetic
information . . . a person may not disclose or be compelled, by subpoena
or any other means, to disclose the identity of an individual upon whom
a genetic test has been performed or the identity of a blood relative of the
individual, or to disclose genetic information about the individual or a
blood relative of the individual in a manner that permits identification of
the individual” except when necessary for criminal or death investigations
(including identification of bodies, pursuant to a specific court order, for
purposes of paternity determinations, with individual consent, for
furnishing information to decedent’s relatives for purposes of medical
diagnosis); ME. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2215 (2018) does not require consent,
but sets conditions on when information can be disclosed, including
requiring “due consideration” to the interests of those affected, limiting
information disclosed to minimal necessary to achieve a lawful purpose;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-602 (2018) requires consent for disclosure, but
only applies to samples of minor children and excepts the newborn
screening program; GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1, 33-54-3 (2019) (requiring
consent for disclosure, but it is limited to insurer held information).
186. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.171 (2019).
187. These state laws limit further disclosure by the employer. 016-14 ARK.
CODE. R. § 004-4009.7.4 (LexisNexis 2018); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.03 (2005);
IDAHO CODE § 39-8301 (2006) (Employer access to genetic information is
limited to proceedings in which employee health is at issue or an
employment decision in which reasonably believe the health condition
poses a real risk and cannot be redisclosed); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/25
(restricts employers from disclosing lawfully acquired genetic information
and also prohibits disclosure of individually identifiable genetic
information from wellness programs to employers); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:368(4) (employers cannot disclose genetic information except to the
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restricts disclosure of genetic information to employers.188 California
restricts disclosure by insurers.189
Should genetic information get into the individual’s medical record
(such as through automatic placement of genomic information into the
medical record or through the return of research results to the
participant), Arizona’s and Washington’s statutes provide additional
protections by imposing obligations on those seeking to access genetic
information from providers through a subpoena or discovery request to
provide opportunities to limit disclosures through protective order or
other judicial mechanisms.190
ii. Confidentiality protections for genetic information
Numerous states provide confidentiality protections for genetic
information that extend beyond the protections offered to health
information under federal or state laws regarding privacy of non-genetic
individual, a research who complies with the Common Rule, if required
by law, or to agency for compliance investigation; genetic information
must be kept separate from personnel files); MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.21.6615
(2010) (Limits employer disclosure for research consistent with the
Common Rule, court order, compliance investigation, and public health
agency for infectious disease investigation; genetic information must be
kept separate from personnel file); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (2018)
(broad prohibition of revealing genetic information about employees,
licensees, or applicants).
188. “No person shall disclose to an employer, labor organization, employment
agency or licensing agency, any genetic testing results or genetic
information, that genetic services have been requested, or that genetic
testing has been performed.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9333 (2018).
189. California Civ. Code § 56.265 (“A person or entity who underwrites or
sells annuity contracts or contracts insuring, guaranteeing, or
indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death . . . .
shall not disclose individually identifiable information concerning the
health of, or the medical or genetic history of, a customer . . . to any
affiliated or nonaffiliated depository institution, or to any other affiliated
or nonaffiliated third party for the use with regard to the granting of
credit)(emphasis added), Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10123.35, 10140.1, 10149.1 (life
and disability insurers), and 742.407 (multiple welfare arrangements,
includes imposition of penalties for disclosure without consent).
190. Arizona’s law provides that “if genetic testing information is subpoenaed,
a health care provider shall respond pursuant to § 12-2294.01 subsection
E . . . . the court shall take all steps necessary to prevent the disclosure
or dissemination of that information.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2802C
(2019); The statute also protects genetic information in government hands
(e.g., public health department) from disclosure. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2802A (2019); See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.060 (West
2019) (requiring attorneys to give notice to health care providers and
patients before serving a discovery request or a subpoena for health care
information to allow time for a protective order. In addition, health care
providers may not disclose information without consent if the appropriate
notice was not given).
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health information. To the extent they impose a broad obligation upon
holders of genetic information to maintain confidentiality of such
information and refrain from disclosure, these state laws fill a gap in
the HIPAA Privacy Rule by extending obligations beyond HIPAA
covered entities191 to the researcher, the biobank, and any subsequent
holder if the genetic data of research participants were to get out from
the research context.
In some cases, the confidentiality protection is constructed so
broadly that its scope is unclear. Examples include Arizona, Colorado,
and Georgia,192 which declare genetic information “confidential” and
“privileged” without specifying what that means.193 Several states
include general statements that genetic information is confidential and
may only be disclosed with consent of the person tested.194 The scope
of these laws is unclear because they do not necessarily specify to whom
the confidentiality obligation applies.

191. HIPAA covered entities include health care providers, health insurers,
and health care clearinghouses. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
192. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2802A (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-31104.6 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (2019).
193. Colorado’s and Georgia’s laws are explicit that written consent is required
to disclose genetic information. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.6
(2018) (the only exceptions are for diagnosis, treatment, or therapy); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (2019). While these may be more specific than some
of the other broad laws, other states are much more specific about the
scope of the confidentiality protections afforded, such as protection from
discovery, including subpoena.
194. Arizona declares the results of genetic tests performed according to ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448.02 (2019) are “privileged and confidential” and
“may not be released to any party without the expressed consent of the
subject of the test”; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2802A (2019);
Georgia, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and South Carolina have
similar language. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 760.40
(2018); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-L (Consol. 2019); see S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-92-10 (2019); New York does permit a court to order disclosure, but
requires the court to “consider the privacy interests of the individual
subjects of the genetic test and of close relatives of such individual, the
public interest, and, in the case of medical or anthropologic research, the
ethical appropriateness of the research. Disclosure shall be permitted only
to the individuals or agencies expressly named in court orders N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-L (Consol. 2019); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 4, §§ 509.3
(2019) and D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 4, §§ 509.7-8 (2019) (imposes
requirement on employers, employment agencies, or labor organization
that if they “obtain . . . protected genetic information when seeking
current health status information, the genetic information will be subject
to the same restrictions that apply to genetic information generally” also
must put in in a “separate confidential file, not in the employee’s general
file” if received for “any lawful reason”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.3-4
(2018) (individuals with confidential patient information must establish
security procedures and have employees sign confidentiality statement).
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There are mechanisms, such as mandatory public health reporting
requirements, that could allow information held by researchers to be
disclosed to government officials. Many states do, however, extend
confidentiality protections to genetic information held by government
agencies and officials (such as public health departments, newborn
screening programs, and disease registries) and may protect such
information from state open records requests.195 Such protections may
provide some reassurance to research participants. However, there are
a myriad of exceptions to confidentiality obligations of state or
governmental holders of genetic information.196
Several exceptions include those that participants would likely
expect, such as disclosure to the person tested or their legally authorized
representative, to medical providers or other medical personnel, for
treatment or payment purposes, or when the person tested consents
(typically in writing). Some states also allow disclosure to relatives for
medical purposes if the person tested is deceased. However, other
exceptions might surprise research participants, especially given their
breadth. These include disclosures for public health purposes, newborn
screening, abuse and neglect reporting, research, law enforcement
(including identification of persons), paternity determinations, and to
monitor legal compliance. There are also exceptions for quality
improvement purposes, such as for peer review, utilization review and
quality assurance, for health care operations, or other business
operations. Other exceptions include: when the person tested brings a
lawsuit or other complaint or genetic information is placed at issue in
litigation or pursuant to a court order; as authorized or required by
law; for marketing; and for due diligence in sale of business.
iii. Laws against compelled disclosure
The Golden State Killer case highlighted the value of genetic
information for law enforcement in the identification of suspects.197
Legal demands for genetic information could also stem from civil cases,
195. This protection often extends to state open records acts. See, e.g. MINN.
STAT. § 13.386 (2018) (specifically classifies genetic information that is
held by a government entity as “private data on individuals,” which would
shield such data from disclosure in response to requests under state open
government laws); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/30(d) (2019) (a state agency,
local health authority, or health oversight agency); 65 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 67.708 (2018) (extending state open record acts to commonwealth
agency or local agencies); North Dakota’s law permits public health to
disclose genetic information to law enforcement, but also provides that
such information cannot be used in “any administrative, civil, or criminal
action or investigation directed against the individual” unless it was
collected in that criminal investigation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01.3-06
(2017).
196. See Appendix for list of these exceptions by state.
197. See Fuller, supra note 2; Ram et al., supra note 5.
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such as family law disputes or personal injury matters.198 While genomic
research databanks may be particularly attractive for law enforcement
or civil legal demands, any holder of genetic information could be
subject to a legal demand, and federal laws generally do not shield
holders other than researchers from having to comply.
No federal laws protect genetic information generally from
compelled disclosure via court order or subpoena, although, as described
above, federal law authorizing Certificates of Confidentiality and a
handful of state laws may protect some research data from compelled
disclosure.199 To the extent the information holder is a covered entity,
the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits disclosure of PHI without individual
authorization to law enforcement to help identify a suspect or in
response to a legal demand, such as a subpoena, court order, or
warrant.200 For civil legal demands, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits
disclosure of PHI pursuant to a court order or subpoena without
individual authorization if the covered entity receives evidence that
there were reasonable efforts to notify the individual about the request
to allow the individual to object and to seek a qualified protected order
for the information from the court.201
Several states more broadly shield any holders of genetic
information from compelled disclosure. Texas protects any person
against compelled disclosure of an individual’s genetic information
without the individual’s consent.202 Delaware, Illinois, Nevada,
198. Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Legal Counsels’
Experiences with and Perspectives on Legal Demands for Research
Data, 7 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 1, 3 (2012).
199. See supra Part III.A.1 & III.A.2.
200. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2018).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (2018); To make the disclosure, the covered
entity would have receive evidence in the form of a written statement and
documentation of either (1) the requestor’s notice to the individual with
information about the litigation and instructions for raising objections, or
(2) documentation of an agreement between the parties or a request to
the court for a qualified protective order. What “Satisfactory Assurances”
Must a Covered Entity That Is Not a Party to the Litigation Receive
Before It May Respond to a Subpoena Without a Court Order?, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/faq/706/what-satisfactory-assurances-must-a-coveredentity-receive-before-it-responds-to-a-subpoena/index.html (last reviewed
July 26, 2013).
202. “A person or entity that holds genetic information about an individual
may not disclose or be compelled to disclose, by subpoena or otherwise,
that information unless the disclosure is specifically authorized by the
individual.” TEX. INS. CODE § 546.102(b) (2017); see also TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 21.403 (2017); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 58.001 et seq. (2017)
(suggesting the language of the statute may apply more broadly) (“Except
as provided by [other sections], genetic information is confidential and
privileged regardless of the source of the information . . . This section
applies to a redisclosure of genetic information by a secondary recipient
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Oklahoma, and Oregon also provide broad protections for any holder
of genetic information from compelled disclosure,203 but with more
exceptions than the Texas law.204 These laws would arguably protect
researchers and biobanks from compelled disclosure of genetic
information pursuant to a subpoena, but they would also apply to other
holders of the information if the information were to be released from
of the information after disclosure of the information by an initial
recipient. Except as provided by [statutory section], a health benefit plan
issuer may not redisclose genetic information unless, the redisclosure is
consistent with the disclosures authorized by the tested individual under
an authorization executed under [statutory provision]”). That the law
refers both “any person” language and health benefit plans specifically
within the same section suggests the wording is deliberate.
203. The Delaware statute provides that “regardless of the manner of receipt
of the source of genetic information, a person shall not disclose or be
compelled, by subpoena or other means, to disclose the identity of an
individual upon whom a genetic test has been performed or to disclose
genetic information about the individual in a manner that permits
identification of the individual.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1205 (2015)
(emphasis added). However, there are many exceptions to this protection,
including disclosure for criminal investigations or proceedings, paternity
determinations, court order, for data bank requirements, with consent of
the individual, for medical diagnosis of a blood relative when the
individual is dead, for identifying bodies, for newborn screening, an insurer
discloses to its regulator, or the disclosure is otherwise legally permitted.
Oregon, Nevada, and New Jersey use similar language in their statutes,
including the exceptions. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.539(1) (2019); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 629.171 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (West 2018); Illinois
provides that genetic information “shall not be admissible as evidence,
nor discoverable in any action of any kind in any court, or before any
tribunal, board, agency or person,” with exceptions for individual consent,
specific law enforcement purposes, or paternity testing. 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 513/30(a).
204. The Delaware, New Jersey, and Oregon use similar language and all three
provide for the following exceptions: criminal or death investigation
(including identification of bodies) or criminal or juvenile proceeding; for
paternity determinations; by court order (Oregon requires it to be a
specific court order); for criminal DNA banking; with consent of the
individual tested; for medical diagnosis of a blood relative when the person
tested is deceased; for newborn screening required by law; Finally,
Delaware also excepts disclosure by insurers to protect against fraud,
material misrepresentation or material nondisclosure. Delaware and New
Jersey except disclosure to an insurance regulatory authority; and
Delaware also excepts disclosure as authorized by law. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 1203 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.539(1) (2019); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-46 (West 2018); Oklahoma also excepts disclosures for law
enforcement proceedings and investigations, insurers who “anticipates or
is reporting fraud or criminal activity” and for paternity determinations,
as well as where the individual is a party to the proceeding at which the
genetic information is at issue or the individual was insured and the
insurance policy and the genetic information is at issue. OKLA. STAT. tit.
36, § 3614.3A (2019).
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the research context, such as through a return of research results to the
individual or their physician or through breach or hacking. However,
with the exception of Illinois, these laws do not protect researchers and
biobanks from disclosing genetic information pursuant to a court order.
Utah’s law allowing for compelled disclosure of genetic information
is much more restrictive. Such orders must limit disclosure to the parts
“essential to fulfill the objective of the order” and to those persons who
need access, as well as including other measures necessary to protect
the individual.205 Illinois’ law is unique, declaring genetic information
inadmissible in legal proceedings.206 This provision can protect an
individual’s information from being used against them, even if the
information is somehow disclosed.
In sum, state laws creating confidentiality protections for genetic
information are significant in a couple ways. First, this is an area where
the gap in federal protection could be significant if the research
institution declines to extend HIPAA covered entity status to its
researchers and biobanks. Moreover, subsequent holders of genetic
information gathered through genomic research are not likely covered
by the requirements of HIPAA. Nevertheless, the mere designation of
genetic information as “confidential,” without more, may offer few
substantive protections to the affected individual, particularly given the
numerous exceptions to this general rule. But the second significant
finding is that some states extend substantial protections against
disclosure by the researchers or indeed any holder of genetic
information, however obtained. Perhaps the most important of these
are protections against compelled disclosure through subpoena for
researchers or any other holder of genetic information.
c. Laws restricting access to or use of genetic information

As discussed above, GINA prohibits health insurers and employers
with 15 or more employees from requiring, requesting, or conditioning
approval or employment on the submission of genetic information. State
laws can go beyond GINA’s requirements by extending the prohibitions
on access to smaller employers, other types of insurance, or other nonemployer or insurance entities.207 These legal protections are relevant to
participants in genomic research because of the potential for genetic
information to escape the confines of research use and be accessible to
employers, insurers, or others who may have an interest in an
individual’s genetic information. The primary ways that genetic
information could be accessed from the research context are through
inclusion of genomic information in the medical record,208 return of the
205. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-45-103(2)(b)(ii)(A) (West 2018).
206. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/15 (2019).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 218-232.
208. Prince et al., supra note 50, at 827, 829, 832 (indicating that some
studies automatically place genomic research results into participant
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results of genetic testing to the individual and their health care
provider, authorized disclosure such as through subpoena or court
order, breach, or hacking.
GINA also prevents the use of genetic information by employers in
making employment decisions, including hiring, firing, promotions, and
access to other benefits.209 GINA and the ACA prevent health insurers
from using genetic information to determine eligibility, benefits, or
premiums.210 The gaps in GINA’s protections, described above, limit its
applicability to employers with fewer than fifteen employees or other
types of insurance providers, such as disability, life, or long-term care
insurers. Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule generally requires
authorization for use as well as disclosure of individually identifiable
health information, it may have limited applicability to researchers,
biobanks, and subsequent holders of research participants’ genetic
information.211
States impose a variety of limits on analysis or use of genetic
materials or information that apply beyond the limits of GINA or the
HIPAA Privacy Rule. A few states broadly limit use of genetic
information by any person without consent.212 The restrictions that
states impose on analysis or use of genetic information are important

medical records without participant consent); see, e.g., Iftikhar J. Kullo
et al., Return of Results in the Genomic Medicine Projects of the eMerge
Network, 5 FRONTIERS IN GENETICS 1, 2 (2014) (describing research results
from the eMerge network being included “preemptively” in electronic
health records).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 20000ff-1(a) (2008).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53(d) (2008).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 180-183.
212. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-2, 21-3 (2019) (“[G]enetic analysis of an
individual or collection, retention, transmission or use of genetic
information without the informed consent of the individual or the
individual’s authorized representative is prohibited” except for law
enforcement purposes (including identifying bodies), criminal DNA
databases, parental determinations, newborn screening, if results are not
identified with the individual or family, court determinations of damage
awards under the Genetic Information Privacy Act, by medical
repositories or registries, medical or scientific research and education if
the identity of the individual or the individual’s family members is not
disclosed, emergency treatment, by a laboratory pursuant to a written
order from a health care practitioner); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (West
2018) (“No person shall retain an individual’s genetic information without
first obtaining authorization” except if for purposes of criminal or death
investigation or a criminal or juvenile proceeding, for paternity
determination, by court order, for criminal DNA banking, or for
“anonymous research where the identity of the subject will not be
released”); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(3) (2019) (no retention unless by
court order, as authorized to benefit blood relatives of deceased
individuals, for newborn screen).
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to protecting research participants from the risk that genetic
information generated in research could be used against them in the
event that the information escapes the research context.213
To address the concern that genetic information can be used to
limit employment, insurance, and other opportunities, states have
passed a variety of laws to fill GINA’s gaps by extending prohibitions
on use of genetic information to a broader range of employers, other
types insurers besides health insurance, and even other contexts.
i. Employment
Seventeen states apply prohibitions on employer access to or use of
genetic information where GINA does not because they define employer
to include those with less than 15 employees. As Table 1 illustrates, 11
of these applying to employers with only one employee, and the
remainder apply to employers with up to five employees (Table 1).214
213. There are several plausible ways a participant’s genetic information may
escape the research context, including the return of results to the
individual and/or the health care provider, a permitted disclosure such as
via court order or subpoena, breach, or hacking. See Thought-Leader,
supra note 51.
214. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-402(2) (2018) (Arkansas provisions limiting
collection and use of genetic information apply to employers as defined by
21 U.S.C. § 203(d), which includes “any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”);
ARK. CODE § 016-14.2-1078 (2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926, 12940
(West 2019), CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11008 (West 2019), CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 2, § 11072 (West 2019) (California provisions allow exceptions
permitted by GINA and apply to employers who employ five or more
people but does not include certain religious entities within the definition
of employer); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-51, 46a-60 (2019) (Connecticut
provisions apply to employers who employ three or more people); D.C.
CODE § 2-1402.11 (2017) (D.C. provisions apply to employers who employ
“an individual”); IDAHO CODE § 39-8301 (2019) (Idaho provisions apply
to employers who employ five or more people); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019)
(Iowa provisions apply to any employers who employ “employees in the
state”, thus suggesting the employer must have more than one employee);
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-601 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 37.1200-1202 (2018) (Michigan provisions apply to employers who
employ one or more people); MINN. STAT. § 181.974 (2019) (Minnesota
provisions apply to employers who employ one or more people); MINN.
STAT. § 181.974.1(b) (2018) (Minnesota provisions apply to employers
who employ one or more people); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 141-H:3 (1996);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(5) (McKinney 2019), N.Y. EXEC. LAW 296(1)(a)
(McKinney 2019) (New York provisions apply to employers who employ
four or more people); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.2 (2019) (Oklahoma
provisions apply to employers as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), which
includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee”); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.001,
659A.300, 659A.303 (2019) (Oregon provisions apply to employers who
employ one or more people); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 6.7-2.1 (2018)
(Rhode Island provisions apply to employers employing “individuals”,
thus suggesting the employer must have more than one employee); S.D.
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Table 1

Minimum employees to come
under state discrimination laws
15
5
4
3
2
1

Unspecified

States
MD
CA, ID
NY
CT
IA, RI
AR, DC, MI, MN, OK,
OR, UT, VT, VA, WA,
WI
NH, SD

At least two states explicitly prohibit employers from obtaining
consent to testing by offering employees a benefit.215 These prohibitions
contrast with GINA, which permits limited rewards or penalties in the
context of voluntary wellness program.216 Rhode Island, on the other

CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20 (2019) (employer not defined); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-45-103 (West 2018), UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103(2)(a) (West
2018), (noting Utah provisions apply to employers employing one or more
people); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 9331, 9333 (2018) (Vermont provisions
apply to employers as defined by VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d, which
includes employers who employ one or more individuals); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 40.1-2 through 40.1-28.7:1 (2018) (Virginia provisions apply to
employers who employ another person); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.180
(2019) (applying to any person, firm, corporation, and the state’s access
only); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.32 through 111.372 (2018) (applying to
employers employing one or more people but not including certain social
clubs and fraternal societies); Although Nebraska has a similar law, it
defines genetic testing as limited to testing conducted for clinical purpose
and, therefore, would not apply to our circumstances. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-236 (2019).
215. IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 141-H:3 (2018); In
addition, Massachusetts law prohibits business entities implementing
wellness programs from discriminating against any person in terms of
compensation or other benefits on the basis of genetic information. 105
MASS. CODE REGS. § 216.012 (2018).
216. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (Final Rule), 81 Fed. Reg.
31143 (2016); A bill in Congress would alter GINA’s limits on employers’
ability to access genetic and other health information and on the
incentives/penalties that can be offered. See Kathy L. Hudson & Karen
Pollitz, Undermining Genetic Privacy? Employee Wellness Programs and
the Law, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 3 (2017); The bill was discharged by two
Committees and, thus, could be considered by the full House. See Actions
Overview, Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th
Cong. (2018).
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hand, does not allow employees to waive protections with respect to
genetic information.217
ii. Insurance
Regarding access, four states go beyond GINA by applying
restrictions on use of genetic information to insurance other than health
insurance. Vermont prohibits all insurers – specifically including life,
disability, and long-term care insurance – from using genetic
information for underwriting, providing: “No policy of insurance offered
for delivery or issued in this state shall be underwritten or conditioned
on the basis of: (1) any requirement or agreement of the individual to
undergo genetic testing; or (2) the results of genetic testing of a member
of the individual’s family.”218 Colorado and California restrict collection
of genetic information by disability insurers, however, California’s law
is limited to disability insurance for hospital, medical, and surgical
expenses.219 Colorado and Maryland restrict collection of genetic
information by long-term care insurers.220
Regarding analysis and use of genetic information by insurers, a few
states go beyond GINA and prohibit use of genetic information in
disability insurance underwriting outright221 or restrict its use in
217. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-5 (2018) (“Any contract or agreement, which
purports to waive the provisions of this chapter, is null and void as being
against public policy”).
218. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §9334 (2018). The statute defines “insurance” as
“a policy of insurance regulated under Title 8, offered or issued in this
State, including health, life, disability, and long-term care insurance
policies, hospital and medical service corporation service contracts, and
health maintenance organization benefit plans.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 9331 (2018).
219. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3.1104.7 (2018); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140.1 (West
2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10149 (West 2019).
220. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3.1104.7 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 18-120
(West 2018).
221. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3.1104.7 (2018) (“Any entity that receives
information derived from genetic testing may not seek, use, or keep the
information for any nontherapeutic purpose or for any underwriting
purposes connected with the provision of group disability insurance or
long-term care insurance coverage” where “genetic testing” is defined as
“any laboratory test of human DNA, RNA, or chromosomes that is used
to identify the presence or absence of alternations in genetic material
which are associated with disease or illness.”); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-1313(3)
(2019) (“No person shall discriminate on the basis of a genetic test or
private genetic information . . . for any policy or contract of disability
insurance or any health benefit plan”. Genetic test is defined as “the
testing or analysis of an identifiable individual’s DNA that results in
information that is derived from the presence, absence, alteration or
mutation of an inherited gene or genes, or the presence or absence of a
specific DNA marker or markers”); IDAHO CODE § 39-8302 (2019)
(“Private genetic information” is defined as “any information about an
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disability insurance underwriting unless its use is “based on sound
actuarial principles or actual or reasonably anticipated claims
experience.”222 While the latter approach is less protective, it seems
identifiable individual that is derived from the presence, absence,
alteration or mutation of an inherited gene or genes, or the presence or
absence of a specific DNA marker or markers, and which has been
obtained from a genetic test or analysis of the individual’s DNA or from
a genetic test of analysis of a person’s DNA of whom the individual is a
blood relative.” Id.
222. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-224 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 175, § 108I
(2018) (“No insurer, agent or broker authorized to issue policies against
disability from injury or disease or policies providing for long term care
in the commonwealth shall practice unfair discrimination against persons
because of the results of a genetic test or the provision of genetic
information, as defined in this section. For purposes of this section, unfair
discrimination means cancellation, refusing to issue or renew, charging
any increased rate, restricting any length of coverage or in any way
practicing discrimination against persons unless such action is taken
pursuant to reliable information relating to the insured’s mortality or
morbidity, based on sound actuarial principles or actual or reasonably
anticipated claim experience.” “Genetic information [is] a test of human
DNA, RNA, mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or proteins for the
purposes of identifying genes, inherited or acquired genetic abnormalities,
or the presence of absence of inherited or acquired characteristics in
genetic material, which are associated with the predisposition to disease,
illness, impairment or other disease process.”); ME. STAT. tit. 24-A,
§ 2159-C(3) (2019) (Insurers may not unfairly discriminate against an
individual on the basis of genetic information or genetic test results in the
issuance, withholding, extension, or renewal of policies for life, disability,
long-term care, accidental injury, or annuity. “Unfair discrimination”
includes “the application of the results of a genetic test in a manner that
is not reasonably related to anticipated claims experience.”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 2019) (“No person shall make or permit any
unfair discrimination against any individual on the basis of genetic
information or the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available
the results of a genetic test to the person in the issuance, withholding,
extension or renewal of a policy of life insurance, including credit life
insurance, an annuity, disability in some insurance contract or credit
accident insurance coverage.” “Genetic information” is defined as
“information about genes, gene products or inherited characteristics that
may derive from an individual or family member” and “genetic test” is
defined as a “test for determining the presence or absence of an inherited
genetic characteristics in an individual including tests of nuclei acids such
as DNA, RNA and mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or proteins in order
to identify a predisposing genetic characteristic”); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2421-2 through 24-21-3 (2019) (Permits life, disability, and long-term care
insurers to use genetic analysis or information, but only “if the use of
genetic analysis or genetic information for under writing purposes is based
on sound actuarial principles or actual or reasonably anticipated
experience” where “genetic information” is defined as “the genetic makeup
of an individual or members of an individual’s family” and “genetic
analysis” refers to “a test of an individual’s DNA, gene products or
chromosomes that indicates a propensity or susceptibility to illness,
disease, impairment or other disorders, whether physical or mental; that
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likely to provide some protections to research participants, as much of
the genetic information from whole genome sequencing will be of
uncertain clinical significance and many conditions are multifactorial
and the relationships may not be known.223 Such genetic information is
unlikely to provide the kind of actuarial justification to permit their use
in underwriting. On the other hand, research involving whole genome
sequencing may also generate information that has known clinical
significance, and disability insurers would not be restricted from using
that information in underwriting. Wyoming prohibits disability insurers
from treating genetic information as a preexisting condition in the
absence of a diagnosis of a condition related to genetic information.224
While this does not prohibit its use in underwriting, it does provide
protection against denial of coverage should a claim arise.
A few states also prohibit use of genetic information225 or limit its
use unless it is based in “sound actuarial principles” 226 in long term care
demonstrates genetic or chromosomal damage due to environmental
factors; or that indicates carrier status for disease or disorder”).
223. Anya E.R. Prince, Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of
Genomics: Is A Rational Discrimination Policy Rational?, 96 NEB. L.
REV. 624, 656 (2018) (“[G]iven the current state of clinical knowledge,
much genomic information is remarkably unpredictive”).
224. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-19-107, 26-19-306 (2019).
225. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3.1104.7 (2018) (“Any entity that receives
information derived from genetic testing may not seek, use, or keep the
information for any nontherapeutic purpose or for any underwriting
purposes connected with the provision of group disability insurance or
long-term care insurance coverage” where “genetic testing” is defined as
“any laboratory test of human DNA, RNA, or chromosomes that is used
to identify the presence or absence of alternations in genetic material
which are associated with disease or illness”); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 18120 (2019) (a long-term care insurer may not “use a genetic test, the
results of a genetic test, genetic information, or a request for genetic
services to [ ] deny or limit the amount, extent, or kind of long-term care
insurance coverage available to an individual; or [ ] charge a different rate
for the same long term care insurance” unless “the use is based on sound
actuarial principles” where “genetic test” is defined as “an analysis of
human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites that detect
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” and genetic information
“means information derived from a genetic test”).
226. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 18-120 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175,
§ 108I (2018) (“No insurer, agent or broker authorized to issue policies
against disability from injury or disease or policies providing for long term
care in the commonwealth shall practice unfair discrimination against
persons because of the results of a genetic test or the provision of genetic
information, as defined in this section. For purposes of this section, unfair
discrimination means cancellation, refusing to issue or renew, charging
any increased rate, restricting any length of coverage or in any way
practicing discrimination against persons unless such action is taken
pursuant to reliable information relating to the insured’s mortality or
morbidity, based on sound actuarial principles or actual or reasonably
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insurance. Only Vermont prohibits use of genetic information in
underwriting for life insurance, although California and Maryland
prohibit underwriting based on genetic carrier status.227 A few other
anticipated claim experience.” “Genetic information [is] a test of human
DNA, RNA, mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or proteins for the
purposes of identifying genes, inherited or acquired genetic abnormalities,
or the presence of absence of inherited or acquired characteristics in
genetic material, which are associated with the predisposition to disease,
illness, impairment or other disease process.”); ME. STAT. tit. 24-A,
§ 2159-C(3) (2019) (Insurers may not unfairly discriminate against an
individual on the basis of genetic information or genetic test results in the
issuance, withholding, extension, or renewal of policies for life, disability,
long-term care, accidental injury, or annuity. “Unfair discrimination”
includes “the application of the results of a genetic test in a manner that
is not reasonably related to anticipated claims experience.”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 2019) (“No person shall make or permit any
unfair discrimination against any individual on the basis of genetic
information or the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available
the results of a genetic test to the person in the issuance, withholding,
extension or renewal of a policy of life insurance, including credit life
insurance, an annuity, disability in some insurance contract or credit
accident insurance coverage.” “Genetic information” is defined as
“information about genes, gene products or inherited characteristics that
may derive from an individual or family member” and “genetic test” is
defined as a “test for determining the presence or absence of an inherited
genetic characteristics in an individual including tests of nuclei acids such
as DNA, RNA and mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or proteins in order
to identify a predisposing genetic characteristic”); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2421-2 through 24-21-3 (2019) (Permits life, disability, and longterm care
insurers to use genetic analysis or information, but only “if the use of
genetic analysis or genetic information for underwriting purposes is based
on sound actuarial principles or actual or reasonably anticipated
experience” where “genetic information” is defined as “the genetic makeup
of an individual or members of an individual’s family” and “genetic
analysis” refers to “a test of an individual’s DNA, gene products or
chromosomes that indicates a propensity or susceptibility to illness,
disease, impairment or other disorders, whether physical or mental; that
demonstrates genetic or chromosomal damage due to environmental
factors; or that indicates carrier status for disease or disorder”).
227. VT. STA. ANN. tit. 18, § 9331 (2018). Maryland prohibits underwriting
based on specified genetic traits or other traits “that [are] harmless.”
Given the named traits, this statute may be limited to carrier status that
does not put the individual at risk of the disease. (prohibiting insurers
from “refus[ing] to insure or mak[ing] or allow[ing] a differential in ratings,
premium payments, or dividends in connection with life insurance and
annuity contracts solely because the applicant or policyholder has sicklecell trait, thalassemia-minor trait, hemoglobin C trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or
a genetic trait that is harmless in itself) (emphasis added); MD. CODE
ANN., INS. § 27-208(3) (LexisNexis 2018) (prohibiting insurers from
“refus[ing] to insure or mak[ing] or allow[ing] a differential in ratings,
premium payments, or dividends in connection with life insurance and
annuity contracts solely because the applicant or policyholder has sicklecell trait, thalassemia-minor trait, hemoglobin C trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or
a genetic trait that is harmless in itself.”); California has a similar
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states do restrict its use unless such use is based on “sound actuarial
practice or actual or reasonably anticipated claim experience.”228

provision, CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West 2019) (“No insurance company
licensed in [California] shall refuse to issue or sell or renew any policy of
life or disability insurance . . . solely by reason of the fact that the person
to be insured carriers a gene which may, under some circumstances be
associated with disability in that person’s offspring, but which causes no
adverse effects on the carrier”).
228. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 120E (2019) (“No insurer, agent or broker
authorized to issue policies on the lives of person in the commonwealth
shall practice unfair discrimination against persons because of the results
of a genetic test or the provision of genetic information . . . For purposes
of this section unfair discrimination means cancellation, refusing to issue
or renew, charging any increased rate, restricting any length of coverage
or in any way practicing discrimination against persons unless such action
is taken pursuant to relatable information related to the insured’s
mortality or morbidity, based on sound actuarial principles or actual or
reasonably anticipated claim experience.”); ME. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2159C(3) (2019) (Insurers may not unfairly discriminate against an individual
on the basis of genetic information or genetic test results in the issuance,
withholding, extension, or renewal of policies for life, disability, long-term
care, accidental injury, or annuity. “Unfair discrimination” includes “the
application of the results of a genetic test in a manner that is not
reasonably related to anticipated claims experience.”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17B:30-12 (West 2019) (“No person shall make or permit any unfair
discrimination against any individual on the basis of genetic information
or the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available the results of
a genetic test to the person in the issuance, withholding, extension or
renewal of a policy of life insurance, including credit life insurance, an
annuity, disability in some insurance contract or credit accident insurance
coverage.” “Genetic information” is defined as “information about genes,
gene products or inherited characteristics that may derive from an
individual or family member” and “genetic test” is defined as a “test for
determining the presence or absence of an inherited genetic characteristics
in an individual including tests of nuclei acids such as DNA, RNA and
mitochondrial DNA, chromosomes or proteins in order to identify a
predisposing genetic characteristic”); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-2 through
24-21-3 (2019) (Permits life, disability, and long-term care insurers to use
genetic analysis or information, but only “if the use of genetic analysis or
genetic information for underwriting purposes is based on sound actuarial
principles or actual or reasonably anticipated experience” where “genetic
information” is defined as “the genetic makeup of an individual or
members of an individual’s family” and “genetic analysis” refers to “a test
of an individual’s DNA, gene products or chromosomes that indicates a
propensity or susceptibility to illness, disease, impairment or other
disorders, whether physical or mental; that demonstrates genetic or
chromosomal damage due to environmental factors; or that indicates
carrier status for disease or disorder”); Wisconsin’s law prohibits insurers
from using genetic information obtained for life insurance in underwriting
for any other insurance. WIS. STAT. § 631.89 (2018).
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iii. Other
Though GINA’s prohibition on collecting or requesting genetic
information does not extend beyond employers or health insurers, we
found a number of states that expand prohibitions on use of genetic
information beyond GINA to a range of other areas, such as housing,
education, and financial transactions.229 Some prohibit discrimination
based on genetic information to places of public accommodation, which
is an expansive protection to a variety of business that offer services
and products to the public.230

229. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 195.81(d)(1) (2017) (temporary housing
assistance programs for parolees); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (West 2019)
(Genetic and other discrimination in housing is “declared to be against
public policy”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12944 (West 2019) (prohibition
against discrimination in housing and employment); variety of California
laws restricting discrimination in financial transactions, including: CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 7044 (West 2019) (California Health Facilities
Financing Authority, Children’s Hospital Program of 2004); CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 4, § 7065 (West 2019) (California Health Facilities Financing
Authority, Children’s Hospital Program of 2008); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4,
§ 7092 (West 2019) (California Health Facilities Financing Authority, the
Community Clinic Grant Program of 2005); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4,
§ 7124 (West 2019) (California Health Facilities Financing Authority,
Investment in Mental Health Wellness Grant Program); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 4, § 8095(k) (West 2019); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 8102 (West 2019)
(California Pollution Control Financing Authority, California Recycle
Underutilized Sites (Cal Reuse) Program); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 8115
(West 2019) (California Pollution Control Financing Authority,
Sustainable Communities Grant and Loan Program-Grants); CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 4, § 8123 (West 2019) (California Pollution Control Financing
Authority, Sustainable Communities Grant and Loan Programs-Loans;
and CAL. CODE REGS. tit 4, § 9064 (West 2019) (California Educational
Facilities Authority, the Cefa Academic Assistance Grant Program); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 11135 (West 2019) (prohibiting discrimination based on
genetic information (among other characteristics) in “any program or
activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by
any state agency, if funded directly by the state, or receiving any financial
assistance from the state,” and explicitly includes the “California State
University.”); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 14, § 4906 (2019) (housing); 14 DEL.
ADMIN. CODE § 225 (2019) (“any program or activity received approval
or financial assistance from or through the Delaware Department of
Education”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4 (2019) (housing or lending
decisions); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2019); Exec. Order No.
01.01.2007.16F, 34 MD. CODE REGS. 1728 (2019) (state programs); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 5122-14-11 (LexisNexis 2019); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-2618 (LexisNexis 2019).
230. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31 (2019) (discrimination law extends to “deny[ing],
directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4D (2019);
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-30-22 (LexisNexis 2019) (mental health
provision).
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Iowa includes genetic information as part of “identification
information” for purposes of its identity theft law.231 Vermont explicitly
limits putting some genetic specimens into criminal databases. This
includes specimens “collected voluntarily,” suggesting that specimens
collected with consent for research could not be placed into these
databases.232
iv. Exceptions in state laws limiting use of genetic information
There are numerous exceptions to the state law restrictions imposed
on analyzing or using genetic information described above.233 These not
only may undermine or narrow the protections, but also make it more
challenging to describe the protections to participants in genomic
research.
For example, states may permit genetic information to be used
without individuals’ knowledge or consent for paternity testing,
newborn screening, law enforcement purposes, or criminal DNA
banking.234 In addition, consistent with GINA (but typically not
included in consent forms), states may permit employers to use genetic
information for determination of bona fide occupational qualifications,
workers’ compensation claims, and worker safety (e.g., to monitor toxic
exposures).235
In sum, states extend GINA-type prohibitions on the collection,
access, or requesting of genetic information to entities that are not
subject to GINA to varying degrees. One-third of states provided
GINA-type employment protections to employers with five or fewer
employees. Only a few extended protections to non-health insurance
and several states extend genetic discrimination protections beyond
employment or insurance such as to housing or education, suggesting
that affording such protections is possible. One fear often expressed
about expanding GINA’s scope is that it would be economically
unworkable to extend prohibitions on genetic discrimination to other
contexts, including smaller employers, other forms of insurance,
educational, or economic opportunities. While empirical study may yet
reveal these provisions are largely symbolic and difficult to enforce, the
fact that several states have expanded the scope of genetic anti-

231. “A person commits the offense of identity theft if the person fraudulently
uses or attempts to fraudulently use identification information of another
person, with the intent to obtain credit, property, services, or other
benefit.” IOWA CODE § 715A.8 (2019).
232. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332 (2019).
233. See infra table in the Appendix for list of laws with these exceptions.
234. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/22, 30-31 (2019); for further
examples, see Appendix.
235. ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/25 (2019)
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discrimination may suggest that such expansions are economically
feasible.
d. Individual rights created

One of the primary ways states fill in gaps in the federal laws
protecting participants in genomic research is to extend broader private
rights to the individual. The federal laws offer few legal remedies or
enforceable rights for individuals aggrieved by violations of these federal
requirements; the Common Rule is silent as to remedies, there is no
private right of action (right to sue) under the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
although a violation could serve as evidence for a state tort claim,236
and GINA limits recovery.237 The enforcement mechanisms under these
federal laws focus on administrative penalties rather than conferring
individual causes of action. Thus, perhaps the most significant way that
states expand upon the protections offered to participants in genomic
research is to provide private rights of action and statutory remedies
for violations of state laws limiting access, use, and disclosure of genetic
information.
Aside from private enforcement, states may build upon the federal
standards by offering individuals more specific rights to access and
control their genetic information than offered under federal law,
including rights to notification about what is done with the individual’s
information, right to access information, right to request the
destruction of the individual’s biospecimens or samples, or property
rights in one’s genetic information. Given the focus of this project, we
have only included laws that are written broadly enough that they
236. See, e.g., Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (“HIPAA
does not contain any express language conferring privacy rights upon a
specific class of individuals . . . . Because HIPAA specifically delegates
enforcement, there is a strong indication that Congress intended to
preclude private enforcement.”); Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics &
Gynecology, P.C., 314 Conn. 433, 459 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (“[T]o the extent
it has become the common practice for Connecticut health care providers
to follow the procedures required under HIPAA in rendering services to
their patients, HIPAA and its implementing regulations may be utilized
to inform the standard of care applicable to such claims arising from
allegations of negligence in the disclosure of patients’ medical records
pursuant to a subpoena”).
237. For the Common Rule, see text accompanying notes 108-109; For
GINA, see Pub. L. No. 110-881, § 207, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) and
Background Information for EEOC Final Rule on Title II of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ginabackground.cfm (last visited Dec. 30, 2018) (discussing filing charges with
the EEOC and remedies for a violation in paragrpahs 24 and 25, and
noting that damages are subject to Title VII’s cap on combined
compensatory and punitive damages (excluding past monetary losses)
ranges from $50,000 for employers with 15-100 employees to $300,000 for
employers with more than 500 employees).
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could be interpreted to apply to research-related holders of genetic
information.
i. Enforcement rights
State laws regarding access, use, or disclosure of genetic information
distinguish themselves from their federal counterparts by providing
remedies, penalties, or both for violations of their requirements.
Twenty-six states create a private right of action for violation of their
various genetic-specific laws.238 Eight states make violations of laws
regarding genetic information a violation of the state’s unfair or
deceptive trade practice statute.239 Unlike the Federal Trade

238. These include ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.020 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5404 (2018); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.35 (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10140.1 (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 742.407 (West 2019); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 56.17 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.6 (2018); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (2018); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 1208 (2019); FLA.
STAT. § 760.40 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.541 (2017) (any person); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-54-8 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 108L (2018); 10
ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/40(a) (2019); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1
(2019); IOWA CODE § 507B.7 (2019); IOWA CODE 715A.8 (2019); IOWA
CODE 729.6 (2019); IOWA CODE § 715A.8 (2019); IOWA CODE § 729.6
(2019); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-15.11(5) (2019); LA. ADMIN CODE tit.
37, § 4515 (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN
§ 40:3.1 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:3.1 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch., 151B, § 4 (2018); See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175, § 108H (2018);
See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175, § 108L (2018); See MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 175, § 120E (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176A, §3B (2018);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 5B (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 24
(2017); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-C (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 19302
(2018); MINN. STAT. § 181.974.3 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.345, .405
(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.201 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141H:6 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:546 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-6 (2019); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615
(McKinney 2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.3-4 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-93-90 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20 (2019); TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 21-403(e) (2017); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 58.001 et seq. (2017); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 26-45-105 (West 2017); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. R398-1
(2019) (newborn screening only); UTAH CODE § 26-23-6 (West 2018); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:1 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §9334 (2018); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9335 (2018); See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.02.005(2019).
239. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.6 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-8 (2019); IND. CODE § 27-4-1-4 (2018);
IND. CODE § 27-8-26-1 (2018); IOWA CODE § 507B.4(h) (2019); IOWA CODE
§ 715A.8 (2019); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-15.11(5) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B,
§ 4 (2018); see MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 175, § 108 (2018); MASS GEN. LAWS
ch. 175, § 120E (2018); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 176A, § 3B (2018); MASS
GEN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 5A (2018); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 24 (2018);
MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1303 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-93-10 (2018);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 9334, 9335 (2018).
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Commission Act (FTCA),240 which may only be enforced by the FTC,241
most state unfair trade practice laws permit private causes of action,
allowing individuals to recover compensatory damages and attorneys’
fees, with some states also providing for punitive damages.242 In
contrast, other states only authorize state enforcement of their geneticspecific laws either through the attorney general’s office or through the
appropriate state agency.243 Several of these state enforcement
240. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
241. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and
Law Enforcement Authority, FED TRADE COMM’N (July 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-wedo/enforcement-authority.
242. Bob Cohen, Right to Private Action Under State Consumer Protection
Act – Preconditions to Action, 117 AM. L. REP.5th 155, § 2[a] (2004); Of
the states listed in supra note 239, the following specifically authorize
individual actions: see GA. CODE. ANN. § 33-54-8 (2019); GA. CODE. ANN
§ 10-1-399(d) (2019) (pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(d) (2019),
which authorizes treble damages (for intentional violations), equitable
relief, and “irrespective of the amount in controversy” attorney’s fees and
costs); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (2016); See MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 175 § 108H; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 108L (2018);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 120E (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
176A, §3B (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 5B (2018); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 176G, § 24 (2017) (pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93A,
§ 9, which authorizes the greater of actual damages or twenty-five dollars,
double or treble damages (for willful or knowing violations), equitable
relief, attorney’s fees and costs); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-90 (2018)
(pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (2018), which authorizes treble
damages (for willful or knowing violations), equitable relief, attorneys fees
and costs); Indiana expressly provides that it does “not create a cause of
action other than an action by: (1) the commissioner to enforce his order;
or (2) a person . . . to appeal an order of the commissioner.” The
remainder are silent, although some, like Vermont authorize an individual
cause of action within the statute we considered. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 9334, 9335 (2018).
243. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.933 (West 2018) (authorizing the state
attorney general to bring an action against an agency or third party for a
violation); Other states authorize attorneys general or district attorneys
to enforce the acts. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6220 (2019); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 39-8304 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 § 70G (2018);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-6 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.545 (2019).
Others place the authority with the state official that oversees insurers.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-53-3 (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4 (2018)
(declaring a violation of IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26 as an “unfair trade
practice”); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1309(2) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17B:30-12 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.65(C) (West 2019);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.65 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3901.491C (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.501C (2019); TEX. INS.
CODE § 84.002(a) (2017). Some states classify violations as crimes see,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01.3-09 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.543
(2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-37-30 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-5506(a), (b)(2) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 942.07 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 943.201
(2018).
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provisions impose civil or criminal fines or imprisonment for violations
of the state’s genetic-specific laws.244 While state action can be an
important mechanism for enforcing these laws and serve as a deterrent,
they typically do not compensate individuals whose rights have been
violated as civil or criminal fines are paid to the state, not the
individual. In addition, where state enforcement is the only mechanism,
aggrieved individuals may have no recourse against someone who has
violated their rights if the state chooses not to act. Accordingly, a state
law provision of a private right of action can be significant.
Importantly, eight states provide for statutory damages, that is, a
minimum amount that may be collected in damages for a violation of
the law (Table 2). The significance of statutory damages is that it
obviates the need for the aggrieved individual to prove they were
harmed or injured in some tangible way by the violation, it is sufficient
to prove the violation occurred,245 which makes it easier to assert a claim
for intangible or dignitary harms than it would be under an ordinary
tort claim for damages, which requires proving an injury.246 For
example, if a researcher or biobank were to disclose a participant’s
genetic information without consent, under a statutory damages
provision, the affected individual does not have to prove she suffered
an economic or other tangible harm from the unlawful disclosure; if she
can prove the violation, she is entitled to the statutory damages
amount. If the aggrieved individual can demonstrate actual damages
that are greater than the statutory damages, typically she may recover
her actual damages.

244. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.030 (2018) (it is a misdemeanor to
knowingly collect, analyze, retain, or disclose DNA in violation of the
chapter); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01.3-09 (2019) (making knowing disclose
of protected information a misdemeanor).
245. See ROBERT L. HAIG, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS 131, n.14 (4th ed. 2016) (describing statutory damages as “an
automatic measure of recovery to plaintiffs regardless of injury or profits
“where proof of damages or discovery of profits is difficult or impossible”)
(quoting Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887
F.2d 399, 406, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457 (2d Cir. 1989)).
246. Id. at 130-131.
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Table 2
State (code citation)

Damage amount

Alaska (Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.13.020)

Actual damages + $5,000
(+ $100,000 if the violator profited from
violation)

California (Cal. Civ. Code 56.17)

Negligent disclosure, civil penalty not to

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-3-1104.6 & 10-3-

Greater of actual damages or $10,000 per

exceed $1,000 (paid to subject)
1104.7

violation

Illinois (410 Ill Comp. Stat. Ann. 513/1)

Greater of $2,500 or actual damages
(negligent) OR
Greater of $15,000 or actual damages
(intentional or reckless)

Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 22:1023)

Greater of actual damages or $50,000
(negligent)
Greater of actual damages or $100,000
(intentional)

Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch.

Actual damages (contract) or special

151B § 4)

damages not to exceed $1,000

New Hampshire (NH Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141-

Not less than $1,000 per violation

H:1 et seq)
Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 192.531 et

Violations regarding retention or human

seq)

subjects requirements (§§ 192.537 & 547)
greater of actual damages or:
$100 (inadvertent violation)
$500 (negligent violation)
$10,000 (knowing or reckless violation)
$15,000 (knowing violation w/ fraudulent
representation)
$25,000 (knowing violation with intent to
sell, transfer or use for commercial
advantage, personal gain or malicious
harm)
Violations regarding consent or disclosure
requirements (§§ 535 and 539) greater of
actual damages or:
$1,000 (inadvertent violation)
$5,000 (negligent violation)
$100,000 (knowing or reckless violation)
$150,000 (knowing violation w/ fraudulent
representation)
$250,000 (knowing violation with intent to
sell, transfer or use for commercial
advantage, personal gain or malicious
harm)
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As Table 2 shows, the statutory minimum damages vary
considerably, from a total award low of $1,000 to a high of $50,000 for
negligent violations and a per violation low of $1,000 and high of
$10,000. Nevertheless, provision of any level of statutory damages could
be essential for enforcing the rights afforded by these statutes, as actual
damages may be difficult to prove. Those states with per violation
statutory minimum damages also may facilitate claims from multiple
participants because of the ability to aggregate those claims and
increase the value of the suit. In addition to statutory damages, several
states authorize punitive damages, 247 which may be imposed to deter
the violator and others from engaging in similar behavior in the future.
States also provide for equitable relief, or non-monetary remedies, which
can be in addition to or instead of damages, as appropriate.248
Seventeen states also provide for attorneys’ fees249 and twelve
provide for court costs.250 These provisions may encourage attorneys to
undertake cases and, thus, make it more feasible for people to seek to
247. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (2018) (health care providers and facilities;
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-45-105 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:1
(2018) (employer); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9335 (2018) (insurers and
employers).
248. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/40(a) (2019) (health insurers and employers);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 22-66-320(e) (2018) (health insurers); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-3-1104.6 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (2018)
(health, disability, and long-term care insurers); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-548 (2019) (health insurers); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019) (health insurers and
employers); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70G (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 1711-C (2018) (health care facilities and providers); MINN. STAT.
§ 181.974.3(4) (2018) (employers); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-6 (2019) (any
person); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.541(1) (2019) (any person); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-6.7-3 (2018) (employer); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-90 (2018) (health
insurers); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-45-105 (2017) (insurers and employers);
VT. STAT ANN. tit. 18, § 9335 (2018) (any person); See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.02.005 et seq. (2019) (applying heath care providers).
249. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-8 (2019); IOWA CODE § 715A.8 (2019); IOWA
CODE § 729.6 (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (2018); LA. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 37, §4515 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 181.974.3(3) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:6 (2018); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-21-6 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.201 (2019); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-3 (2019) (to prevailing applicant or employee); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-45-105 (2018);
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:1 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9335
(2018). This number also includes the states who provide attorneys’ fee
to prevailing party infra note 165.
250. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.17 (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-8 (2019);
IOWA CODE § 715A.8 (2019); IOWA CODE § 729.6 (2019); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1023 (2018); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, §4515 (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 181.974 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:6 (2018); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-21-6 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.201 (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. § 28-6.7-3 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20 (2019); VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-28.7:1 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9335 (2018).
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redress violations under these laws. In contrast, some states provide for
attorneys’ fees and costs for the prevailing party, which suggests that
defendants could be eligible for attorneys’ fees and costs if the plaintiff
does not establish the violation of the statute.251 This adds an additional
financial risk to bringing a lawsuit, which could serve as a deterrent to
those who seek to enforce their rights under these laws.
ii. Right of notification
A couple of states require individuals to be notified about what is
done with their genetic information. For example, Florida and New
Jersey require any person who requests or performs genetic testing or
analysis to notify the individual when genetic testing is performed or
when the results of such genetic tests are obtained.252 Florida also
imposes an obligation to provide the results to the person’s physician,
upon request, and to indicate whether the information was used to make
a decision for “insurance, employment, mortgage, loan, credit, or
educational opportunity.”253 Both states’ laws apply the notice
requirement to “a person” who requires, requests, or receives the results
of genetic testing. In keeping with our analytic approach discussed
above,254 we interpret such broad statutes to potentially apply to
researchers and biobanks because neither the statutory provision nor
the definition of genetic testing is limited to clinical or diagnostic
settings.
iii Right to access information
The right to access one’s information is often viewed as providing
individuals with more control over such information.255 Some
251. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.6 (2018); See COLO. REV. STAT. § 103-1104.7 (2018); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/40(a)(3) (2019); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.541(6) (2019)
(although an award to the defendant may be made “only if the court finds
that the plaintiff had no objectively reasonable basis for asserting a claim
or for appealing an adverse decision of the trial court); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-37.3-4 (2018) (contrast R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-3 (2018) which
refers to the prevailing applicant or employee, excluding the employer
from recovery); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-90 (2018); See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.02.005 et seq. (2019) (applying to costs).
252. FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-48 (West 2018) (Both
states’ laws apply the notice requirement to “a person” who requires,
requests, or receives the results of genetic testing. In keeping with our
analytic approach discussed in we interpret such broad statutes to
potentially apply to researchers and biobanks because neither the
statutory provision nor the definition of genetic testing is limited to
clinical or diagnostic settings).
253. FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 161-166.
255. See, e.g., Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health
Information 45 C.F.R. § 164.524, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
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participants seek full access to their genomic information.256
Nevertheless, in the context of genomic research, the right of access to
one’s own genomic information, particularly findings of ambiguous
clinical relevance, may also be viewed as creating risk rather than
protecting participants from risk. There is considerable debate about
the legality and ethics of returning individuals their genomic
information, which could expose the individual to a number of risks,
including psychological distress, familial disruption, unneeded medical
intervention, and discrimination in insurance, employment or other
economic opportunities.257
Federal human subjects research regulations under the Common
Rule do not require that researchers provide participants with access to
their information or data being held by researchers.258 To the extent the
research institution designates researchers or biobanks as HIPAA
covered entities or uses a HIPAA-covered laboratory, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule requires covered entities to provide individuals with access
to their health information (which includes genetic information) by
request.259 And if that information escapes the research context and is
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access/
index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2019) (stating, “Providing individuals
with easy access to their health information empowers them to be more
in control of decisions regarding their health and well-being. For example,
individuals with access to their health information are better able to
monitor chronic conditions, adhere to treatment plans, find and fix errors
in their health records, track progress in wellness or disease management
programs, and directly contribute their information to research”).
256. Anna Middleton et al., Potential Research Participants Support the
Return of Raw Sequence Data, 52 J. MED. GENETICS 571, 572-73
(2015) (reporting survey results that 62% of participants would like to
access their raw sequence data in a genomic study); see also Adrian
Thorogood et al., APPLaUD: Access for Patients and Participants to
Individual Level Uninterpreted Genomic Data, 12 HUM. GENETICS 7, 8
(2018) (listing research projects returning individual access to genomic
data).
257. See, e.g., Thought Leader supra note 51; McGuire et al., supra note 49,
at 28; Kristin E. Clift et al., Patients’ Views on Incidental Findings from
Clinical Exome Sequencing, 4 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 38,
40 (2015); Joon-Ho Yu et al., Attitudes of Genetics Professionals
Toward the Return of Incidental Results from Exome and WholeGenome Sequencing, 95 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 77, 77 (2014); Susan
M. Wolf, The Past, Present, & Future of the Debate Over Return of
Research Results & Incidental Findings, 14 GENETICS MED. 355
(2012).
258. There has been substantial debate about return of research results because
there is no such legal obligation under the Common Rule. See, e.g., Susan
M. Wolf, Return of Individual Research Results & Incidental Findings:
Facing the Challenges of Translational Science, 14 ANNU. REV. GENOMICS
HUM. GENET. 557 (2013) [hereinafter Return of Individual Research].
259. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii) (2018). The regulations allow covered
entities to deny an individual access to his or her health information while
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obtained by employers labor organizations, GINA permits, but does not
require, employers and labor organizations to disclose an individual’s
genetic information to the individual employee or member at the
written request of the individual.260
Although numerous states have provisions that grant individuals
the right to access their own information, only Oregon’s law explicitly
applies to research participants.261 Several states are more broadly
written, but grant the right of the person tested to get access to their
genetic information.262 Under Florida law, the person tested may request
it is being used in research, but only if the research includes treatment
(e.g., a clinical trial, not research only involving the individual’s
information) and the individual has agreed to the denial of access as part
of the consent to participate in the research and the covered entity informs
the individual that the right of access will be reinstated at the completion
of research. Thus, the “research exception” to the obligation to provide
individuals access to their information would not likely apply to genomic
research that does not involve treatment; There has been substantial
debate about return of research results because there is no such legal
obligation under the Common Rule. See also Barbara J. Evans,
HIPAA’s Individual Right of Access to Genomic Data: Reconciling Safety
and Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 5 (2018) (discussing the
applicability of HIPAA’s right of access to research laboratories that store
genomic data, including the research exception under the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) for certain laboratories that do not
report individual-specific results for clinical purposes, and arguing that
individuals have a civil right to their genomic data).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(b) (2008).
261. The relevant portion of the statute, which in various sections specifically
addresses research, provides that “An individual or an individual’s
representative, promptly upon request, may inspect, request correction of
and obtain genetic information from the records of the individual.” OR.
REV. STAT. § 192.537(7).
262. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1204 (2012) (“An individual promptly upon
request, may inspect, request correction of and obtain genetic information
from the records of that individual”); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 629.121, 629.141
(2017) (“A person who takes a genetic test may inspect or obtain any
genetic information included in the records of the test” where genetic test
is “a test . . . to determine the presence of abnormalities or deficiencies,
including carrier status, that . . . [a]re linked to physical or mental
disorders or impairments or . . . [i]ndicate a susceptibility to illness,
disease, impairment or any other disorder, whether physical or mental”);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (West 2018) (“An individual or individual’s
representative, promptly upon request, may inspect, request correction of
and obtain genetic information from the records of the individual unless
the individual directs otherwise by informed consent . . . ”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-22 (2019). Although these statutes do not mention
genetic testing for research purposes, they define genetic tests or
information broadly, so that they may be interpreted as applying to
research tests. That other states limit their definitions of genetic tests or
information to tests done for clinical purposes supports this interpretation.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17020(8)(e) (2018); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10148 (West 2019) (“The insurer shall notify an applicant of a test result
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that “the information will be made available to his or her physician.”263
Other states’ laws refer to patients’ rights to access their own records,
and, thus, may only apply to research participants who are also
patients.264 In addition, some states limit the right to particular
circumstances.265 Some of these states allow individuals to amend their
genetic information.266 Washington’s law, which applies to medical
information, including genetic information, similarly permits correction
of information.267
The significance of these state laws is that, for researchers that are
not HIPAA covered entities, these states may require researchers to
allow participants to access their information where ordinarily the
Common Rule and HIPAA would not require it. It also could limit the
ability of such researchers to conduct research without giving
participants the option to receive their genomic information. Although
by notifying the applicant or the applicant’s designated physician”);
MINN. STAT. § 72A.139 (2019) (“The life insurance company or fraternal
benefit society shall notify an individual of a genetic test result by
notifying the individual or the individual’s designated physician”).
263. FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018).
264. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-109 (2018) (refers to
“unambiguous diagnostic results”); 10A N.C. ADMIN CODE § 47c.0105
(2019); See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.005 et seq. (2019).
265. For newborn screening programs, see, e.g., ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 122802A (2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124975 (2019); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-111 (2018). For other contexts, see, e.g. MICH.
COMP. LAWS. §§ 333.5431(1)-(2) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-519 (2019);
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-80 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.310(3) (2019);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.140-50 (2019). For other contexts, see, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 333.17020, 333.17520 (2018) (limited to MDs and genetic
tests, defined as a test for clinical purposes); MINN. STAT. § 72A.139
(2019) (limited to life insurance); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (2019)
(limited to life or disability insurance); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.4032 (2017);
TEX. INS. CODE § 546.101 (2017); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 58.001 et seq.
(2017) (limiting application to insurance, labor, and occupations,
respectively).
266. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1204 (2019) (“An individual promptly upon
request, may inspect, request correction of and obtain genetic information
from the records of that individual”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (2019);
OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(7) (2019) (“An individual or an individual’s
representative, promptly upon request, may inspect, request correction of
and obtain genetic information from the records of the individual”).
267. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act Guidance (2009),
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERV.
(Mar.
24,
2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/guidanceon-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act/index.html (noting that
“GINA has implications regarding the actual or perceived risks of genetic
research and an individual’s willingness to participate in such research,”
and its relevance to consent, as well as the evaluation of the risks of the
study); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.100 (2019).
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there are strong arguments for permitting research participants the
right to access their information,268 the return of genomic research
results to participants poses ethical269 and legal risks. The legal risks
stem from the fact that once in the possession of the individual or their
physician, genomic information is more apt to be accessed by others
who may use the information in a discriminatory or malicious manner.270
iv. Right to destroy samples
Another type of control over one’s genetic information is the right
to order that one’s genetic information be destroyed. In the research
context, the right to destroy may prevent a health care provider from
sharing genetic information with researchers, may prevent researchers
who already have genetic information from conducting secondary
research with that information or samples, or may prevent further
disclosure of the information outside the research context, whether
through legal or unauthorized means. Federal laws, including the
Common Rule, GINA, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, do not provide
individuals a right to order the destruction of their genetic information
by anyone who holds such information.271
Oregon’s law requires destruction of a DNA sample held by “any
person” upon the individual’s request, unless the information is required
for criminal investigation purposes, retention is authorized by a specific
court order, or it is for anonymous or coded research after notification
or consent.272 In addition, DNA samples used in non-anonymous
research must be destroyed by researchers if the individual withdraws
from the study, unless the individual consents to retention.273 New
Jersey’s provisions are very similar to Oregon’s, although samples can
only be retained for criminal investigation purposes, court order, or with
consent.274 Nevada’s law generally provides that a person holding an
individual’s genetic information must destroy it upon request.275 Other

268. See Evans, supra note 259, at 5-6.
269. See Return of Individual Research, supra note 258, at 3, 9-10.
270. Thought-Leader., supra note 51.
271. Although researchers may have an ethical obligation to destroy a sample
when a participant withdraws consent, the regulations do not require it.
See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
272. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.527(4) (2019).
273. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(5) (2019).
274. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-46 (2018).
275. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.161 (2019). Like the Oregon law, there are
exceptions for criminal investigations and court orders, as well as when
necessary for the medical record or authorized or required by state or
federal law.
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states limit this right to request destruction of genetic samples to
specific circumstances, most commonly newborn screening registries.276
v. Property rights
Five states, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana,
provide that genetic information is the property of the individual.
Alaska’s statute simply says that “a DNA sample and the results of a
DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of
the person sampled or analyzed.”277 Colorado and Georgia refers to
genetic information being “the unique property of the individual.”278
Florida provides that “the results of . . . DNA analysis, whether held
by a public or private entity, are the exclusive property of the person
tested.”279 Louisiana states that “genetic information is the property of
the” applicant, insured, or enrollee.280
It is not clear what these statutes intend. Traditional property
rights typically include the right to the use of and benefits from the
property and the right to exclude others.281 However, in one of the few
cases involving one of these statutes, the federal district court found
Florida’s property state law inapplicable to claims brought by biological
specimen donors for conversion. It interpreted the statute as providing
“only [ ] penalties for disclosure or lack of informed consent if a person
is being genetically analyzed.”282 More recently, however, courts have
signaled a greater openness to considering claims based on an assertion
of genetic property ownership.283 Thus, though courts had historically
been reluctant to recognize individuals’ genetic property interests
provided under state laws, the legal status of genetic property
ownership is unsettled and may be shifting to a broader recognition of

276. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §44-37-30 (2018).
277. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2018).
278. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.6 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2019).
279. FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2018).
280. LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (2018); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, §4515 (2018).
281. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730, 730 (1998) (citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kaiser
Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979), as famously stating that “one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property” is “the right to exclude others.”); see also
Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2018) (identifying three limited property
entitlements a person may have in their DNA: the right to exclude,
the right to access, and the right to commercialize).
282. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
283. Peerenboom v. Perlmutter, No. 2013-CA-015257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2017).
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an individual property interest in their genetic information.284 If so,
these state-level genetic property laws would potentially offer genomic
research participants significantly greater control over their genetic
information, including the right to exclude others from using the
information, a broader right of access to the information, and remedies
for unwanted uses.285
C. Medical Privacy Laws
1. Federal Medical Privacy Laws

As described above, the primary federal health information privacy
laws are the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.286 Participants in
genomic research are often generally aware of HIPAA’s privacy
protections because of their interactions with the law in the clinical
health care setting, but they may not be aware of HIPAA’s specific
protections or its limitations. The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally
prohibits covered entities287 and their business associates288 from using
or disclosing PHI289 without individual authorization.290 The HIPAA
Privacy Rule provides individuals the right to access their information,
receive an accounting of disclosures, and request amendments or
corrections to their PHI.291 In addition, the HIPAA Security Rule
imposes technical, physical, and organizational standards for covered
entities and their business associates who handle PHI, such as
encryption, facility access controls, and workforce security measures.292
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s general prohibition on uses and
disclosures of PHI by covered entities and business associates is subject
to several exceptions whereby PHI may be disclosed without individual
authorization or an opportunity to object. These exceptions include,
284. Roberts, supra note 281, at 1110.
285. Id. at 1164-1167.
286. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2018).
287. A HIPAA covered entity is: “(1) A health plan. (2) A health care
clearinghouse. (3) A health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered
by this subchapter.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
288. A “business associate” is a person or entity that performs certain functions
or activities that involve the use or disclosure of protected health
information on behalf of, or provides services to, a covered entity. 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
289. Protected Health Information (PHI) is “individually identifiable health
information . . . that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii)
Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any
other form or medium.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
290. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018).
291. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a), 164.526(a), 164.528(a)(1) (2018).
292. 45 C.F.R. § 164.302-318 (2018).
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among others, uses and disclosures for treatment, payment, or health
care operations;293 as required by law; for public health purposes; for
law enforcement purposes; about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic
violence; in response to a court order or subpoena in a judicial or
administrative proceeding; for government inspection; for national
security and intelligence purposes; and for research purposes if an IRB
or Privacy Board waives authorization.294 Thus, even if a researcher or
biobank is considered a covered entity and the research data were PHI,
there are many circumstances under HIPAA where the researcher or
biobank may use or disclose participants’ information without their
authorization.
As noted above, HIPAA may have limited applicability to
researchers and biobanks if they do not furnish health care services to
the research participant or engage in covered transactions regarding
such services, such as submitting a claim for payment.295 Although
research institutions may elect to extend covered entity status beyond
their clinical health care providers to researchers, they are not required
to do so.296 Moreover, not all research data may be considered PHI if it
is not created by a health care provider, health plan, or employer or it
is not individually identifiable.297 For example, if a non-covered entity
researcher collects data from participants directly or anonymizes the
data, the HIPAA Privacy Rule would not apply.298 If the information
293. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c) (2018).
294. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2018).
295. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102-103 (2018); see also When is a Researcher Considered
to be a Covered Health Care Provider Under HIPAA?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERV. (Nov. 27, 2006), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/faq/314/when-is-a-researcher-considered-a-covered-healthcare-provider-under-hipaa/index.html.
296. See When Does a Covered Entity Have Discretion to Determine Whether
a Research Component of the Entity is Part of Their Covered Functions,
and Therefore, Subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule?, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Mar. 14, 2006), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/faq/315/when-does-a-covered-entity-have-discretion-todetermine-covered-functions/index.html.
297. Individually
identifiable
health
information
is:
“information that is a subset of health information, including demographic
information
collected
from
an
individual,
and:
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer,
or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of
health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for
the provision of health care to an individual; and (i) That identifies the
individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe the information can be used to identify the individual.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103 (2018).
298. Under the Privacy Rule, information is considered de-identified and thus
beyond the Privacy Rule’s reach if the information “does not identify an

76

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research

were to exit the research context through a permitted disclosure or
breach, HIPAA would not apply to third parties holding the
information. In other words, HIPAA’s protections apply to specific
entities and do not follow the health information once it leaves those
entities’ hands.
In terms of violations and enforcement, the HIPAA Privacy Rule
requires covered entities and their business associates to notify the
affected individuals in the event of a breach of their unsecured
(unencrypted) information.299 The HIPAA Privacy Rule only provides
for enforcement by governmental authorities, who may seek civil or
criminal penalties, depending on the severity of the violation.300
Notably, although individuals affected by a breach may file a complaint
with the government, HIPAA does not provide individuals with a
private cause of action or other mechanism to seek redress for
violations.301 In sum, due to its limited applicability, extensive
exceptions, and limited remedies, the HIPAA Privacy Rule offers only
limited protection to participants in genomic research. In fact,
participants who are reassured by consent language referencing federal
health information privacy laws may not fully understand how limited
those protections are.
2. State Medical Privacy Laws

A multitude of state laws address medical privacy generally, with
much duplication as states apply them to various types of health care
providers, health insurers, and those businesses that support the health
care system. These are generally consistent with the HIPAA Privacy
Rule obligations as well as its limits and, thus, do not add to the scope
of protections afforded to research participants. We therefore focused
on state laws that extend health information privacy obligations beyond
individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe
that the information can be used to identify an individual is not
individually identifiable health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a)
(2018). Information that is stripped of eighteen identifiers is considered
de-identified (e.g., name, birthdate, zip codes, addresses, social security
numbers, medical record numbers, etc.). 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2018);
This safe harbor for de-identification would apply to genetic or genomic
information that has been demonstrated to be re-identifiable without use
of a code or breaching data security. See supra text accompanying notes
20 and 22.
299. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2018).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–6 (2010) (authorizing criminal penalties); 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.400-426 (2018) (authorizing civil penalties).
301. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (“HIPAA does not
contain any express language conferring privacy rights upon a specific
class of individuals . . . . Because HIPAA specifically delegates
enforcement, there is a strong indication that Congress intended to
preclude private enforcement”).
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the HIPAA Privacy Rule, whether by imposing obligations on entities
not covered by HIPAA, imposing obligations that go beyond those
required by HIPAA, or providing affected individuals private remedies
for violations or additional rights.
a. State laws imposing privacy obligations beyond HIPAA covered entities

Some states impose a broad obligation on “any person” to maintain
confidentiality of medical or health information.302 In other cases, states
302. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-999a (2019) (“No person shall disclose
individually identifiable medical record information . . . with the
malicious intent to damage an individual’s reputation or character.”);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-412(1), (3) (2019) (criminal penalties for
“any person who . . . steals or discloses to an unauthorized person a
medical record or medical information, or who, without authority, makes
or causes to be made a copy of a medical record or medical information”);
210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/6.17 (2018) (any person who “willfully or
wantonly discloses hospital or medical record information” is guilty of a
misdemeanor); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-C (2018) (Aggrieved individual
may bring a civil action “against a person who has intentionally
unlawfully disclosed health care information” for equitable relief, costs,
and a forfeiture or penalty (not to exceed $5,000, but may increase to
$10,000 for health care practitioners and $50,000 for health care facilities
if sufficient evidence that constitutes general business practice); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.298 (2019) (providing a person who “negligently or
intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of sections
144.291 to 144.297” is liable for “compensatory damages caused by an
unauthorized release or an intention, unauthorized access, plus costs and
reasonable attorney fees”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.293 (2019) (“A
provider, or a person who receives health records from a provider, may
not release a patient’s health records to a person without [patient consent
or specific legal authorization]”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 439.590(1) (2019)
(Except as otherwise authorized by HIPAA, “a person shall not use,
release or publish: (a) individually identifiable health information from an
electronic health record or a health information exchange for a purpose
unrelated to the treatment, care, well-being or billing of the person who
is the subject of the information; or (b) Any information contained in an
electronic health record or retained by or retrieved from a health
information exchange for a marking purpose.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3414-1, 34-14-3 (2019); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.151 (West
2018) (“A person may not reidentify or attempt to reidentify an individual
who is the subject of any protected health information without obtaining
the individual’s consent or authorization if required under this chapter or
other state or federal law.”); WIS. STAT. § 146.84(2)(a), (b) (2018)
(“Whoever does any of the following may be fined not more than $25,000
or imprisoned for not more than 9 months or both: . . . 2. Discloses
confidential information with knowledge that the disclosure is unlawful
and is not reasonably necessary to protect another . . . (b) Whoever
negligently discloses confidential information in violation of s. 146.82 is
subject to a forfeiture of not more than $1,000 for each violation.”); WIS.
STAT. § 610.70 (2018) (“Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains
information about an individual from an insurer or insurance support
organization under false pretenses may be fined not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned for not more than 9 months or both.” They “shall be liable to
the individual for actual damages to that individual, exemplary damages
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extend the confidentiality obligations to individuals to whom health
information is disclosed,303 whereas other states impose confidentiality
obligations on specific classes of persons who may not be HIPAA

of not more than $25,000 and costs and reasonable actual attorney fees”);
WIS. STAT. § 146.84(1)(b) (2018) (“Any person . . . who violates s. 146.82
or 146.83 [regarding confidentiality of patient health care records] in a
manner that is knowing and willful shall be liable to any person injured
as a result of the violation for actual damages to that person, exemplary
damages of not more than $25,000 and costs and reasonable actual
attorney fees”).
303. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(7)(a) (2019) (“If the content of any record
of patient treatment is provided under this section, the recipient, if other
than the patient or the patient’s representative, may use such information
only for the purpose provided and may not further disclose any
information to any other person or entity, unless expressly permitted by
the written consent of the patient”); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 159.005(e)
(West 2017) (“A person who receives information made confidential by
this subtitle may disclose the information only to the extent consistent
with the authorized purposes for which consent to release the information
is obtained.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03.A.3 (2018) (“No person to
whom health records are disclosed shall redisclose or otherwise reveal the
health records of an individual, beyond the purpose for which such
disclosure was made, without first obtaining the individual’s specific
authorization to such redisclosure”); WIS. STAT. § 146.82(2)(a)11 (2018)
(“A person to whom a [health care] report or record is disclosed under
this subdivision may not further disclose the report or record, except to
the persons, for the purposes, and under the conditions specified in
§ 48.981(7)”).
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covered entities, such as employers,304 researchers,305 and other noncovered entities, including recipients of health information.306
304. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.20 (2019) (“Each employer who receives medical
information shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure the
confidentiality and protection from unauthorized use and disclosure of
that information.” Further, “[n]o employer shall use, disclose, or
knowingly permit its employees or agents to use or disclose medical
information which the employer possesses pertaining to its employees
without the patient having first signed an authorization . . . permitting
such use or disclosure.” Finally, the medical information “may be used
only for the purpose of administering and maintaining employee benefit
plans, including health care plans and plans providing short-term and
long-term disability income, workers’ compensation and for determining
eligibility for paid and unpaid leave from work for medical reasons.”); See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128f (2019) (“No individually identifiable
information contained in the personnel file or medical records of any
employee shall be disclosed by an employer to any person or entity not
employed by or affiliated with the employer without the written
authorization of such employee”).
305. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (2019) (providing medical information may be
disclosed to researchers for “bona fide research purposes” but “no
information so disclosed shall be further disclosed by the recipient in a
way that would disclose the identity of a patient or violate this part”);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-121 (2018) (permits sharing of mental health
information for research provided researchers “sign an oath of
confidentiality” and no identifying information is disclosed); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 176A, § 14B (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 20(f) (2018)
(health care facilities may disclose patient information for research with
notice to patient of such research and agreement to “maintain the
confidentiality of all identifiable patient information”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 56-7-124 (2019) (“[a]ny third party vendor or contractor, as well as any
other entity that gains access to [medical] information to perform
[research], will be bound to comply with all applicable state and federal
laws and regulations regarding vigilant protection of the confidential
information”);TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 159.004(3) (West 2017) (patient
information may be disclosed to “qualified personnel for research . . . but
the personnel may not directly or indirectly identify a patient in any
report of the research, audit, or evaluation or otherwise disclose identity
in any manner”); WIS. STAT. § 610.70 (2018) (insurance information may
be shared for research provided “any materials that allow for the
identification of an individual must be returned to the insurer or destroyed
as soon as reasonably practicable, and no individual may be identified in
any actuarial, research, accreditation, or auditing report.”); WIS. STAT.
§ 146.82(2)(a)(6) (2018) (to researchers affiliated with the health care
provider if also “provides written assurances . . . that the information will
be used only for the purposes for which it is provided to the researcher,
the information will not be released to a person not connected with the
study, and the final product of the research will not reveal information
that may serve to identify the patient whose records are being released
under this paragraph without the informed consent of the patient”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-2-609 (2018) (hospital information may be disclosed for
research provided there are “reasonable safeguards to protect the
information from redisclosure;” and “reasonable safeguards to protect
against identifying, directly or indirectly, any patient in any report of the
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Three states impose confidentiality and security obligations more
broadly to all holders of personal information, which includes medical
information.307 For example, Arkansas’s Personal Information
Protection Act imposes confidentiality obligations on any person or
business that “acquires, owns, or licenses personal information about an
Arkansas resident.”308 These obligations require those holding personal
information to take steps to secure the data, destroy it when it is no
longer needed, and notify people of any breach.309
research project;” and has “procedures to remove or destroy at the earliest
possible opportunity, consistent with the purposes of the project,
information that would enable the patient to be identified, unless an
institutional review board authorizes retention”).
306. WIS. STAT. § 146.82(5)(c) (2018) (“Notwithstanding sub. (1) an entity
that is not a covered entity may redisclose a patient health care record it
receives under this section only under the following circumstances: 1. The
patient or person authorized by the patient provides informed consent for
the redisclosure. 2. A court of record orders the redisclosure. 3. The
redisclosure is limited to the purpose for which the patient health care
records was initially received.”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13 (2018)
(information disclosed “shall be kept confidential by the party receiving
such information and the limitations on disclosure in this section shall
apply to such party.”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18 (2018) (Patient
information disclosed “should be kept confidential by the party receiving
such information and the limitations on such disclosure in this section
shall apply to such party”).
307. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-103 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66A, § 2
(2018) (“Each holder maintaining personal data shall . . . (c) not allow
any other agency or individual not employed by the holder to have access
to personal data unless such access is authorized by statute or
regulations . . . or is approved by the data subject”); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646A.604 (2018) (“[A] person that owns or licenses personal information
shall provide to the Attorney General within a reasonable time at least
one copy of any notice the person sends to consumers or to the person’s
primary or functional regulator in compliance with this section or with
other state or federal laws or regulations that apply to the person as a
consequence of a breach of security”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.602 (2018)
(personal information is defined as “[a] consumer’s first name or first
initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following
data elements, if encryption, redaction or other methods have not
rendered the data elements unusable or if the data elements are encrypted
and the encryption key has been acquired: [social security, driver’s license,
passport number, financial or credit card account numbers plus access
code, biometric information used to identify a person in a transaction] (vi)
A consumer’s health insurance policy number or health insurance
subscriber identification number in combination with any other unique
identifier that a health insurer uses to identify the consumer; and (vii)
Any information about a consumer’s medical history or mental or physical
condition or about a health care professional’s medical diagnosis or
treatment of the consumer”).
308. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-101 (2018).
309. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-101 (2018).
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b. State laws imposing obligations beyond HIPAA

States often impose obligations on researchers or others that seek
to access health information held by government agencies, such as
public health authorities.310 A few of these restrict researchers’ use of
the information in particular ways, such as from secondary research or
from reidentification of data.311 Many of the risks associated with the
release of data from the research context are only possible if the data
are identifiable or could be re-identified.312 Although genomic data
stripped of other identifiers is not considered identifiable under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule,313 genomic data can itself be a tool for reidentification, particularly when matched with public genetic
databases.314 Texas broadly prohibits any person from re-identifying a
person from their PHI, which would apply to researchers as well as
other third parties attempting re-identification for any purpose.315 This
state law goes beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which does not contain
any prohibition on reidentification of data, but rather considers
deidentified data not to be PHI, and therefore does not restrict the use
or disclosure of deidentified information.316 The federal Department of
Health & Human Services has not altered the rules regarding
310. A list of laws is on file with the authors.
311. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 10-33.010 (2018) (no uses beyond
that specified in agreement); 186 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 4-007 (2018) (“Any
de-identified data . . . asked for by and furnished to a researcher may not
be intentionally re-identified in any manner”); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN.
He-C 1504.05(d) (2018) (“The principal investigator shall . . . [n]ot seek
to ascertain or disclose the identity of patients or employers or other group
purchasers revealed in the data set for any purposes except as approved
as part of the study”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-202 (2018) government
agent must “require the removal or destruction of the individual
identifiers associated with the records as soon as the purpose of the
research project has been completed.”).
312. See Thought-Leader, supra note 51.
313. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2018).
314. Erika Check Hayden, Privacy Loophole Found in Genetic Databases,
NATURE (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.nature.com/news/privacyloophole-found-in-genetic-databases-1.12237.
315. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.151 (West 2018) (“A person
may not reidentify or attempt to reidentify an individual who is the
subject of any protected health information without obtaining the
individual’s consent or authorization if required under this chapter or
other state or federal law”).
316. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d), 514(a)-(b) (2018); See also, Guidance Regarding
Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in
Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule, HEALTH INFO. PRIVACY, https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/
index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
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deidentification of information with respect to genomic information,
despite the fact that genomic information, even stripped of identifiers
is inherently re-identifiable.
States may extend privacy protections beyond HIPAA by shielding
identifiable health data from disclosure in response to a legal demand
or from being admitted as evidence in a legal proceeding. In many cases,
these additional protections only apply to information held by state
agencies.317 For instance, California does not permit government
agencies to disclose personal data in response to a “subpoena, court
order, or other compulsory legal process,” without first making
reasonable “attempts to notify the individual to whom the record
pertains.”318 Such protections, including those making such governmentheld data inadmissible in a legal proceeding, could apply to data that
is shared with researchers. For example, in authorizing researchers’
access to data contained in its Parkinson’s Disease Registry, California
law makes explicit that the data, regardless of the holder, shall be
protected from subpoena, discovery, or admission in any legal
proceeding.319
States may also impose stricter limits on commercial uses of health
information. Although HIPAA prohibits covered entities and their
business associates from selling, using, or disclosing PHI for marketing
purposes without individual authorization,320 some states further
restrict marketing and commercial uses of health information.321

317. A list of laws is on file with the authors.
318. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.24 (West 2019).
319. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103865 (West 2019); See also NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-666 (2018) (explicitly permitting sharing of patient-identified
data with approved researchers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-669 (2018) (“All
case-specific and patient-identifying data furnished and any findings or
conclusions resulting from such data shall be privileged communications
which may not be used or offered or received in evidence in any legal
proceeding of any kind, and any attempt to use or offer any such
information, findings, conclusions, or any part thereof, unless waived by
the interested parties, shall constitute prejudicial error resulting in a
mistrial in any such proceeding”).
320. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2018).
321. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (West 2019) (“Except to the extent
expressly authorized by a patient, enrollee, or subscriber, or as provided
by subdivisions (b) and (c), a provider of health care, health care service
plan, contractor, or corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates shall not
intentionally share, sell, use for marketing, or otherwise use medical
information for a purpose not necessary to provide health care services to
the patient.”) (emphasis added); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123148
(West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478o(b) (2019) (“No managed care
organization shall sell, for any commercial purpose the names of its
enrollees or any identifying information concerning enrollees.”); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-19-307 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1211 (2019)
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Finally, some states provide a greater right of access to health
information when such information is in the form of laboratory test
results. Although HIPAA provides individuals a right of access to their
own health information from covered entities, genomic researchers,
biobanks, and genetic laboratories may not be HIPAA covered
entities.322 A few states provide individuals a right to laboratory testing
results, but these “rights” are primarily discussed in terms of health
care providers’ obligations to patients.323 In contrast, Delaware provides
that a medical laboratory “shall provide a copy” of laboratory results
upon written request of the individual; “medical laboratory” is not
defined.324 New Hampshire declares that medical information contained
in the medical records of a hospital or other facility is the property of
the patient, who is entitled to a copy upon request.325 States frequently
create a right to access records, but this right typically is cast in terms
of patients, and, thus, likely do not apply to research participants who
are not also patients.326 States may also impose obligations on insurers

(restricting the State from using protected health information for
commercial purposes).
322. The question of whether HIPAA’s right to access health information
extends to genomic research results has been in the literature, it has not
been decided. See, e.g., Jennifer Dreyfus and Mark Sobel, Concern about
Justifying the Release of Genomic Data as a Civil Right, 103 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 163, 165 (2018); see, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Response to
Dreyfus and Sobel, 103 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 166, 167 (2018).
323. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123148 (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 207-c(b) (2019); N.H. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 332-I:2(I)(b)-(c) (2019).
324. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1212 (2018).
325. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21(X) (2018).
326. 104 MASS. CODE REGS. 27.17 (2018); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 47B.0103
(2019); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-20-90 (2018) (Medicaid “client”); ALA.
CODE § 22-56-4 (2018); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 12.534(a); See ARIZ.
ADMIN. CODE § R9-21-209 (2019); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10
(2019); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1-801 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 19a-490b (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-7c (2006); D.C. CODE § 71202.02(a) (2009); See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1761A (2019); FLA.
STAT. § 395.3025(1) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 394.4615(1-2) (2019); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 284-04-500 (2018); 2008 Ga. Laws 1680; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 37-3-166(7) (2019); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-4-6-.05 (2019); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-39-1-1 (2018); See ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-B (2018); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.292 (2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (2019); MO.
REV. STAT. § 338.100 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-53 (2018);
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 322-I:3(I) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8505 (2019);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 439.591 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.061 (2019); OR.
REV. STAT. § 179.505 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-2-101 (2019); TEX.
OCC. CODE ANN. § 159.006 (West 2017); See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1127.1:03 (2019); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 284-04-500 (2018); See, e.g., WIS.
STAT. § 51.30 (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-607 (2019).
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toward insureds or applicants.327 A few states offer individuals a right
to remove328 or amend information held by insurers or the state health
information exchange.329 Some also provide an option from opting out
of certain uses of information.330
327. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1009 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202108 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2110 (2019); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 56.107 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-1003 (2018) (health
insurance); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-983 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-399 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175I, § 8(a) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 14-138 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-301 (2018); WIS. STAT.
§ 610.70 (2018).
328. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1009 (2019) (insurance information); 62 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1407-C(b), (c) (2018) (state health information exchange); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2108 (2019) (insurance information); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-39-9(a)(4) (2019) (insurance information); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 33-19-302 (2018) (insurance information).
329. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-20-90 (2018); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1009
(2019) (insurance information); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-1003 (2019)
(health care coverage cooperative); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-581-59
(2019) (Psychiatric Security Review Board); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128f
(2019) (applying to employee personnel files or medical records); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 38a-983 (2019) (insurance institution, agent or insurance
support organization); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-39-9(a)(4) (2019) (insurance
institution, agent, or insurance support organization); GA. COMP. R. &
REGS. 290-4-6-.05 (2019) (mental health and substance abuse facilities);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175I, § 8(b) (2018) (insurance institution, insurance
representative, or insurance support organization); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
175I, §9(a) (2018) (“factual error[s]” or “any misrepresentation or
misleading entry” in insurance institution, insurance representative, or
insurance support organization); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66A, § 2 (2018);
ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-B (2018) (treatment records); MO. CODE REGS.
ANN. tit. 13, § 70-1.020 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-307 (2018);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-545 (2018) (health care provider); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-11-312 (1996) (hospital record); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-04500(6) (all health insurers); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 610.70 (2019) (applying to
insurers); WIS. STAT. § 610.70 (2018) (insurers).
330. MINN. STAT. § 144.293 (2019) (allowing patients to exclude their
information from a health information exchange); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3705.33 (West 2019) (allowing parents to request removal of identifying
information from birth defects information system); WIS. STAT.
§ 146.82(2)(a)(5) (2018) (allowing private pay patients to deny access to
their records for research by submitting an annual request); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 332-I:3(VI) (2018) (allowing individual to opt out of sharing
name, address, and protected health care information through the health
information organization); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-I:4(II)(a) (2018)
(allowing individual to opt out of allowing health care provider or business
associate to use protected health information for fundraising); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 439-538(2) (2019) (“A covered entity that makes individually
identifiable health information available electronically . . . shall allow any
person to opt out of having his or her individually identifiable health
information disclosed electronically to other covered entities, except” as
required by HIPAA or state law or if a Medicaid or CHIP recipient.);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 439.591 (2019) (requiring consent to retrieve health
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c. State laws providing remedies and penalties beyond HIPAA

As noted above, one of the most significant ways that state laws
close gaps in protections offered by the HIPAA privacy Rule is to offer
individuals a private right of action for violations of state medical
privacy laws. At least sixteen states authorize a statutory private right
of action for breach of the state’s medical privacy laws.331 This explicit
care records from a health information exchange and notice of breach);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.112(c)-(d) (2019) (granting medical facility
patients the right to “(c) refuse to participate in any medical experiments
conducted at the facility. (d) retain his or her privacy concerning the
patient’s program of medical care” (Medical experiments is not defined)).
331. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2118 (2019) (a person whose insurance
information is disclosed in violation of §§ 20-2108 through 20-2110 may
sue for appropriate equitable relief); CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.101 (West 2019)
(“Any provider of health care, health care service plan, pharmaceutical
company, or contractor who negligently creates, maintains, preserves,
stores abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall be
subject to the remedies and penalties provided under subdivisions (b) and
(c) of Section 56.36”); CAL. INS. CODE § 791.20 (West 2019) (“[A]ny
person whose rights are violated [by insurance institution, agent or
insurance-support organization] may apply to any court of competent
jurisdiction, for appropriate equitable relief” and for actual damages
sustained.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-988a(b) (2019) (An individual who
is harmed by an insurer may “bring an action for equitable relief, damages
or both” and may recover “double damages, costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fee”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-4-6-.07 (2019) (allowing
mental health patient whose confidentiality to bring suit in appropriate
court); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175I, § 20(a) (2018) (may seek appropriate
equitable relief for a violation by insurance institution, insurance
representative or insurance-support organization); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
176B, § 17 (2018) (stating that “the commissioner, the attorney general,
any district attorney or aggrieved party” may bring claim for equitable
relief for a violation by a medical service corporation); ME. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 1711-C (2018) (Aggrieved individual may bring a civil action “against a
person who has intentionally unlawfully disclosed health care information”
for equitable relief, costs, and a forfeiture or penalty (not to exceed $5,000,
but may increase to $10,000 for health care practitioners and $50,000 for
health care facilities if sufficient evidence that constitutes general business
practice); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 550.1406(4) (2018) (“A member may
bring a civil action for damages against a health care corporation for a
violation of this section and may recover actual damages or $200.00,
whichever is greater, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs”);
MINN. STAT. § 144.298 (2019) (providing a person who “negligently or
intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of sections
144.291 to 144.297” is liable for “compensatory damages caused by an
unauthorized release or an intention, unauthorized access, plus costs and
reasonable attorney fees”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-407(1-2) (2018)
(suit may be brought for injunctive relief against an insurance institution,
insurance producer or insurance-support organization for violation of
confidentiality); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-553 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-16-817 (2018) (“A person aggrieved by a violation of this part may
maintain an action for relief” including for enforcement, damages, and
reasonable attorney’s fees. “[I]f the violation results from willful or grossly
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right simplifies the case for recovery, compared to a tort cause of action
that relies on the statute as evidence of the duty to maintain
confidentiality, and renders it less susceptible to dismissal. A couple of
these laws provide for statutory minimum damages or punitive
damages, which as discussed earlier, means it may be easier for the
individual to assert the claim without having to prove they were
tangibly (e.g., economically) harmed by the violation, which may be
difficult to establish for breaches of confidentiality.332 Maryland does
negligent conduct, the aggrieved person may recover not in excess of
$5,000, exclusive of any pecuniary loss.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 332-I:6
(2018) (“An aggrieved individual may bring a civil action . . . and, if
successful, shall be awarded special or general damages of not less than
$1,000 for each violation, and costs and reasonable legal fees” (applies to
medical records disclosure)); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.680 (2019) (a person
whose insurance information is disclosed in violation of OR. REV. STAT.
§ 746.607 (2019) may sue for equitable relief and actual damages, and
costs of the action and attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing
party); See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1503(c) (2019) (“Any violation of
this section shall be an invasion of the patient’s right to privacy”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-11-1504 (2019) (“The penalties and injunctions available
under this chapter shall apply to this part. Civil actions for damages for
invasion of privacy shall also be available to a person for violations of this
part.”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 241.156(a) (West 2017) (“A
patient aggrieved by a violation of this subchapter relating to the
unauthorized release of confidential health care information may bring an
action for: (1) appropriate injunctive relief; and (2) damages resulting
from the release.”); WIS. STAT. § 146.84(1)(c) (2018) (“An individual may
bring an action to enjoin any violation of s. 146.82 or 146.83 or to compel
compliance [with those sections] and may, in the same action, seek
damages”); WIS. STAT. § 610.70 (2018) (“Any person who knowingly and
willfully obtains information about an individual from an insurer or
insurance support organization under false pretenses” shall be “liable to
the individual for actual damages to that individual, exemplary damages
of not more than $25,000 and costs and reasonable actual attorney fees.”);
WIS. STAT. § 146.84(b) (2018) (“Any person . . . who violates s. 146.82 or
146.83 [regarding confidentiality of patient health care records] in a
manner that is knowing and willful shall be liable to any person injured
as a result of the violation for actual damages to that person, exemplary
damages of not more than $25,000 and costs and reasonable actual
attorney fees”); (“Any person . . . who negligently violates s. 146.82 or
146.83 shall be liable to any person injured as a result of the violation for
actual damages to that person, exemplary damages of not more than
$1,000 and costs and reasonable actual attorney fees”); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-2-616 (2018) (with respect to medical records, “A person aggrieved
by a violation of this act may maintain an action for relief as provided in
this section.”).
332. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-988a (2019) (allowing an individual to recover
“double damages”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-I:6 (2018) (providing for
special or general damages of not less than $1,000 per violation); WIS.
STAT. § 610.70 (2018) (providing for exemplary damages up to $25,000);
WIS. STAT. § 146.84 (2018) (providing for exemplary damages up to
$25,000).
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not provide a private right of action, but allows a patient to petition
the State prosecutor to investigate an allegation that a “medical record
has been inappropriately obtained, maintained, or disclosed.”333
Like HIPAA, states may impose criminal or civil penalties for
failing to maintain confidentiality, although some states may require
specific intent.334 Notably, HIPAA’s prohibitions and penalties do not
apply to third parties who improperly access, use, or appropriate health
information without authorization. A few states penalize those who
acquire or use medical information without authorization through
criminal laws against medical identity theft or other medical privacy
violations.335 In some cases, these state laws that punish obtaining
health information on false pretenses or misappropriation of health
information only apply to data held by certain entities, such as
government officials or health insurers, which may be less relevant to
research participants.336
333. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-307(k)(2) (LexisNexis 2018).
334. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-999a (2019); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-C
(2018); MINN. STAT. § 144.298.2(4) (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1502.2 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-3 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 610.70
(2018); WIS. STAT. § 146.84(1)(b) (2018); WIS. STAT. § 146.84(1)(bm)
(2018); See also HAW. CODE R. § 11-93-37 (2018) (failing to confidentially
maintain certain medical records, such as psychiatric records (§ 11-93-29,
Psychiatric Services), is a misdemeanor).
335. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-412 (2019) (“Any person who, without
proper authorization, knowingly obtains a medical record or medical
information with the intent to appropriate the medical record or medical
information to his own use or to the use of another, who steals or discloses
to an authorized person a medical record or medical information, or who,
without authority, makes or causes to be made a copy of a medical record
or medical information commits theft of a medical record or medical
information.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-551 (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 144.298.2(4) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-674 (2018) (“Any private or
public entity, individual, or approved researcher who wrongfully discloses
confidential data obtained from the medical record and health information
registries or uses such information with the intent to deceive shall be
guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 439.590(3) (2019) (“A person who accesses an electronic health record
or a health information exchange without authority to do so is guilty of a
misdemeanor and liable for any damages to any person that result from
the unauthorized access.”); WIS. STAT. § 146.84(2)(a)-(b) (2018)
(“Whoever does any of the following may be fined not more than $25,000
or imprisoned for not more than 9 months or both: 1. Requests or obtains
confidential information under § 146.82 or 146.83(1c) or (3f) under false
pretenses. 2. Discloses confidential information with knowledge that the
disclosure is unlawful and is not reasonably necessary to protect
another . . . (b) Whoever negligently discloses confidential information in
violation of s. 146.82 is subject to a forfeiture of not more than $1,000 for
each violation”).
336. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118I, § 16 (2018) (providing that
“unauthorized access to or disclosure” of health information through the
statewide health information exchange is subject to fines or penalties);
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As noted above, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities
and their business associates to notify affected individuals (and the
media if the breach affects more than 500 individuals in a state) of a
breach.337 Breach notification must be provided within 60 days of the
discovery of the breach and must include descriptions of breach, the
information involved, the steps the individuals can take to protect
themselves, contact information for the covered entity, and the steps
the covered entity is taking to mitigate the breach.338 States may impose
breach notification obligations beyond HIPAA’s by extending
applicability to non-HIPAA covered entities and business associates.
Wisconsin broadly imposes a requirement of breach notification on any
“entity,” defined as “a person other than an individual,
that . . . [c]onducts business in this state and maintains personal
information in the ordinary course of business,” if the personal
information of 1,000 individuals or more is disclosed without
authorization.339 Virginia’s law applies to government funded entities,
including public universities, that may not otherwise be covered by
HIPAA.340 States that impose privacy obligations on holders of
consumers’ “personal information” may also require breach
notification.341

N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES He-P
3012.07 (2018) (“Persons who fraudulently request [birth control program]
data shall be subject to the penalty for unsworn falsifications in
accordance with RSA 641:3”); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. He-P 3012.07(e)
(2018) (“Persons who fraudulently request [cancer registry] data shall be
subject to the penalty for unsworn falsifications in accordance with RSA
641:3”); WIS. STAT. § 610.70 (2018); (“Any person who knowingly and
willfully obtains information about an individual from an insurer or
insurance support organization under false pretenses may be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than 9 months or both. (b)
Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains information about an
individual from an insurer or insurance support organization under false
pretenses shall be liable to the individual for actual damages to that
individual, exemplary damages of not more than $25,000 and costs and
reasonable actual attorney fees”).
337. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a) (2018).
338. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2018).
339. WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2018).
340. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:05 (2019) (requiring notice of breach of
confidentiality of medical information to “the Office of the Attorney
General, the Commissioner of Health, the subject of the medical
information, and any affected resident of the Commonwealth without
unreasonable delay”).
341. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (2018) (applying to “any person or business
that acquires, owns, or licenses computerized data that includes personal
information”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.604 (2018) (applies generally to “a
person that owns or licenses personal information”).
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Research participants may feel particularly reassured when HIPAA
is invoked because the law is broadly recognized and synonymous with
health information privacy in many peoples’ minds.342 Thus, mention of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule during a research consent process may provide
an unrealistic and inaccurate sense of reassurance to prospective
participants in genomic research. In fact, HIPAA provides limited
protections, particularly against the risk that information will be used
or disclosed outside the research context because of its broad exceptions
and inapplicability to non-covered entities. More than other laws,
HIPAA may be highly salient to research participants, but also subject
to the broad misconception that its protections follow the data. State
laws are thus significant to the extent they extend and fill in known
gaps in the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s protection, which they do in three
primary ways: by expanding privacy obligations to non-covered entities;
by imposing stricter obligations beyond those required in the Privacy
Rule; and by providing individuals with private remedies, including
damages, for violations of state privacy requirements.
D. Disability Discrimination Laws

Were data to escape the research context, disability discrimination
laws may provide some protection against the risk that the information
will be used to limit an individual’s opportunities, such as employment.
Disability discrimination laws,343 like the federal ADA and similar state
statutes, generally protect those who have manifest conditions from
discrimination, whereas GINA and state genetic discrimination laws
apply only to pre-symptomatic genetic information.344 Although it may
appear that disability discrimination laws would not afford protection
to participants in genomic research, they do have a limited role, given
how disability is defined under the laws. The ADA applies not only to
physical or mental impairments that substantially limit a major life
activity, but also to individuals who are “regarded as” having a
disability.345 This protection focuses on the perception of the employer
342. NASS ET AL., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 80-81 (2009).
343. We specifically focused on disability discrimination laws in our searches.
In an effort to cabin the scope of our research, we did not examine nonhealth related discrimination laws, such as civil rights laws that protect
against discrimination based on race, gender, religion, national origin, or
sexual orientation, except to the extent such law explicitly included
disability within its protections.
344. Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in
Employment, 36 J.L., MED, & ETHICS 837, 839 (2008) [hereinafter
Genetic Discrimination].
345. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018); See generally Dale Larson, Unconsciously
Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the Regarded-As Prong of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 UCLA L. REV. 451, 466 (2008)
(describing the 2008 ADA amendments and how they reinstated earlier
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or other actor and does not require the individual to in fact have a
disability.346 While undoubtedly more limited than genetic-specific
protections, this protection can supplement genetic-specific protections,
for example, by expanding protections beyond large employers and
health insurers, as well as applying to non-genetic information collected
as part of the research data.347
1. Federal Disability Discrimination Laws

As noted above, GINA and the ADA generally cover different ends
of the disease spectrum, with GINA addressing discrimination based on
pre-symptomatic genetic information and the ADA addressing manifest
conditions.348 While it may arise infrequently, the ADA could provide
protections beyond the large employers and health insurers GINA
broad interpretations for the regarded-as prong to protect against adverse
actions motivated by “prejudiced attitudes, such as myths, fears,
ignorance, or stereotypes concerning disability”); Clayton, supra note 15
(noting that the regarded-as prong of the ADA’s disability definition, “has
received much less attention than the first two, may significantly expand
the protection provided by the ADA”); Prior to the adoption of GINA,
the EEOC settled a case under the ADA in which the Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway Company genetically tested employees. Then
EEOC Commissioner, Paul Miller, stated that “employers should be
aware of the EEOC’s position that the mere gathering of an employee’s
DNA may constitute a violation of the ADA.” EEOC and BNSF Settle
Genetic Testing Case under Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 8, 2001), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/5-8-02.cfm.
346. Larson, supra note 345, at 460-461 (describing the climate in which the
ADA was drafted and the focus on affording protections against “negative
attitudes” and disability); However, there is uncertainty about how far
the regarded-as prong would reach and may hinge on whether an employer
believes the participant is currently disabled because of a genetic mutation
or only at risk of future disability see, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, Big Data
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 777, 779
(contending that the ADA “does not stretch to cover individuals who are
perfectly healthy at present but whom an employer suspects of being at
risk of serious ailments later in life based on big data analysis”);
Nevertheless, persistent public misunderstandings of genetics and
genomics suggest that some may “regard” those with certain genetic
mutations as disabled see Rebecca Burr Carter, et al., Young Adults’
Belief in Genetic Determinism, and Knowledge and Attitudes towards
Modern Genetics and Genomics: The PUGGS Questionnaire, 12 PLOS
ONE 1, 24 (Jan. 23, 2018); Angela D. Lanie et al., Exploring the Public
Understanding of Basic Genetic Concepts, 13 J. GENET. COUNS. 1, 5
(2004).
347. These disability discrimination laws also provide protections should a
participant experience a manifest disability at some point in the future.
However, because such events would be tangential to the research, we do
not discuss these.
348. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 344, at 839.
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covers to the extent a participant is “regarded-as” disabled. In addition,
states, which largely follow the ADA approach, can expand coverage to
smaller employers. With these applications in mind, we describe the
broad federal protections the ADA provides for people living with
disabilities.349 The ADA protects people with disabilities from
discrimination in employment, access to goods and services, and
participating in State and local government programs.350 The ADA
defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual,” having a record of such an impairment, or being regarded
as having such impairment.351 These latter two provisions can be read
to cover genetic information that has not manifested.352 Unlike many of
the other federal laws we considered, the ADA also provides individuals
a mechanism for seeking redress for violations of the law.353 However,
like GINA, the ADA only applies to employers with 15 or more
employees,354 creating a significant gap in its protections. In addition,
insurers may take disabilities into account in underwriting, as long as
such decisions are actuarially justified, and not based on disability
alone.355
There are several exceptions to both the ADA and state laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. These laws often
do not apply to private clubs or accommodations owned or operated on
349. In adopting the ADA, Congress acknowledged the Nation’s goal “to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for” individuals living with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7) (2018).
350. Informational and Technical Assistance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act, U.S. DE’T OF JUST. CIV. RIGHTS. DIV.,
https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
351. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018).
353. 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2015) (regarding private suits).
354. The ADA: Your Employment Rights as an Individual with a Disability,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Mar. 21, 2005),
https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada18.html.
355. Individuals’ Right Under HIPPA to Access Their Health Information 45
C.F.R. §164.524, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access/
index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (“Providing individuals with easy
access to their health information empowers them to be more in control
of decisions regarding their health and well-being. For example,
individuals with access to their health information are better able to
monitor chronic conditions, adhere to treatment plans, find and fix errors
in their health records, track progress in wellness or disease management
programs, and directly contribute their information to research”);
Insurance, Accommodating Disabilities. Bus. Mgmt. Guide (CCH) ¶
10,225, 2015 WL 8400563 (2018).

92

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research

behalf of a religious corporation, association or society, or other
organization that is not open to the public. Employment discrimination
laws typically have exceptions for bona fide occupational qualifications
or to protect the safety and well-being of employees.
2. State Disability Discrimination Laws

State disability discrimination laws, like the ADA, tend to be
generally applicable, but may have broader reach than the ADA.356 For
example, many states have laws that prohibit employers from asking
about or making employment decisions based on disability,357 but these
356. In some cases, state laws merely reiterate the obligation to comply with
federal discrimination laws, whether by their own programs or by
contractors. See, e.g., 12 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-7:7.604 (2019)
(requiring that child welfare services comply with the ADA, Civil Rights
Act, Age Discrimination Act, and the Rehabilitation Act); 121 MASS.
CODE REGS. 2.210 (2018) (contractors of the Massachusetts Office of
Refugees and Immigration must comply with the ADA and other federal
discrimination laws). In this section, we focus on those laws that establish
independent state law obligations.
357. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a)
(2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1) (2018); HAW. ADMIN. RULES
§ 12-46-183 (2018); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4 (2019) (wages); IND. CODE
§ 22-9-5-1 (2018); 910 IND. ADMIN. CODE 3-3-1 (2019); Iowa Code
§ 216.6(1)(a) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18A.140 (2019) (state
employees in “classified” (or merit) service); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.170(2) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:323 (2018); ME. STAT. tit.
5, §4571 (2018) (the “opportunity for an individual to secure employment
without discrimination . . . is declared a civil right”); ME. STAT. tit. 5,
§4572 (2018); 2018 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 20-606
(LexisNexis); 2018 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 20-610 (interns);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. 37.1202 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2019); MO.
REV. STAT. § 213055(1) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102 (2019);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 284.150 (2019)
(state employment); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2019) (private
employment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A6, A7(I)-(II) (2018); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 168A-5 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01, 02.4-03
(2018); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis 2019); OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE § 455:10-3-5(A) (2019) (state employment); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659A.006, 659A.109, 659A.019, 659A.112, 659A.142 (2019); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 953 (2018); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (2018); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 through 20-13-13 (2019); 23-100 MISS. CODE
R. § 3.2 (LexisNexis 2018) (Medicaid program); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§§ 21.051, 21.052, 21.053 (2017) (employer, employment agency, and labor
organizations); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2018);
VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (2018)
(Virginia Human Rights Act (public business)); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9
(2018); W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (2018);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (2019) (applying to employers generally);
WYO. ADMIN. COD. §5084-7 (2019); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
RULE 2-400 (Cal. State Bar Ass’n 2018) (employment in law practice);
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 19702 (2019) (state employment); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-40y (2019) (internships); FLA. STAT. § 1000.05 (2018) (employees of
state K-20 education system); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-29 (2019) (applying
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laws may apply to more employers than the ADA does because of how
employer is defined.358 As Table 3 shows, 21 states have discrimination
to apprenticeship and other training and retraining programs); MINN. R.
7520.0350 (2019) (public safety employment; MINN R. 9575.0090 (2019)
(Department of Human Services); 23-100 MISS. CODE R. § 3.2 (2019)
(Medicaid program); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-30-1 (2019); 30-2501 MISS.
CODE. R. §1:2 (LexisNexis 2019) (Mississippi Board of Massage Therapy);
203-6.2 MISS. CODE R. § 30-2 (LexisNexis 2019) (Mississippi Interior
Designer Advisory Commission); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-2531 (2019) (civil
service system).
358. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (2018) (9 employees or more); See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-34-401 (2018) (“every . . . person employing persons”,
excluding “religious organizations or associations, except such
organizations or associations supported in whole or in part by money
raised by taxation or public borrowing”);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (2018) (1 or more employees, but not the US
government); 48 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/3 (2019) (1 or more employees);
IOWA CODE § 216.2(7) (2019) (“every . . . person employing employees”);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.130 (West 2019) (eight or more employees);
IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553 (2018) (“any number
of employees”, but does not include non-profit religious or fraternal
corporations or associations); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1201(b) (2018) (1
employee or more); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2019) (defining employer as
1 employee or more); MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(6) (2019) (Six employees
or more “but does not include corporations and associations owned or
operated by religious or sectarian organizations” or the U.S., corporations
wholly owned by the U.S., certain departments and agencies of D.C.,
Indian tribes, and certain bona fide private membership clubs); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 (2018) (applying to places with one employee or
more “but does not include fraternal, charitable, or religious association
or corporation if the association or corporation is not organized either for
private profit or to provide accommodations or services that are available
on a non-membership basis”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2(7) (2018)
(Six employees or more but does not include “an exclusively social club,
or fraternal or religious association or corporation, if such club,
association, or corporation is not organized for private profit”); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2019) (1 or more employees); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5 (2018) (1 or more employees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01A
(LexisNexis 2019) (4 employees or more); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 954b
(2018) (4 employees or more); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.106 (2019) (6 or
more employees but “do[es] not apply to the Oregon National Guard”);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1 (2019) (hires or employs “any employee”);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (2018) (applying to places with at least one
employee but does not include certain social clubs or fraternal societies);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-102 (2019) (two or more employees but does not
include religious organizations or associations); MD. CODE, STATE
GOVERNMENT § 20-601 (2018) (defining “employer” as 15 employees or
more but does not include certain bona fide private membership clubs);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310, 613.320 (2019) (15 employees or more but
does not include “any religious corporation, association or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on of its religious activities”);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3 (2019); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002 (2017)
(15 employees or more); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102(1)(i) (LexisNexis
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laws that apply to more employers than the ADA does, and ten apply
to employers with only one employee. These provisions, coupled with
the GINA provisions, extend protections against discrimination in
employment to smaller employers in 33 states, with 17 of these applying
to only one employee.
Table 3

Minimum employees to come
under state discrimination
laws
15
12
9
8
6
4
2
1
Unspecified

States

MD, NC, NV, TX, UT
WV
AR
KY
IN, MO, NH, OR
OH, PA
IA, CO, WY
HI, IL, NJ, ME, MT, MI, MN,
ND, SD, WI
LA, VA

State disability discrimination laws apply to a number of areas
beyond employment. For the most part, these are areas covered by the
ADA, such as sale or rental of housing, financial transactions,
education, by the state, or healthcare, as well as the broad “places of
public accommodation,” used in the ADA and, thus, do not expand on
its protections.359 However, states also have specific provisions regarding
insurance that, given court interpretations of the ADA, may expand
disability protections beyond the ADA.360 In particular, the provisions
2017) (15 employees or more but does not include certain religious entities,
certain entities constituting an affiliate or wholly owned subsidiary of
certain religious entities, or the Boy Scouts of America); LA. REV. STAT.
§23:302 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §40.1-2 (2018); VA CODE ANN. § 51.5-40,
41 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903B (2018).
359. A list of these laws is on file with the authors.
360. States that limit use of disability in insurance underwriting broadly or for
disability or life insurance, which we consider particularly relevant,
include: Cal. Ins. Code § 10401 (disability insurance for discrimination of
insureds “in same class”); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/236 (2019) (life
insurance “unless the rate differential is based on sound actuarial
principles and a reasonable system of classification and is related to actual
or reasonably anticipated experience directly associated with the
disability); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-501 (LexisNexis 2018) (insurer
generally on the basis of physical handicap or disability, “except by the
application of standards that are reasonably related to the insurer’s
economic and business purposes”); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4224 (McKinney
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prohibiting discrimination based on disability in insurance generally in
Oregon and Maryland, in disability insurance in California, and in life
insurance in Illinois and New York expand on the genetic-specific
prohibitions described supra. As a result of these state expansions,
participants in the same research study could have more protections
should their genetic information be used against them depending on
where they live.
The ADA permits individuals to bring a claim when they are
discriminated against. In addition to authorizing aggrieved individuals
to bring claims,361 states often also create commissions or other
organizations for investigating claims and enforcing the rights
afforded.362 Some states also authorize minimum damage amounts,
2019) (Life insurance or accident and health insurance, “except where the
refusal, limitation or rate differential is permitted by law or regulation
and is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or
reasonably anticipated experience” and with requirement to “notify the
insured or potential insured . . . the specific reason or reasons for such
refusal, limitation or rate differential”); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.015 (2019)
(insurance generally based on physical disability, unless underwriting
standards or rates “is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to
actual or reasonably anticipated experience”). Relevant to genomic
information if these states apply the modern definition of disability, which
includes the “regarded-as” prong. See 054-00-028 ARK. CODE R. § 3
(LexisNexis 2018) (life insurance, annuities, and disability insurance based
on physical or mental impairment, except where the “refusal, limitation
or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principals or is related to
actual or reasonably anticipated experience”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2.109
(2018) (life insurance, life annuity, or disability coverage “unless the rate
differential, or refusal to provide, is based on sound actuarial principles or
is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience); MO. CODE
REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 100-2.200 (2018) (based on physical or mental
impairment, “except where the refusal, limitation or rate differential is
based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience”); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. R590-129-4 (2018)
(insurance generally). Finally, a few states apply to specific types of
insurance: CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6 (West 2019) (infertility treatment);
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-502 (LexisNexis 2018) (surety insurer); MINN.
STAT. § 176.201 (2018) (worker’s compensation insurance); 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 991.2003 (2018) (automobile insurance, provided does not impair
ability to operate a motor vehicle); 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 27-1-39, 27-223 (2019) (casualty, fire, home owners, accident and health, marine, or
automobile insurance); See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3502.053 (West 2017)
(mortgage guaranty insurance). A list of states that specifically apply to
health insurance is on file with the authors.
361. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 16-123-107 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 49:146
(2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.5(b) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.021 (LexisNexis 2019); MINN. STAT. § 181.935(a) (2018).
362. See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-4 (2019); 016-14 ARK. CODE. R.
§ 002-1078 (2018); MD. CODE REGS. 07.03.01.10 (2018); MD. CODE REGS.
07.03.03.23 (2018); MD. CODE REGS. 07.03.07.15 (2018); MD. CODE REGS.
07.03.16.19 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-502 (LexisNexis 2018); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-610 (LexisNexis 2018); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
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although these appear limited to discrimination in credit.363
Authorization for recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs is broader, but
limited to only a few states.364 Others may impose fines.365 State
employees or licensees may face disciplinary proceedings for
discriminatory actions.366
§ 4A:7-2.2 (West 2019); OR. ADMIN. R. 407-005-0030(1) (2019); 10 COLO.
CODE REGS. § 2506-1:4.070.2 (2019); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 813.53
(West 2018); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 849.52 (West 2018); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 19702 (West 2019); MINN. R. 7520.0350 (2019); MINN. R.
9575.0090 (2019); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a (McKinney 2018); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-04 (LexisNexis 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit 25.21,
§ 5.1501 (2019); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:10-5-143 (2019); OR. ADMIN.
R. 943-005-0030(1) (2019); OR. ADMIN. R. 943-005-0030 (2019); 11 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-51-10 (2019); 1-7 WYO. CODE R. §5084-7
(LexisNexis 2019); see also 16 DEL. ADMIN. CODE 5100-1006 (2018)
(imposing requirement to provide information about non-discrimination
statutes and policies, how to file a discrimination complaint, and refer to
the online civil rights complaint); 016-14 ARK. CODE. R. § 004-1068.5.2
(2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12931 (West 2019) (department may provide
assistance to communities and persons therein in resolving dispute relating
to discriminatory practices).
363. MICH COMP. LAWS § 750.147a (2018) ($200 or actual damages, whichever
is greater for discrimination in credit transactions); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296-a (McKinney 2018) (compensatory damages to the person aggrieved
for discrimination in credit transactions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.021 (LexisNexis 2019) (may award “compensatory and punitive
damages of not less than one hundred dollars” for discrimination in credit
transactions).
364. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (2019) (for intentional acts of
discrimination; also authorizes punitive damages. Damages are limited
based on the size of the employer (under 14 limited at $15,000, > 15-100
limited to $50,000, >100-200 limited to $100,000, >201-500 limited to
$200,000, and >500 limited to $300,000); MICH COMP. LAWS § 750.147a
(2018) (authorizing costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to “prevailing
party”); MINN. STAT. § 181.935 (2018) (authorizes damages, costs,
attorney’s fees, equitable relief); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021
(LexisNexis 2019) (authorizes attorney’s fees, court costs, and equitable
relief in addition to damages for discrimination in credit transactions).
365. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-502 (LexisNexis 2018) (surety insurance); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 645.321 (2019) ($500 for the first offense; second offense
risks license in real-estate transactions); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(LexisNexis 2019) (fine of no more than $10,000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 492-602 (providing for fines up to $1,000 or imprisonment in instances of
housing discrimination due to intimidation or interference). The following
states specify that the behavior is a misdemeanor without specifying the
penalty within the terms of the statute we identified: IND. CODE. § 35-462-2 (2018) (making discrimination in jury selection a Class A
misdemeanor); MINN. STAT. § 176.201(2) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 207.310(3) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.140-50 (2019).
366. ME. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2159-C(3) (2019); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:44G-10.7
(West 2018); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 4A:7-3.1 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 610.185 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 645.321 (2019); 93 NEB. ADMIN.
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State disability discrimination laws may afford additional
protections when states lack genetic-specific laws, when they extend the
protections to employers with fewer than fifteen employees, and when
they extend the protections to insurers. These protections are not as
robust as genetic-specific laws in this context because they apply only
when a participant is “regarded-as” disabled on the basis of the genomic
information revealed through the research. However, they provide
additional protections than genetic-specific laws because they apply to
non-genetic information collected in the study.

IV. Discussion
A. Key Findings of the Web of State Legal Protections: Volume and
Variety

This project aimed to determine whether and how well state laws
fill known gaps in federal laws that protect participants in genomic
research. We embarked on this research knowing states had adopted
their own laws that sometimes went beyond the floor established by
federal laws such as the Common Rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
GINA, and the ADA, but we were surprised by the sheer quantity of
state laws that we uncovered, even after limiting consideration to laws
that expand on federal protection and apply to a large genomic research
project, like the All of Us study. The quantity of state laws is striking,
standing alone, as it points to the complexity of identifying what
protections are afforded to research participants and communicating
those protections effectively to participants.367
Applicable state laws are not just numerous, they are extremely
variable. States expand on the substantive protections provided by
federal laws in myriad ways. One significant shortfall in the federal laws
is their limited scope of application; the Common Rule applies only to
federally-funded or federally-conducted research, HIPAA applies only
to covered entities and their business associates, and GINA applies only
to health insurers and large employers. We found several instances
where state laws broadened the scope of these protections. In the most
dramatic cases, states would apply the protections, such as the
requirements for consent for genetic testing or prohibitions on disclosure
CODE § 15-003 (2018); 2019 N.Y. Laws § 220-E; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 239(4)
(McKinney 2019); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-04 (LexisNexis 2019); OR.
ADMIN. R. 943-005-0030 (2018); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 371-4.25.173 (2019).
367. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. , GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION
ACT
GUIDANCE
(2009),
available
at
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/guidanceon-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act/index.html (noting that
“GINA has implications regarding the actual or perceived risks of genetic
research and an individual’s willingness to participate in such research,”
and its relevance to consent, as well as the evaluation of the risks of the
study).
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of genetic or health information, to any person.368 Thus, unlike the
federal laws, the reach of these state legal protections did not depend
on who sought or held the information.
In other instances, states explicitly expanded the scope of
protections to a broader range of entities beyond those covered by
comparable federal laws. In particular, state genetic and disability
discrimination laws apply to much smaller employers than GINA’s or
the ADA’s limit of fifteen-employees. In total, 33 states apply nondiscrimination requirements to employers with fewer than 15
employees, and 17 of these states apply the requirements to employers
with only one employee.369
There is also significant variation among states’ substantive legal
protections. In the most notable cases, the state laws expand on the
federal protections not just by degree, but in kind. For example, a few
states also expand GINA’s protections beyond health insurance to longterm care and disability insurance, and even life insurance.370 In the
area of human subjects research, a few states also have human subjects
research laws that apply the Common Rule’s IRB review and consent
requirements to contexts when the Common Rule would not. In
particular, Oregon’s law requiring IRB review for even anonymous and
deidentified genetic research is a dramatic departure from how such
research is conducted under federal law. In the privacy context, Texas
takes a completely different approach than the HIPAA Privacy Rule
by prohibiting re-identification of any person from their PHI. The
additional protection offered by this Texas law is particularly relevant
to participants of genomic research now that it is technically possible
to re-identify supposedly “de-identified” genomic information without
access to identification codes or breaching data security.371
Perhaps the most significant way that state laws differ from the
federal laws is their explicit provision of enforcement rights for
violations of the laws. The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not permit a
private right of action, and the Common Rule is silent on the issue.
GINA allows for a private right of action, but limits recovery. In
practice, this means that an individual whose information is used or
disclosed in violation of law has few options to seek redress if they are
harmed. In contrast, a majority of states create a private right of action
for violation of their various genetic-specific laws.372 A number of states

368. See supra text accompanying notes 173 (for consent to genetic testing)
and 185 (for disclosure of genetic information).
369. See supra text accompanying note 214.
370. See supra notes 219-229 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 21 to 23 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text, describing how twentyseven states provide a private right of action and eight states allow
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similarly create a private of right of action for breach of their medical
privacy laws.373 Several states also provide for statutory minimum
damages, attorneys fees, and court costs for breach of the genetic and
medical privacy laws.374 Because injury as a result of breach may be
difficult to prove, these provisions can make it feasible for an aggrieved
participant to seek redress and for attorneys to take their cases. As a
result, it also can create an incentive for holders of participants’
information to ensure compliance with those obligations.
State laws also create rights that are not afforded by the federal
laws. For example, a couple of states require notification regarding what
is done with their genetic information.375 Others provide a right to
request destruction of genetic information.376 These provisions may
afford participants more control over the use of the genomic materials
than is provided under federal law or in other states. Finally, a handful
of states declare genetic information to be the property of the person
tested, which, as discussed above, could give participants significantly
more control over their genomic research information if courts change
course and begin to recognize these property rights.377
B. Implications for Researchers and Participants

As the foregoing suggests, there is no single “web of legal
protections,” but rather multiple “webs of legal protections” that vary
greatly depending on which state laws are implicated. This reality
makes it challenging to convey accurately and concisely the risks,
benefits, and protections afforded to research participants in a largescale, national genomic research study.
1. Challenges in Developing the Study Consent Form

In a national study like the All of Us project, the multiplicity and
variation of state laws mean some participants may have legal
protections and rights that other participants do not. This raises
challenging questions for IRB review and consent form drafting. How
does the IRB appropriately assess the risk/benefit ratio for the study
in the review process? And how does the consent form communicate
the different protections afforded to participants? We consulted with
such a study that sought to develop a common consent form. The
attempt quickly bogged down on the question of which laws would
individual enforcement under state unfair and deceptive trade practices
laws.
373. See text accompanying note 331, describing sixteen states that provide
private rights of action for violations of the state medical privacy laws.
374. See supra Table 2 describing eight states’ statutory damages provisions.
375. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 273-275.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 277-285.
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apply. An attempt to adopt the laws of “most protective” state as a
voluntary standard was quickly abandoned. While ethically appealing,
there are two problems to this approach: first, as our analysis
demonstrates, there is no single “most protective” state to follow, even
if researchers and their institutions would be willing to voluntarily
commit to protections that go beyond those required by federal law.
Even when states expand on federal protections, their choices are not
consistent. For example, each of the states presented in Table 4 have
expanded on GINA’s restrictions on use of genetic information in
insurance underwriting to disability, long-term care, and/or life
insurance. However, none of these states have made the same choices.
Table 4

State restrictions of use of genetic information in
insurance underwriting
CO
MD
VT
Disability
Long-Term Care
Life
Moreover, although Vermont has been very protective with respect to
expanding GINA-like protections, it has not adopted some protections
that other states have. In short, while its provisions against use of
genetic information in insurance underwriting extend to disability, longterm care, and life insurance and to employment for employers with
only one employee, and it also creates a private right of action, it did
not create the statutory minimums that other states have. In addition,
it does not have human subjects protections that fill in the Common
Rule gaps. Thus, it is not possible, even in this limited context, to say
that Vermont’s law is the most protective law.
The second challenge of trying to adopt a “most protective”
common consent form is that in some instances researchers cannot
extend substantive rights that are afforded by some states but not
others. For example, researchers may wish to promise to protect the
confidentiality of research data and not to disclose research information
to anyone outside of the research team, even a subpoena. But unless
the project has a Certificate, as authorized by federal law, or is taking
place in one of the few states with laws that afford protection against
subpoena, a researcher would not be able to fulfill that promise.
2. Determining the Choice of Law

A further implication for researchers and institutions is a choice of
law question: which jurisdiction’s law applies in a large-scale study,
where participants, researchers, and the biobank may all reside in
different states? The rights and protections afforded to participants in
a national study may differ depending on where they live, where their
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data or biospecimens are stored, or where the researcher is located.
Researchers, institutions, and IRBs lack guidance on this choice of law
question and may struggle to comply if the applicable law varies with
each participant.
Given the variation in state laws and that no single consent form
will comply with all states’ laws, a national, multi-site study may be
tempted to ignore state laws and focus solely on complying with federal
laws. However, ignoring state laws may not be legal or ethical. For
example, Delaware law requires that consent for genetic testing disclose
the right to results unless the individual directs otherwise.378 If Delaware
law applies to participants who live in Delaware, the researcher may be
required to researcher offer these participants their genomic sequencing
results, even if the research protocol specifies, and federal law permits,
that researchers would not return results of unknown clinical
significance.
Alternatively, choice of law questions are often addressed by
agreement, and consent forms potentially could specify which state’s
laws applies, particularly if the law chosen is justifiable (for example,
the researcher’s state). However, this option poses its own challenges,
including how to describe in simple terms what a reasonable person
would want to know about the implications of the law chosen, as
required by the Common Rule. In addition, if the consent form’s choice
of law resulted in an individual waiving their state-based rights, this
may violate the Common Rule’s provision prohibiting exculpatory
clauses in consent forms.379 Finally, because consent forms may not be
considered binding contracts, their choice of law provisions may not be
enforced in the same way as ordinary commercial contracts.380
Although answering the choice of law question is beyond the scope
of this project, our research findings underscore the importance of
answering the question. Without guidance, significant legal and ethical
uncertainties result, including what information must be provided in
the consent form, how long data may be stored, what rights participants
retain throughout research, how often re-authorization must be sought
to use participants’ data, whether data can or must be disclosed or reidentified, and what liabilities and obligations would flow if data are
breached or misused.

378. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 1201 (2019).
379. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2019) (“No informed consent, whether oral or written,
may include any exculpatory language through which the subject is made
to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases
or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its
agents from liability for negligence”).
380. Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing
Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 119, 161-166 (2009).
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3. State Laws as Models for Closing Gaps in Federal Legal Protections

Despite the complex picture presented by the various state laws,
they provide valuable models of how the known gaps in federal legal
protections may be closed. The state laws may provide an opportunity
to test models that are the subject of intense policy debate. For
example, GINA is often criticized for neglecting to extend genetic
discrimination protection to life, disability, or long-term care
insurance.381 Opponents have argued that GINA cannot be feasibly
extended to these other types of insurance without destroying the
market for these products.382 There are several states that could be used
to test, empirically, whether extending GINA’s protections to other
insurance products yields these results. Where state have extended
protections beyond federal laws without incurring excessive costs, such
“successful” state experiments may counsel expanding the federal
protections accordingly. In other areas, such as the provision of private
remedies, states may be better situated than the federal government to
provide for these legal rights and protections, due to their traditional
role and the relative competence of state jurists to enforce these
protections. But even where state variation does not suggest adoption
into the federal standards, it could serve as a model for encouraging
other states to afford fuller protections to research participants and
closing the gaps between states.

V. Conclusion
This article undertakes to map the web of legal protections across
federal and state laws protecting the participants in large-scale genomic
research. The scope, complexity, and variety of these state laws, ranging
from privacy to anti-discrimination, is poorly understood. Yet,
understanding the scope, strengths, and limits of these protections is
particularly critical as enrollment commences in two federally-funded
studies, the All of Us and Million Veteran studies, aiming to amass
DNA, health, and lifestyle data on an unprecedented scale from millions
of individuals. At the same time, the identification and arrest of the
“Golden State Killer” using DNA uploaded to an ancestry database
highlighted how DNA databanks of the scale of the All of Us and
Million Veteran studies can be used for purposes that participants may
381. See Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act,
50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 41, 53-54, 59 (2013) (describing the legislative
decision to exclude these types of insurance from GINA); Jessica D.
Tenenbaum & Kenneth W. Goodman, Beyond the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act: Ethical and Economic
Implications of the Exclusion of Disability, Long-Term Care and Life
Insurance, 14 PERSONALIZED MED. 153 (2017).
382. See Slaughter, supra note 381, at 54; Tenenbaum & Goodman, supra
note 381.
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find objectionable. These concerns about law enforcement use add to
risks that information will be hacked or otherwise disclosed and then
be used against the individual in insurance, employment, or identity
theft. Without assurances of the privacy and limits on use of their
information, research participants should rightly be concerned about
the risks of participation.
This article is the first to consider comprehensively and
simultaneously all the federal and state laws offering protections to
participants in genomic research. The literature typically focuses on the
federal laws in isolation, questioning the strengths of federal legal
protections for genomic research participants provided in the Common
Rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, or GINA. Nevertheless, we found
significant numbers and surprising variety of state laws that provide
greater protections than federal laws, often filling in federal gaps by
broadening the applicability of privacy or nondiscrimination standards
or by providing important remedies for individuals harmed by breaches.
Identifying and explaining the protections these laws provide is
significant both to allow prospective participants to accurately weigh
the risks of enrolling in these studies and as models for how federal legal
protections could be expanded to fill known gaps.
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Appendix
1. Searches Conducted

All the searches were developed after some experimentation with
different search terms. We include only the final searches that were
used.
Human Subjects Research:
a.

Search terms

Multiple searches were performed, as follows:
1. To identify state laws that particularly focused on consent
for research, we conducted searches using advanced search
(for statutes and regulations) for TE(“informed consent”
and “DNA”) [the “TE” limiter was used to limit searches
to Text (to avoid discussion only in annotations, as
“research” frequently appears in unrelated areas),
TE(“informed consent” and “genetic testing”); and
TE(“informed consent” and “genetic information”). The
goal was to use broad terms to ensure coverage, while using
precise terms that apply to the concepts we are studying.
2. To identify state laws that more generally discussed
genomic research, we conducted searches using advanced
search (for both statutes and regulations) for TE(“research
and “genetic information”), TE(research and “genetic
testing”), and TE(research and “DNA”). We also used the
more general search “human subjects” w/5 research.
b.

Exclusion criteria

We excluded search results that did not apply to human subjects
research, such as laws that cover state school curricula (about research),
income tax incentives for certain research, law enforcement DNA
databases and permissible testing of those databases, and licensure
requirements (to the extent it only requires training in human subjects
research). We also excluded laws that talk about genetic information
and research, but not protections (e.g., plant and pesticide research).
We also excluded laws that address regenerative medicine/stem cell
research, as these laws address a very specific type of research that
typically is not considered human subjects research and the oversight
mechanism is not generally applicable. We also excluded laws that
addressed genetic privacy or consent to genetic testing (rather than
research) because, while related, they are not research-specific and will
be addressed in separate datasets.
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Genetic Testing:
a.

Search terms

Consent w/10 (genetic! Or
“blood specimen”)
adv: TE(“informed consent”
adv: TE(“informed consent”
adv: TE(“informed consent”
b.

genom! Or DNA or biospecimen or
and “DNA”)
and “genetic testing”)
and “genetic information”)

Exclusion criteria

We excluded laws that did not pertain to the research context. For
example, we excluded laws that addressed genetic testing in the
criminal context (arrest, conviction), pertained only to paternity
testing, or solely addressed admissibility in court proceedings.
Genetic Privacy:
a.

Search terms

Adv: TI(genetic genom! DNA) TE((gene genetic genom! DNA)
AND (privacy confidential! disclos!))
Note: Three secondary sources were used as a reference: 1) a
collection of state statutes on “Privacy” available from the National
Human
Genome
Research
Institute
(available
at
http://www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm);
(2) a 50-state survey of state genetic privacy laws by the American
Health
Lawyers
Association
(available
at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/50state_char
t_final.pdf); and (3) a Westlaw 50 state survey, Maintaining Privacy
of Health Information, 0100 SURVEYS 7 (Oct. 2013)
b.

Exclusion criteria – Applicable to Genetic Privacy and Health
Information Privacy Laws

We focused on identifying those state health information privacy
laws that create private rights of action or extend requirements beyond
HIPAA covered entities and business associates. So we excluded state
laws from our analysis that simply duplicated or were less stringent
than the HIPAA Privacy Rule. To further limit the dataset to those
that are relevant to the privacy of genomic or health data held by
researchers that was the subject of our inquiry, we used the following
exclusion
criteria:


Communicable diseases, injuries, etc.: The primary
category are laws that protect the privacy/confidentiality
of health information that is unlikely to pertain to
information collected from genomic research because it
doesn’t involve genetic information. For example, all laws
that apply to communicable diseases (STDs, TB, HIV),
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injuries, drug testing results, immunization records, etc. can
be excluded. Continue to include laws that protect health
information generally as well as information that may have
some genetic component (mental health information, cancer
registries).


Utilization review laws, independent or external review –
exclude laws that require these entities to maintain
confidentiality.



Provider-specific confidentiality obligations: Laws setting
forth a general obligation to maintain confidentiality of
health records for particular types of health care providers
or facilities (e.g., nurses, genetic counselors, home health,
assisted living, nursing homes, hospice, behavioral health,
etc.) unless it is accompanied by a manner of private
enforcement for violation (e.g., private cause of action,
damages, etc.) - if it has private enforcement mechanism,
include. Also include laws that set forth specific
requirements for maintaining privacy/retention/patient
access/authorization, etc. that may be different from
HIPAA’s.



Rules of evidence, forensic DNA databases, and other law
enforcement uses of genetic or
health information.
However, include laws that implicate the obligation of
health care providers or others to provide genetic
information pursuant to subpoena or court order.



Laws related to disclosure or privacy and confidentiality
of patient records in the context of disciplinary or
licensing actions against health care professionals.



Laws that pertain to child protective services, adoption,
custodial disputes, domestic violence, paternity disputes.



Laws that address
establishment of heirs.

intestate

succession,

probate,

Health Information Privacy:
a.

Search terms

Adv: (TE((health medical) /s (information data record)) /30
(privacy confidential! disclos!) & “any person” & (penalty! or crim!
((right cause) /2 action)))
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b.

Exclusion criteria - see Genetic Privacy (above)
Genetic Discrimination:

a.

Search terms

(discrimin! or refus! or deny or denial) w/25 (genet! or genom!)
Note: in conducting our test searches, we discovered that some of
the laws included on the NHGRI list did not include the word
discrimination. This search was constructed to capture those laws, as
well as laws that explicitly discuss discrimination.
b.

Exclusion criteria

We excluded laws that did not apply to the research context we
were interested in. Example of such laws that our searches captured
include laws regulating genetic counselors as a profession (not genetic
discrimination), laws that pertained only to prenatal diagnoses,
paternity laws, and laws that addressed genetically modified organisms.
General Disability Discrimination:
a.

Search terms

adv: TE(discrimin! or refus! or deny or denial) and TI(disab!)
b. Exclusion criteria

Given the focus of our research, we focused on laws that specifically
mentioned disability that could be interpreted as applying to
discrimination based on genetic information for a condition that was
not yet manifest. We excluded laws that pertained only to physical
disabilities, and we also excluded broad civil rights or discrimination
laws that did not mention disability.
Despite these restrictions, we still identified vast quantities of laws
that were not likely to go beyond the federal floor HIPAA sets.
Accordingly, we did not include these in the final analysis.
2. Common exceptions to obligations/restrictions
Legend
C = Exceptions to confidentiality obligations
A = Exception to analysis or use restrictions
R = Exceptions to retention
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Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12‐2801 et seq.
Cal. Civ. Code § 56.17
Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 10 § 2218.20
Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 22 § 126055
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 124975 et seq
Cal. Ins. Code § 10123.35
Code Ark. R. 016.14.2‐1078
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10‐3‐1104.6 & 1104.7
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐64‐502
D.C. Code § 2‐1401.03
D.C. Mun. Regs. Tit. 4 § 509
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, § 1205
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, § 1202
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, § 1203
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.40
Ga. Code Ann. § 33‐54‐1 et seq.
Idaho Code Ann. § 398301 et seq.
225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 135:90
410 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 50:3
410 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 513:1 et seq.
C

R

C C

C

As authorized or required by law
Court order

A

Criminal DNA banking

C

For abuse or neglect reporting

R

For criminal databases

A
A

A

For determination of bona fide
occupational qualifications
For due diligence in sale of
business
For genealogy of deceased

C

C
C

For health care operations or
other business operations

C

C
C
R
A
C

C

A

For law enforcement
For marketing

C

C
C
C

C
C
R
A

C C C
C C, A C C

For newborn screening
For paternity determinations
For payment
For peer review

C

C

For public health purposes

C

For purposes of providing
disability accommodations

C

C

C

C
R

For research

C

C
C

For treatment

A
A

A

A

For worker safety (e.g., monitor
toxic exposures)

A
A

A

For workers’ compensation claims

C

If approved by an IRB or Ethics
committees

C

C
C

Legally Authorized representative

C

C

C

Litigation where genetic
information is at issue

C C

C
C
C C

Medical providers
Person tested

C

To blood relatives of decedent for
medical purposes

C
C

To identify deceased individuals

C

C
C

C

To monitor legal compliance or
eligibility

C
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C

C

With consent

C

C

When person tested brings a
lawsuit or other complain
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Iowa Admin. Code r. 641‐4.3(136A) & 4.7(136A)
Iowa Code Ann. § 729.6
37 La. Admin. Code Pt. XIII, 415
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 22:1023
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:368
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23368
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23368
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 111, § 70G
Md. Code Regs. 10.10.13.15
Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 22 § 1711‐C
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24‐A, § 2215
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.1202
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 62V.06
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 191.317
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 375.1300 et seq.
Mont. Admin. R. 2.21.6615
Mont. Code Ann. § 33‐18.902
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 130A‐131‐.17
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 23‐01.3‐02 - 07
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 25‐16‐07
C

Court order

C

C

C

C

C C

C

As authorized or required by law

Criminal DNA banking
For abuse or neglect reporting
For criminal databases

A

A

For determination of bona fide
occupational qualifications

C

For due diligence in sale of
business

C

For genealogy of deceased

C

For health care operations or
other business operations

C
R
C

C

C C

C

C
C

For law enforcement
For marketing

C

C

C
R
C

C

C

For newborn screening
For paternity determinations

C

C

C

C C C

For payment
For peer review
For public health purposes
For purposes of providing
disability accommodations

C
C

C

C

C
C
C C

C
C

C
C

For research
For treatment

A

A

A

For worker safety (e.g., monitor
toxic exposures)

A
For workers’ compensation claims
If approved by an IRB or Ethics
committees

C

C

Legally Authorized representative
Litigation where genetic
information is at issue

C

C

C

Medical providers

C

C

Person tested

C

To blood relatives of decedent for
medical purposes

C

C

C

C

To identify deceased individuals

C

C

C

C

C

To monitor legal compliance or
eligibility
When person tested brings a
lawsuit or other complain

C

C

C
C
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N.D. Legis H.B. 1108 (2015) 2015 North Dakota
Laws H.B. 1108
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141‐H:1 et seq.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5‐43 et seq.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24‐21‐1
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79‐I
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2733
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48‐236
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 629.101 et seq.
Okla. Admin. Code 310:550‐19‐1
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 36 § 3614.3
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 36 § 3614.1
Or. Admin. R. 582‐030‐0010
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 192.531 et seq.
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 192.581
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 27‐18‐52, 52.1 § 27‐19‐44,
44.1 27‐20‐39, 39.1 27‐41‐53, 53.1
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 5‐37.3‐4
S.C. Code Ann. § 38‐93‐10 et seq.
S.C. Code Ann. § 44‐37‐30
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61‐80
C

C

As authorized or required by law

C

C, R
R
C

C, R

C
R

C

Court order
Criminal DNA banking

C

For abuse or neglect reporting

R
R

For criminal databases

A

A

For determination of bona fide
occupational qualifications
For due diligence in sale of
business
For genealogy of deceased

R

C, R

C, R

C
A
C, R
C, R

R

C

C

C

For health care operations or
other business operations
For law enforcement
For marketing

A A
C C, R
C
C

C
C

C

C

C, R C

For newborn screening
For paternity determinations

C

R

C

R

For payment

C

For public health purposes

C

C
C

C

For peer review

For purposes of providing
disability accommodations

C

R
C

R

C

C

C, R
C, R C
C
C
C

C
C

C

C

C
C
C

C

For research
For treatment

A

A

A

A

A

A

For worker safety (e.g., monitor
toxic exposures)
For workers’ compensation
claims
If approved by an IRB or Ethics
committees

C

Legally Authorized
representative

C

C

C

Litigation where genetic
information is at issue

C

Medical providers
Person tested

C

C

C

C

C

To blood relatives of decedent
for medical purposes

C
C

C

C

C

To identify deceased individuals
To monitor legal compliance or
eligibility

C

When person tested brings a
lawsuit or other complain
With consent
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